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ABSTRACT 
 
HUME ON THICK AND THIN CAUSATION 
 
 
 
Alexander Paul Bozzo, B.A., M.A. 
 
Marquette University, 2018 
 
 
 
Hume is known for his claim that our idea of causation 
is nothing beyond constant conjunction, and that our idea 
of necessary connection is nothing beyond a felt 
determination of the mind. In short, Hume endorses a “thin” 
conception of causation and necessary connection. In recent 
years, however, a sizeable number of philosophers have come 
to view Hume as someone who believes in the existence of 
thick causal connections — that is, causal connections that 
allow one to infer a priori the effect from the cause, and 
vice versa. Hume doesn’t wish to deny such connections, 
said philosopher’s claim, he only seeks to demonstrate that 
we can’t know anything about the nature of the thick causal 
connections that make up the natural world.  
In this dissertation, I defend the old or traditional 
interpretation of Hume on causation. I draw attention to 
the important but neglected role of clear and distinct 
perception in Hume’s thought, arguing that for Hume our 
impressions are clear and distinct perceptions, whereas our 
ideas are faint and obscure. Accordingly, Hume’s copy 
principle — the thesis that our ideas are copies of our 
impressions — is Hume’s way of rendering our naturally 
obscure and confused ideas distinct. One need only discern 
the impression from which said ideas are copied. In this 
way, I show that Hume’s opinion concerning our idea of 
thick causation is that it’s an obscure and confused idea, 
and that the only clear and distinct idea we can have of 
causation is thin causation. Furthermore, since meaning for 
Hume is a matter of a word’s being associated with an idea, 
Hume thinks that an expression such as “thick causation” is 
meaningless or confused. In one sense, then, Hume is a 
positivist, and as such doesn’t believe in thick causal 
connections.  
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Chapter One 
The Problem 
Hume’s Principles of Human Nature 
 Hume divides all the perceptions of the mind into two 
distinct kinds: impressions and ideas. He characterizes the 
difference between these two as follows: 
 
Those perceptions, which enter with most force and 
violence, we may name impressions; and under this name 
I comprehend all our sensations, passions and emotions, 
as they make their first appearance in the soul. By 
ideas I mean the faint images of these in thinking and 
reasoning. (T 1.1.1.1)1  
 
Impressions, therefore, are our forceful and violent 
perceptions, and as examples Hume mentions our sensations, 
passions, and emotions. Ideas, on the other hand, are our 
faint and weak perceptions. When we think or reason, says 
Hume, we think and reason with ideas. 
Hume doesn’t regard this as a novel distinction, and 
he doesn’t anticipate much resistance to it. The 
distinction between impressions and ideas, as he soon puts 
                                                        
1 The “T” abbreviates A Treatise of Human Nature, and the numbers indicate the book, part, section, and 
paragraph of the Treatise, respectively. Unless noted otherwise, the italics are in the original.  
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it, is simply the difference between feeling and thinking 
(ibid.). 
Hume draws a further distinction within the class of 
impressions. This is the distinction between impressions of 
sensation and impressions of reflection. Impressions of 
sensation include visual, tactile, auditory, gustatory, and 
olfactory perceptions, as well as perceptions of pleasure 
and pain. Impressions of reflection, on the other hand, 
include our emotions and passions, such as love or hatred. 
Hume’s interested in these distinctions because he 
conceives of himself as embarking on a new science, what he 
calls the “science of MAN” (T Intro. 4).2 The aim of this 
science is to discern (as far as we’re able) the 
fundamental constituents of the human mind, and the 
fundamental principles that govern its operation. Only in 
this way, claims Hume, can we make any progress in the 
other sciences. Thus, for Hume, impressions and ideas 
constitute the fundamental constituents of the human mind. 
The first principle in Hume’s science of human nature 
concerns the manner in which impressions and ideas are 
related. It claims that ideas are ultimately caused by and 
resemble impressions. More specifically, it reads: 
                                                        
2 “Intro” abbreviates Hume’s Introduction to the Treatise, and the numbers indicate the paragraphs. 
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Copy Principle 
“[A]ll our simple ideas in their first appearance are 
deriv’d from simple impressions, which are 
correspondent to them, and which they exactly 
represent.” (T 1.1.1.7) 
 
Don Garrett (1997: 21) helpfully divides the copy 
principle into two main components: the Causal Thesis and 
the Resemblance Thesis. The Causal Thesis states that all 
simple ideas are initially derived from simple impressions, 
whereas the Resemblance Thesis claims that all simple ideas 
exactly resemble their corresponding simple impressions.3 
Put differently, ideas are copies of impressions. 
Accordingly, Hume believes that the mind first 
receives mental content from impressions of sensation, 
which are then copied and retained as ideas in the memory, 
and are such that they can be entertained and rearranged by 
the imagination. These three faculties — sensation, memory, 
and the imagination — constitute the three fundamental 
faculties of the understanding for Hume. The faculty of 
sensation works with impressions, whereas the memory and 
                                                        
3 I shall explain Hume’s reasons for limiting the principle to simple perceptions below. In addition, while 
not all representation is a matter of resemblance, Hume intends only the relation of resemblance when 
stating his copy principle. 
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the imagination work with ideas. Hume helpfully illustrates 
this process as follows: 
 
An impression first strikes upon the senses, and makes 
us perceive heat or cold, thirst or hunger, pleasure 
or pain of some kind or other. Of this impression 
there is a copy taken by the mind, which remains after 
the impression ceases; and this we call an idea. This 
idea of pleasure or pain, when it returns upon the 
soul, produces the new impressions of desire and 
aversion, hope and fear, which may properly be call’d 
impressions of reflection because deriv’d from it. 
These again are copy’d by the memory and imagination, 
and become ideas; which perhaps in their turn give 
rise to other impressions and ideas. (T 1.1.2.1)  
 
Hume intentionally restricts the copy principle to our 
simple perceptions. In order to understand Hume’s reasons 
for limiting the principle in this way, we must first grasp 
the distinction between simple and complex perceptions. 
Simple perceptions — whether they be impressions or 
ideas — “admit of no distinction nor separation,” whereas 
complex perceptions can be “distinguish’d into parts” (T 
1.1.1.2). Hume’s example is the perception of an apple. 
One’s perception of an apple — insofar as it’s conceived as 
having a certain color, taste, and smell — is a complex 
perception, and it’s complex because it has parts (its 
color, taste, and smell) that can be distinguished and 
separated from one another. The parts themselves, however, 
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constitute simple perceptions for Hume, because they don’t 
contain parts that can be distinguished or separated from 
one another.  
As it pertains to the copy principle, Hume asserts 
that the Causal Thesis and the Resemblance Thesis each hold 
only with respect to simple perceptions. He does so for the 
following reason: 
 
New Jerusalem Passage 
I observe, that many of our complex ideas never had 
impressions, that corresponded to them, and that many 
of our complex impressions never are exactly copy’d in 
ideas. I can imagine to myself such a city as the New 
Jerusalem, whose pavement is gold and walls are rubies, 
tho’ I never saw any such. I have seen Paris; but 
shall I affirm I can form such an idea of that city, 
as will perfectly represent all its streets and houses 
in their real and just proportions? (T 1.1.1.4) 
 
Hume claims here that it’s false that all ideas are exact 
copies of impressions. Furthermore, he claims that it’s 
false that all impressions are exactly copied as ideas. We 
sometimes have complex ideas — such as Hume’s idea of the 
New Jerusalem — that never had any corresponding complex 
impression. Hume has never seen any such city. Similarly, 
while Hume has seen Paris, his idea of Paris doesn’t 
exactly resemble his former impression; that is, his idea 
doesn’t perfectly resemble what he saw on that occasion. 
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Thus Hume concludes that our complex ideas aren’t always 
perfectly correspondent to complex impressions. 
 While Hume admits that complex ideas aren’t always 
perfectly correspondent to complex impressions, he does 
believe that all simple ideas are perfectly correspondent. 
We never have a simple idea that isn’t caused by, and that 
doesn’t perfectly resemble, some simple impression;4 and we 
never have a simple impression that isn’t exactly copied by 
some simple idea. This is Hume’s reason for restricting the 
copy principle to our simple perceptions.  
The simple/complex distinction is also relevant to two 
other related principles in Hume’s science of human nature. 
These principles are the following: 
 
Separability Principle 
“[W]hatever objects are different are distinguishable, 
and… whatever objects are distinguishable are 
separable by the thought and imagination.” (T 1.1.7.3) 
 
Inverse Separability Principle 
“[W]hatever objects are separable are also 
distinguishable, and… whatever objects are 
distinguishable are also different.” (ibid.) 
 
                                                        
4 This isn’t strictly speaking correct, however, for Hume does admit the case of the missing shade of blue 
(T 1.1.1.10). But, like Hume, I ignore this complication. 
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As an illustration of these principles, consider once more 
Hume’s example of the perceived apple. Hume claims that the 
color, taste, and smell of the apple can all be 
distinguished from one another — that is, you can in some 
unspecified sense “tell them apart.” And thus, by the 
inverse separability principle, each of these constitutes a 
different quality of the apple. 
In addition, since the color, taste, and smell of the 
apple can all be distinguished from one another, as was 
just indicated, they are — by the separability principle — 
each capable of being perceived separately from one another. 
That is to say, one can conceive of the taste of the apple, 
for example, without also conceiving of its color or smell. 
 Both principles do important work for Hume. Hume’s 
separability principle plays a significant role in his 
discussion of causation, and his inverse separability 
principle plays an important role in his rejection of 
abstract ideas. It’s worth considering this latter 
rejection now, for understanding Hume’s dismissal of 
abstract ideas is helpful in understanding his overall 
theory of meaning, an aspect of Hume’s thought that’s 
relevant to the aims of this dissertation. 
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 Hume’s Meaning-Empiricism 
 For Hume, as for his philosophical predecessors, the 
meaning of a word is its associated idea. Thus the meaning 
of a word “T,” for instance, as uttered by P, is the idea K 
associated with “T” in P’s mind. Accordingly, words that 
lack an associated idea are deemed “meaningless.” This was 
Locke’s view, and Hume assumes it without question.5 Since 
ideas for Hume are the product of experience (as they were 
for Locke), this view is known as meaning-empiricism. 
There are some details in the vicinity, however, that 
require elucidation. Suppose, for instance, that I utter 
the proper name “Trump.” Hume claims that this word has the 
meaning that it does solely because I have a specific idea 
in my mind — in this case, an idea of Donald Trump6 — that I 
associate with the word “Trump.” Moreover, the idea 
associated with a word doesn’t merely account for the 
word’s meaning; it’s also the word’s vehicle of reference. 
My uttering “Trump” is about Donald Trump because my idea 
resembles Donald Trump, in much the same way that a 
photograph of a landscape resembles the landscape itself. 
                                                        
5 See An Essay concerning Human Understanding, III.ii.2, for Locke’s statement of this view. 
6 For reasons that will emerge, an idea of an orange-haired monkey would do just as well. 
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 When we turn to general terms, however — that is, to 
terms that refer to more than one individual — matters 
become a bit more complicated.7 The word “man,” for instance, 
refers to many different individuals. And since reference, 
on meaning-empiricism, is achieved via the associated 
idea’s resembling the thing or things referred to, the 
associated idea of the general term “man” must in some way 
resemble all individual men. Indeed, Locke had introduced 
abstract ideas to serve this express purpose: 
 
[T]he Mind makes the particular Ideas, received from 
particular Objects, to become general; which is done 
by considering them as they are in the Mind such 
Appearances, separate from all other Existences, and 
the circumstances of real Existence, as Time, Place, 
or any other concomitant Ideas. This is called 
ABSTRACTION, whereby Ideas taken from particular 
Beings, become general Representatives of all of the 
same kind; and their Names general Names, applicable 
to whatever exists conformable to such abstract Ideas.8 
 
Hume, however, doesn’t endorse Locke’s theory about 
general terms. Instead, he follows Berkeley in denying the 
very existence of abstract ideas.9 Hume denies the existence 
                                                        
7 There are also complications relevant to proper names that I have skipped over. For example, Hume 
frequently uses “Adam” as a means of referring to the Adam of the Bible, but certainly Hume has never 
seen Adam, and so has no idea of Adam. Hume has a way of addressing such cases, but discussion of his 
account would take us far afield. Cf. T 1.3.4.2. 
8 Locke, An Essay concerning Human Understanding, II.xi.9. 
9 For Berkeley’s view, see his Introduction to A Treatise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge. 
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of abstract ideas because he thinks they present us with 
the following dilemma: 
 
[H]ere is a plain dilemma, that decides concerning the 
nature of those abstract ideas, which have afforded so 
much speculation to philosophers. The abstract idea of 
a man represents men of all sizes and all qualities, 
which it is concluded it cannot do, but either by 
representing at once all possible sizes and all 
possible qualities, or by representing no particular 
one at all. (T 1.1.7.2)  
 
In other words, on a Lockean view about general terms, Hume 
claims that the abstract idea associated with the word “man” 
refers to all men either because (i) it at once represents 
and resembles all the individual sizes and qualities had by 
men, or (ii) it represents all of the individual sizes and 
qualities had by men in some indeterminate fashion: that is 
to say, it doesn’t resemble any particular man any more 
than any other. The problem, says Hume, is that neither (i) 
nor (ii) is true. 
Hume denies the first horn — the claim that abstract 
ideas represent all the individual sizes and qualities had 
by men — because this implies an “infinite capacity in the 
mind” (ibid.). It’s not entirely clear what Hume means by 
this, but the idea seems to be that our mental faculties 
simply aren’t up to the psychological task of representing 
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all the individual sizes and qualities had by men. Hume 
believes that most proponents of abstract ideas agree with 
him on this matter, and so he dispenses with this horn of 
the dilemma rather quickly. 
On the other hand, as characterized by the second horn 
of the dilemma, abstract ideas refer to all men by 
“representing no particular [man] at all” (ibid.). So as to 
best understand Hume’s rebuttal, let’s suppose that “S” 
refers to the idea of a man who is represented as six-feet 
tall, and that “F” refers to the idea of a man who is 
represented as five-feet tall. Recall that ideas are copies 
of impressions for Hume, and so S and F will resemble 
sensory images of a six and a five-foot tall man, 
respectively. For ease of exposition, let’s also suppose 
that S and F are the only ideas of men that one has, and 
that any other quality factoring into S and F (for example, 
hair color) is precisely delineated. Hume labels an idea 
that’s precisely delineated in this fashion a determinate 
idea (T 1.1.7.5).  
 Thus, on the present view, the abstract idea of man, 
in “representing no particular [man] at all” (T 1.1.7.2), 
can no more represent S than it can represent F. That is to 
say, it can no more represent a six-foot tall man than it 
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can represent a five-foot tall man. And since 
representation is a matter of resemblance for Hume, the 
abstract idea of man can no more resemble a six-foot tall 
man than it can resemble a five-foot tall man. Accordingly, 
this account of abstract ideas requires that abstract ideas 
be indeterminate.  
Herein lies Hume’s criticism of abstract ideas. If 
abstract ideas are indeterminate, then abstract ideas imply 
a separation. On the Lockean view, one’s abstract idea of 
man is constructed by taking any particular quality had by 
S and F (for example, the quality of being six-feet tall 
and the quality of being five-feet tall) and separating 
these from what’s common to both S and F. As Locke’s 
comments above indicate, the abstract idea is what results 
after we’ve abstracted out all such uncommon qualities. 
The problem, according to Hume, is that the required 
separation is impossible. Hume claims that we can’t 
distinguish the particular qualities of a thing from the 
thing itself — that is, we can’t distinguish a thing’s 
particular qualities from its “common qualities.” For 
example, Hume writes that “the precise length of a line is 
not different nor distinguishable from the line itself” (T 
1.1.7.3). But, if Hume’s inverse separability principle is 
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correct, then what can be separated can be distinguished, 
and, since abstraction implies a separation, we ought to be 
able to distinguish the particular qualities of a line from 
the line itself, or the particular qualities of some man 
from the man himself. But Hume claims that we can’t. And so 
Hume concludes that “the general idea of a line, 
notwithstanding all our abstractions and refinements, has 
in its appearance in the mind a precise degree of quantity 
and quality” (ibid.). In other words, Hume concludes that 
all of our ideas are determinate, and thus horn (ii) cannot 
save Locke’s account of abstract ideas.  
This establishes an important constraint on any 
acceptable theory of meaning for Hume: if, as Hume claims, 
meaning is supplied by an idea, then even general terms 
must utilize a determinate idea in order to be meaningful. 
But how can a general term refer generally via a 
determinate idea, when reference is solely a matter of 
resemblance? Hume need not labor long here, however, for he 
claims that the discovery has already been made. The 
discovery has been made, he claims, by Berkeley, and Hume 
“look[s] upon this to be one of the greatest and most 
valuable discoveries that has been made of late years in 
the Republic of Letters” (T 1.1.7.1). 
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Accordingly, we may put Hume’s accepted theory of 
meaning as follows. First, Hume claims that we notice many 
different kinds of resemblance among our ideas. For 
instance, we see many lines of many different lengths, and, 
insofar as they’re all lines, we recognize a resemblance 
among them. Second, we form the custom or habit of labeling 
each of these ideas (despite their perceivable differences) 
with the word “line.” Thus I label a line of six inches 
with the word “line,” and a line of eight inches with the 
word “line,” and so on. To make matters more perspicuous, 
let’s call my idea of a line of six inches “K,” my idea of 
a line of eight inches “G,” and any other idea that I 
happen to call a line an instance of “H.” Garrett (1997: 
24) calls the set of all ideas labeled by a certain term 
its revival set, and so our revival set for the word “line” 
consists of K, G, and any instance of H. When I happen to 
utter the word “line,” one of the ideas in the word’s 
revival set — in all its determinacy — comes to mind. Thus 
K, or G, or one of H, is called to mind. But we still 
manage to refer generally because, when we utter this word, 
the custom as well as the idea, is called to mind. And so, 
while every idea that we’ve labeled “line” is “not really 
and in fact present to the mind” when I utter this word, 
every such idea is present to the mind “in power” (T 
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1.1.7.7).10 Consequently, Hume concludes that “all general 
ideas are nothing but particular ones, annex’d to a certain 
term, which gives them a more extensive signification, and 
makes them recall upon occasion other individuals, which 
are similar to them” (T 1.1.7.1).11 
In this way, Hume accounts for meaning without relying 
on a Lockean conception of abstract ideas. In the next 
section, however, I shall indicate how Hume’s meaning-
empiricism presents him with a problem. 
 
 A Nasty Problem 
 In the previous section, we saw that Hume identifies 
the meaning of a word with its associated idea. That is, 
for any term T, Hume claims that: 
 
1. “T”’s meaningful º “T” has an associated idea. 
 
Accordingly, if a word lacks an associated idea, then 
that word is meaningless.  
                                                        
10 Hume’s theory of meaning, therefore, incorporates elements of a “use” view of meaning. What one 
means by the word “line” is in part determined by which ideas one has labeled by that word, and what 
future ideas one is willing to label by that word. In short, it’s partly a matter of how one uses the word. 
11 Hereafter, “associated idea” is shorthand for “associated revival set.” 
 16 
In addition, Hume holds (via his copy principle) that 
ideas are copies of impressions. Thus: 
 
2. “T” has an associated idea only if “T”’s associated 
idea is copied from some impression. 
 
From (1) and (2), it follows that:  
 
3. “T”’s meaningful only if “T”’s associated idea is 
copied from some impression. 
 
Thus, to put matters in a way that Hume doesn’t, a word is 
meaningful only if it has an associated impression.   
 These considerations famously lead Hume to endorse the 
following well-known test for meaning:   
 
When we entertain, therefore, any suspicion that a 
philosophical term is employed without any meaning or 
idea (as is but too frequent), we need but enquire, 
from what impression is that supposed idea derived? 
(EHU 2.21)12 
 
                                                        
12 “EHU” abbreviates An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, and the numbers indicate the section 
and paragraph, respectively. 
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Hume claims, then, that philosophical terms often lack 
associated ideas; and that the way to discern whether a 
word lacks an associated idea is to discern whether or not 
it has an associated impression. If the word lacks an 
associated impression, then the word is meaningless.13 
As an important example, consider Hume’s discussion of 
substance. Traditionally understood, a substance is that in 
which a thing’s properties inhere. Thus Locke, for instance, 
describes the traditional idea of substance when he writes: 
 
[W]hen we talk or think of any particular sort of 
corporeal Substances, as Horse, Stone, etc. though the 
Idea, we have of either of them, be but the 
Complication, or Collection of those several simple 
Ideas of sensible Qualities, which we use to find 
united in the thing called Horse or Stone, yet because 
we cannot conceive, how they should subsist alone, nor 
one in another, we suppose them existing in, and 
supported by some common subject; which Support we 
denote by the name Substance.14 
 
Thus an apple is a substance for Locke just in case it is 
“some common subject” or “support” with various qualities — 
such as its color, taste, and smell — inhering or 
                                                        
13 I have reservations about this way of characterizing Hume’s method. I give voice to these reservations 
in Chapter Five. However, since my focus at present concerns the traditional account of Hume’s test for 
meaning, I needn’t detail such reservations here. 
14 An Essay concerning Human Understanding, II.xxiii.4. 
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subsisting in it. It’s this “support,” properly speaking, 
that constitutes the apple’s substance.  
Locke’s description in the passage quoted above 
concerns material substance, that is, substances in which 
material properties (such as having a certain shape or 
smell) inhere. In addition to material substance, however, 
Locke believes there are mental substances: 
 
The same happens concerning the Operations of the Mind, 
viz. Thinking, Reasoning, Fearing, etc. which we 
concluding not to subsist of themselves, nor 
apprehending how they can belong to Body, or be 
produced by it, we are apt to think these the Actions 
of some other Substance, which we call Spirit.15 
 
Thus mental substance for Locke is any substance in which 
mental properties (such as thinking and reasoning) inhere. 
In contrast, Hume applies his test for meaning to the 
notion of substance and finds it wanting. He writes:   
 
I would fain ask those philosophers, who found so much 
of their reasonings on the distinction of substance 
and accident… whether the idea of substance be derived 
from the impressions of sensation or reflection? If it 
be conveyed to us by our senses, I ask, which of them, 
and after what manner? If it be perceived by the eyes, 
it must be a colour; if by the ears, a sound; if by 
                                                        
15 Ibid., II.xxiii.5. 
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the palate, a taste; and so of the other senses. But I 
believe none will assert, that substance is either a 
colour, or sound, or a taste. (T 1.1.6.1)  
 
 
Hume claims, therefore, that substance isn’t the sort of 
thing that can be perceived by the senses, and thus Hume 
concludes that our idea of substance isn’t derived from an 
impression of sensation. 
Furthermore, Hume claims that our idea of substance 
isn’t derived from an impression of reflection: 
 
The idea of substance must, therefore, be derived from 
an impression of reflection, if it really exist. But 
the impressions of reflection resolve themselves into 
our passions and emotions; none of which can possibly 
represent a substance. (ibid.) 
 
Consequently, our idea of substance isn’t derived from 
an impression of sensation or an impression of reflection. 
Thus, given Hume’s copy principle, Hume concludes that:   
 
We have… no idea of substance, distinct from that of a 
collection of particular qualities, nor have we any 
other meaning when we either talk or reason concerning 
it. (ibid.) 
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For ease of exposition, let’s call a bundle conception 
of substance “substanceb,” and the traditional conception of 
substance “substancet.” In the above passage, Hume seemingly 
claims that we lack an idea of substancet, and thus claims 
that all that we can mean by the term is substanceb. 
The standard reading of Hume, therefore, is that Hume 
departs from Locke insofar as Hume denies our having any 
idea of substancet at all. According to the standard reading, 
Hume’s account of substance is deflationary: to assert that 
an apple is a substance, for example, is merely to say that 
it’s a bundle of various qualities — such as its color, 
taste, and smell — and nothing more.16 Hence, an idea of a 
“support” in which such qualities are said to inhere isn’t 
really any idea at all. Consequently, Hume would regard a 
word like “substancet” as meaningless. 
Georges Dicker provides a nice articulation of this 
reading of Hume. Dicker writes that: 
 
When Hume’s test for meaning is applied to the notion 
of material substance, it yields the result that the 
notion is meaningless and that a thing can be only a 
bundle of properties. Likewise, when the test is 
applied to the notion of a mental substance, it yields 
the result that this notion is meaningless and that a 
mind can be only a bundle of conscious states. 
                                                        
16 A collection of qualities constitutes a “bundle” for Hume just in case these qualities are frequently 
found together, and are taken to be linked by a causal relation (T 1.4.6.4). 
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Meaning-empiricism leaves no room at all for the 
notion of substance as distinct from its properties, 
whether it be a material substance or a mind. (1998: 
21)17 
 
Alexander Rosenberg also endorses this reading of Hume. 
Rosenberg writes that: 
 
According to Hume’s theory, since a term names an idea, 
the meaning of a term is ultimately given by a set of 
impressions that cause the idea that it names, and 
terms without such a pedigree are meaningless noises. 
In effect this theory of meaning constitutes a 
criterion of cognitive significance indistinguishable 
from one of the positivists’ earliest attempts to 
frame a principle of verifiability. (1993: 66) 
 
As Rosenberg intimates, Hume’s often seen as a kind of 
proto-positivist. The logical positivists of the twentieth 
century held that a proposition is cognitively meaningful — 
that is, has a truth-value — just in case it’s analytic or 
empirically verifiable.18 Thus it’s been thought that Hume’s 
a positivist insofar as Hume claims that sentences are 
meaningful only if the ideas contained in them are copied 
from impressions, which in turn are supplied by experience. 
                                                        
17 In the preface to his book, Dicker includes the meaninglessness of “substance” among a list of 
conclusions for which Hume is rightly famous. For instance, Dicker writes that “Hume is famous… for 
arguing that meaningful words must have an empirical reference, so that ‘substance underlying all of a 
thing’s perceivable qualities’ and ‘immaterial soul’ lack meaning” (1998: ix). 
18 For a classic expression of this view, see A. J. Ayer (1952). 
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In order for a cognitively meaningless sentence to count as 
meaningful, the logical positivists claimed that it must be 
relegated to the realm of emotive meaning. Their 
verifiability criterion wasn’t meant to serve as a 
criterion of linguistic meaning generally, but merely as a 
criterion of assertoric meaning. In that case, the analogy 
between logical positivism and Hume can only go so far, for 
Hume’s meaning-empiricism extends to linguistic meaning 
generally. 
This, then, is the standard reading of Hume’s test for 
meaning. But there’s a problem for this interpretation of 
Hume. Simply stated, the problem is that Hume provides an 
explanation as to why philosophers believe in the existence 
of substancet. But explaining why philosophers believe in 
the existence of substancet seems to presuppose that we have 
some idea of substancet. In order to see how this 
constitutes a problem for Hume, I turn to Hume’s 
explanation of the philosopher’s belief in the existence of 
substancet. 
Hume begins by reiterating that “our ideas of bodies 
are nothing but collections form’d by the mind of the ideas 
of the several distinct sensible qualities” (T 1.4.3.2). In 
this passage, Hume’s claiming that our idea of substance is 
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nothing more than an idea of substanceb. Nonetheless, Hume 
claims that we commonly regard this complex idea “as ONE 
thing, and as continuing the SAME under very considerable 
alterations” (ibid.). That is, in Hume’s terminology, we 
attribute a “simplicity” and an “identity” to our ideas of 
bodies, despite the fact that they’re actually composed of 
several distinct ideas.  
Hume next explains why we attribute a simplicity and 
an identity to this collection of ideas. Since Hume’s 
explanation of our attribution of identity mirrors his 
explanation of our attribution of simplicity, I’ll focus 
exclusively on the latter.  
First, Hume claims that the act of the imagination 
when considering a simple and indivisible object,19 feels 
similar to the act of the imagination when it considers a 
complex idea “whose co-existent parts are connected 
together by a strong relation” (T 1.4.3.5). Since each of 
these distinct acts of the mind feel similar, Hume claims 
that we mistake a complex object for a simple one. 
 
Hence the colour, taste, figure, solidity, and other 
qualities, combin’d in a peach or melon, are conceiv’d 
to form one thing; and that on account of their close 
                                                        
19 That is, the act of the imagination when considering a simple impression or idea. 
 24 
relation, which makes them affect the thought in the 
same manner, as if perfectly uncompounded. (ibid.) 
 
Thus Hume claims that the mind’s attribution of simplicity 
to a complex object is explained in part by similar acts of 
the imagination. 
Nonetheless, the mind isn’t totally misled. For when 
the mind “views the object in another light” (ibid.), it 
recognizes that each of the object’s qualities are 
separable: that is, the mind realizes that the idea is a 
complex idea, and that it doesn’t constitute a simple thing. 
This realization 
 
obliges the imagination to feign an unknown something, 
or original substance or matter, as a principle of 
union or cohesion among these qualities, and as what 
may give the compound object a title to be call’d one 
thing, notwithstanding its diversity and composition. 
(ibid.) 
 
Thus Hume’s explanation of how we come to have an idea 
of substancet involves the following: (i) similar acts of 
the imagination lead the mind to attribute a simplicity to 
a complex object, (ii) the mind is uneasy about this 
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attribution, and so (iii) the mind “feigns” an unknown 
something or support of these qualities.20 
 The problem, then, is that Hume claims that we have no 
idea of substancet — at most, we have an idea of substanceb — 
and yet he provides an explanation as to why philosophers 
believe in the existence of substancet.  
In the words of Louis Loeb, these concessions create a 
“nasty problem” for Hume: 
 
Hume declares “substratum” meaningless. [But Hume 
then] sets out to explain why the ancient philosophers 
believe in the existence of material substrata. These 
sections work at cross purposes. How can Hume 
consistently set out to explain the psychological 
causes of a belief that is without meaning or content 
in the first place? (2001: 147) 
 
Robert Fogelin echoes Loeb’s concern. He asks, “What is the 
content of the false philosopher’s belief in substance? 
Hume’s answer seems to be that it is contentless, but then 
what does the belief amount to?” (1985: 11-12). 
This problem is exacerbated by the fact that Hume acts 
in precisely the same way with respect to a host of other 
traditional metaphysical terms. For instance, Hume makes 
                                                        
20 A “fiction” for Hume is a complex idea that’s arranged by the imagination, and is such that this complex 
idea was never copied from any complex impression. For instance, Hume would count his idea of the New 
Jerusalem as a fiction. 
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similar claims about the religious belief in invisible 
intelligent power, the self, external bodies, the existence 
of a vacuum, the idea of changeless time, and the idea of a 
cause. In light of this fact, Loeb identifies the following 
variant on the main problem: 
 
All contentless concepts are the same, just as there 
is only one null set. Yet Hume provides different 
psychological explanations of the beliefs in the 
existence of material substrata, souls, external 
existence and necessary connection. The different 
explanations could be appropriate only if the beliefs 
somehow differ in content, but they do not differ in 
content if the key concepts are meaningless. (2001: 
148) 
 
On one hand, then, Hume makes clear claims of 
meaninglessness, claims about key metaphysical concepts 
like substance, self, body, and cause. On the other hand, 
Hume describes and explains the origin of belief in the 
existence of these traditional metaphysical concepts. But, 
as Loeb notes, these claims work at cross purposes.  
We can articulate the nasty problem more rigorously as 
follows. First, Hume often claims of some term “T” that 
 
4. “T”’s a meaningless expression. 
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In addition, 
 
5. Hume gives an explanation as to why we believe in the 
existence of entities denoted by “T”. 
 
But, finally, 
 
6. Explanations as to why we believe in the existence of 
entities denoted by “T” presuppose that T’s 
meaningful. 
 
The problem is that (4)-(6) are inconsistent.  
Moreover, (4)-(6) engender a contradiction at the level 
of ideas. To see this, recall Hume’s meaning-empiricism:  
 
1. “T”’s meaningful º “T” has an associated idea. 
 
(1) and (4) entail: 
 
7. “T” lacks an associated idea. 
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But (1), (5), and (6) entail: 
 
8. “T” has an associated idea.  
 
Hume’s saddled, then, with the following contradiction: 
 
9. “T” has and doesn’t have an associated idea. 
 
It appears, therefore, that Hume’s committed to a 
contradiction. In the case of substance, Hume seems to be 
committed to both our having and our lacking an idea of 
substancet. Moreover, the purported contradiction is a 
serious one, as it’s engendered by aspects fundamental to 
Hume’s entire project. Hume seems motivated to explain away 
various traditional metaphysical concepts, despite the fact 
that he claims that we have no idea of them.  
In the chapters that follow, I argue that Hume has the 
resources to escape the contradiction. In particular, I aim 
to show that Hume can avoid the nasty problem relative to 
our idea of causation. While my conclusions can be extended 
to other key metaphysical terms, my primary focus is on our 
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idea of causation. Accordingly, in the next section, I 
shall indicate how the nasty problem is relevant to Hume’s 
discussion of causation. 
 
 Thick and Thin Causation 
 In the previous section, we saw that Hume faces a 
nasty problem relevant to his discussion of substance. In 
this section, I indicate how Hume faces a similar problem 
relevant to his discussion of causation. 
 Hume’s views on causation are best appreciated when 
approached within their historical context. Edward Craig 
(1987), for instance, has argued that philosophy during 
Hume’s time was strongly in the grip of what he calls the 
“Image of God doctrine” (13-17). As one might expect, this 
is the view that human beings are made in the image of God.  
 Craig claims that the Image of God doctrine engendered 
various metaphysical and epistemological implications. For 
instance, proponents of the Image of God doctrine regarded 
God’s knowledge as the best and most perfect form of 
knowledge, and thus regarded it as the most certain. God’s 
knowledge was conceived in terms of his having a priori 
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knowledge, and thus a priori knowledge came to be seen as 
the most divine and perfect form of knowledge.21  
In addition, since God was regarded as the creator of 
the natural world, advocates for this view held that nature 
operates in a way analogous to a priori inference. This is 
the metaphysical implication of the image of God doctrine. 
Thus Helen Beebee, for instance, describes the metaphysical 
implication of the Image of God doctrine as follows: 
 
The… claim is that nature itself operates in a way 
that is analogous to a priori reasoning. The way 
nature operates is, of course, via causation: the 
processes we see unfolding around us are causal 
processes, with earlier stages linked to later ones by 
causal relations. The metaphysical upshot of the Image 
of God doctrine, as far as causation is concerned, is 
thus the view that causal relations are, as it were, 
the worldly correlates of a priori inference: causes 
necessitate their effects, or guarantee that those 
effects occur, in a way that is somehow analogous to, 
or perhaps even identical with, the way that premises 
of an argument necessitate or guarantee the truth of 
their conclusions. (2006: 3) 
 
 Accordingly, proponents of the Image of God doctrine 
held that causes necessitate their effects, such that if 
one “could somehow penetrate into the essence of a cause, 
[one] would see that the effect could not fail to come 
                                                        
21 It’s precisely for this reason that proponents of the Image of God doctrine consider mathematics and 
logic (and the certainty that each provides) as most worthy of the label “knowledge.” For more on this, 
see my discussion in Chapter Two on the distinction between knowledge and probability. 
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about” (ibid.).22 Galen Strawson (2014: 109) has termed this 
feature of the causal relation its “AP property,” for it’s 
this feature that warrants an a priori inference from cause 
to effect, and vice versa. Simon Blackburn, in turn, refers 
to causal connections that possess the AP property “thick” 
causal connections (1990: 237). Thus a thick causal 
connection is one that furnishes an a priori inference from 
the cause to the effect, and vice versa. 
As evidence for this view, consider Descartes’s view 
that 
 
it is manifest by the natural light that there must be 
at least as much reality in the efficient and total 
cause as in the effect of that cause. For where, I ask, 
could the effect gets its reality from, if not from 
the cause? And how could the cause give it to the 
effect unless it possessed it? (Third Meditation: CSM 
II 28: AT VII 40)23 
 
A. O. Lovejoy explains: 
 
That “there cannot be more in the effect than there is 
in the cause” is one of the propositions that men have 
                                                        
22 As is well known, Kant later utilizes the metaphor of containment in his Critique of Pure Reason to 
characterize the notion of analyticity (A6-7/B11).  
23 “CSM” abbreviates the edition of Descartes’s works by John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald 
Murdoch, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, Vols. I and II. The roman numerals indicate the volume, 
and the arabic numerals indicate the page. In turn, “AT” denotes the twelve-volume Adam and Tannery 
revised edition, Oeuvres de Descartes. 
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been readiest to accept as axiomatic; a cause, it has 
been supposed, does not “account” for its effect, 
unless the effect is a thing which the eye of reason 
could somehow discern in the cause, upon a 
sufficiently thorough analysis. (1962: 286) 
 
And Spinoza says that he has 
 
shown quite clearly (Pr. 16) that from God’s supreme 
power or infinite nature an infinity of things in 
infinite ways — that is, everything — have necessarily 
flowed or are always following from that same 
necessity, just as from the nature of a triangle it 
follows from eternity to eternity that its three 
angles are equal to two right angles.24 
 
Hence it follows that God is the efficient cause of 
all things that can come within the scope of infinite 
intellect.25 
 
Accordingly, philosophers within the Image of God tradition 
held that causation was thick.  
 Since human beings are made in God’s image, proponents 
of the Image of God doctrine also suggested an important 
epistemological implication. They held that since human 
beings are made in God’s image, our cognitive capacities 
must mirror or approximate the cognitive capacities of God. 
Hence, Craig (1987: 18-27) claims that the epistemological 
                                                        
24 Ethics 1p17s. 
25 Ethics 1p16c1. The preceding three quotations are taken from Dicker (1993: Ch. 3). 
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implication of the Image of God doctrine inspired the 
“Insight Ideal,” namely the view that 
 
Human beings are, in principle, capable of attaining a 
priori knowledge about the nature and structure of the 
natural world. 
 
 In other words, the Image of God doctrine suggests 
that the causal relation is thick, and the Insight Ideal 
says that humans can in principle discern this relation. 
As we shall see, however, the view that causal 
connections are thick is diametrically opposed to Hume’s 
own account of causation. Hume claims, for instance, that 
our idea of causation is a complex idea consisting of at 
least three elements:  
  
A. The cause is spatiotemporally contiguous with the 
effect, 
B. the effect succeeds the cause in time, and 
C. events like the cause are constantly conjoined with 
events like the effect.  
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By way of an example, consider bringing a pot of water 
to a boil. In this case, the flame’s heating the water to a 
temperature of 212°F at 1 atm causes the water to boil. 
Heating the water causes it to boil, says Hume, because 
heating the water at that temperature and in those 
conditions occurs before and adjacent to the effect; and, 
whenever water is heated to that temperature and in those 
conditions, it boils. 
This view is called the regularity theory of causation, 
and it derives its name from the third condition mentioned 
above: namely, that like causes are constantly conjoined 
with like effects. Hume’s most explicit endorsement of this 
view is presented in his first definition of a cause. In 
this regard, Hume writes: 
 
First Definition of a Cause 
We define a cause to be, An object precedent and 
contiguous to another, and where all the objects 
resembling the former are plac’d in a like relation of 
priority and contiguity to those objects, that 
resemble the latter. (T 1.3.14.35) 
 
Hume’s first definition of a cause omits the condition 
of a necessary connection between the cause and its effect. 
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Thus if we consider Hume’s first definition in isolation, 
we discover that causes don’t necessitate their effects.  
Hume insists, however, that even if the objects that 
constitute the cause and the effect aren’t necessarily 
connected, the concept of a necessary connection still 
factors into our idea of a cause (T 1.3.2.11). Accordingly, 
Hume addresses this issue with his second definition of a 
cause, which reads: 
 
Second Definition of a Cause 
We define a cause to be, An object precedent and 
contiguous to another, and so united with it in the 
imagination, that the idea of the one determines the 
mind to form the idea of the other, and the impression 
of the one to form a more lively idea of the other. (T 
1.3.14.35) 
 
Hume claims, therefore, that the necessary connection 
between a cause and its effect is solely a feature of our 
minds, and not objects. It’s an impression of reflection — 
a determination or disposition of the mind to believe that 
the effect will occur, given the cause. Consequently, our 
idea of necessary connection is copied from an impression 
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of reflection, and thus is an “idea of reflection,”26 to use 
a phrase of Harold Noonan’s (2007: 28).  
On Hume’s conception, then, there’s nothing intrinsic 
to the cause that necessitates its effect. It’s not the 
case that causal relations contain the AP property. It’s 
only after we’ve experienced a constant conjunction of 
causes and effects that we entertain the idea of necessary 
connection. To illustrate this, Hume provides the following 
example. Suppose that Adam, upon first being created, 
considers the causal relation between two billiard balls: 
 
It would have been necessary, therefore, for Adam (if 
he was not inspired) to have had experience of the 
effect, which followed upon the impulse of these two 
balls. He must have seen, in several instances, that 
when the one ball struck upon the other, the second 
always acquired motion. If he had seen a sufficient 
number of instances of this kind, whenever he saw the 
one ball moving towards the other, he would always 
conclude without hesitation, that the second would 
acquire motion. His understanding would anticipate his 
sight, and form a conclusion suitable to his past 
experience. (A 14)27 
 
Thus, Hume claims that Adam requires experience to make any 
non-arbitrary inference from the cause. Herein lies Hume’s 
repudiation of the Insight Ideal. He writes that: 
                                                        
26 An idea of reflection is an idea derived from an impression of reflection. 
27 The “A” abbreviates Hume’s An Abstract of a Book lately Published; Entitled, A Treatise of Human 
Nature, followed by the paragraph number. 
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Were a man, such as Adam, created in the full vigour 
of understanding, without experience, he would never 
be able to infer motion in the second ball from the 
motion and impulse of the first. It is not any thing 
that reason sees in the cause, which makes us infer 
the effect. Such an inference, were it possible, would 
amount to a demonstration, as being founded merely on 
the comparison of ideas. But no inference from cause 
to effect amounts to a demonstration. (A 11; cf. A 14 
and T 1.3.14.13) 
 
Adam can demonstrate the effect from the cause, apart 
from experience, only if Adam can perceive something about 
the cause that entails the effect. But, as we’ve seen, Hume 
claims that there’s “not any thing that reason sees in the 
cause” (ibid). Thus, as Beebee eloquently summarizes the 
point, for Hume “the fundamental source of our empirical 
beliefs is something more animal than divine, namely custom 
or habit” (2006: 5).28  
We’ve seen, then, that Hume endorses a thin rather 
than a thick conception of causation. He claims that our 
idea of causation includes the idea of a necessary 
connection, but that our idea of necessary connection is 
thin: it’s a determination of the mind that’s based on an 
experience of the constant conjunction of causes and 
                                                        
28 Note that Hume includes a chapter on animal reasoning in both the Treatise and the first Enquiry.  
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effects, and not anything that’s perceived to be the case 
in objects.  
In order to have an idea of thick causation, one needs 
to have an idea of thick necessary connection, a necessary 
connection of objects of the causation, a necessary 
connection between cause and effect. But Hume, as we’ve 
seen, denies we have any impression corresponding to this 
idea. And thus Hume concludes that we lack an idea of thick 
necessary connection. According to him,  
 
[W]e deceive ourselves, when we imagine we are possest 
of any idea of this kind, after the manner we commonly 
understand it. All ideas are deriv’d from, and 
represent impressions. We never have any impression, 
that contains any power or efficacy. We never 
therefore have any idea of power. (T 1.3.14.11) 
 
And: 
 
We wou’d not willingly stop before we are acquainted 
with that energy in the cause, by which it operates on 
its effect… And how must we be disappointed, when we 
learn, that this connection, tie, or energy lies 
merely in ourselves… Such a discovery not only cuts 
off all hopes of ever attaining satisfaction, but even 
prevents our very wishes; since it appears, that when 
we say we desire to know the ultimate and operating 
principle, as something, which resides in the external 
object, we either contradict ourselves, or talk 
without a meaning. (T 1.4.7.5) 
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 Such claims echo Hume’s earlier claim that “we have no 
idea of substance” (T 1.1.6.1), which generated the nasty 
problem above. Similarly, Hume claims that we “never… have 
any idea of power” (T 1.3.14.11). Given Hume’s meaning-
empiricism, then, it seems to follow that an expression 
like “thick causation” is meaningless. 
 The problem is that Hume frequently seems to refer to 
thick causal connections, or at least their conceptual 
blood relatives, powers and forces. For instance, he 
writes: 
 
[T]he powers and forces, by which the [course of 
nature] is governed, [are] wholly unknown to us. (EHU 
5.21) 
 
[W]e are ignorant of those powers and forces, on which 
[the] regular course and succession of objects totally 
depends. (EHU 5.22) 
 
[T]he scenes of the universe are continually shifting, 
and one object follows another in an uninterrupted 
succession; but the power or force, which actuates the 
whole machine, is entirely concealed from us, and 
never discovers itself in any of the sensible 
qualities of body. (EHU 7.8) 
 
Even if Hume’s speaking ironically in these passages, if 
his words are to have any meaning — if “the power or force, 
which actuates the whole machine” isn’t pure gibberish — 
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then these words must have associated ideas. Here, for 
instance, is how Ken Clatterbaugh (1999: 204) puts the 
point:  
 
In Hume’s own theory of knowledge, when we talk of 
ultimate principles, etc., we are literally speaking 
nonsense; we are using words without ideas associated 
with them… To take Hume’s talk about secret powers 
seriously, even to think that such sentences are 
meaningful, would mean that Hume would have to set 
aside the entire epistemological framework of his 
philosophy in the Treatise and the Enquiry. 
 
Asher Jiang makes a similar point: 
 
Hume frequently states that we are ignorant of genuine 
power. There is a well-known internal difficulty 
concerning this claim concerning ignorance. According 
to Hume, we do not have an impression-based idea of 
genuine power; on the other hand, every noun needs a 
corresponding idea to be meaningful. Is his claim 
concerning ignorance, which makes use of the noun 
“power,” meaningless in light of his own criterion of 
meaningfulness? (2015: 229) 
 
In addition, Hume’s entire focus in T 1.3.14 is to 
discern what our idea of necessary connection is, and to 
explain why philosophers falsely believe in the existence 
of thick necessary connections. For instance, Hume suggests 
that we project our idea of thin necessary connection on to 
objects. Famously, he writes: 
 41 
 
Thus, upon the whole, we may infer, that when we talk 
of any being, whether of a superior or inferior nature, 
as endowed with a power or force, proportioned to any 
effect; when we speak of a necessary connexion betwixt 
objects, and suppose that this connexion depends upon 
an efficacy or energy, with which any of these objects 
are endowed; in all these expression, so applied, we 
have really no distinct meaning, and make use only of 
common words, without any clear and determinate ideas. 
But as it is more probable that these expressions do 
here lose their true meaning by being wrong applied, 
than that they never have any meaning; it will be 
proper to bestow another consideration on this subject, 
to see if possibly we can discover the nature and 
origin of those ideas we annex to them. (T 1.3.14.14) 
 
As Hume intimates in this passage, he intends to give an 
explanation as to why we believe in the existence of thick 
causal connections.29 
Accordingly, Hume also seems to face the nasty problem 
in relation to his discussion of causation. Substituting 
“thick causation” for “T,” we can put the nasty problem 
relative to Hume’s discussion of causation as follows: 
 
10. “Thick causation” is a meaningless expression. 
 
                                                        
29 Janet Broughton has emphasized that Hume admits a thick idea of necessary connection — what she 
calls his “bare” idea of necessary connection (2007: 198) — which serves as Hume’s philosophical target.  
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11. Hume gives an explanation as to why we believe in 
the existence of thick causal connections. 
 
But, finally, 
 
12. Explanations as to why we believe in the 
existence of thick causal connections presuppose that 
“thick causation” is meaningful. 
 
When conjoined with Hume’s meaning-empiricism, (10)-
(12) entail a contradiction: we both have and don’t have an 
idea of thick causation. 
This is the nasty problem relevant to Hume’s views on 
causation. It’s a problem for all interpretations of Hume, 
but it has appeared most frequently as a challenge to one 
side in the so-called “New Hume debate.” In the next 
section, therefore, I indicate what this more recent debate 
is, and how the nasty problem is relevant to it. 
 
 The New Hume Debate 
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In recent years, a new interpretation of Hume — the 
so-called “New Hume” — has emerged in the literature. The 
manner in which one frames the various positions in this 
debate is controversial. At present, therefore, I shall 
stick to a fairly simple and intuitive formulation.   
The traditional interpretation of Hume interprets Hume 
as making a metaphysical claim about causation. According 
to this account, Hume claims that causation, as it exists 
in nature, is nothing more than regular succession. Saul 
Kripke, for instance, expresses this view when he writes 
that, “If Hume is right,” then “even if God were to look at 
[two causally related] events, he would discern nothing 
relating them other than that one succeeds the other” 
(1982: 67). The main support for this interpretation of 
Hume is the deflationary reading discussed above. Hume’s 
typically understood to be a proto-positivist, and thus 
it’s argued that the only idea of causation that Hume 
admits is an idea of thin causation. Thus the “Old Hume,” 
as he’s typically called, denies any idea of thick 
causation. 
In the early 1980s, however, a number of works on Hume 
appeared in the literature that challenged this account of 
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Hume’s views on causation.30 The leading proponent of this 
interpretation is Galen Strawson (2014).  
Strawson argues that Hume’s primary aim when 
discussing causation (as when discussing other topics) is 
epistemological, not metaphysical. Hume never doubts the 
existence of thick causal connections. Thus Hume’s a causal 
realist, but a realist of a certain sort. Strawson and 
others argue that, while Hume’s a realist, he’s a skeptical 
realist. In other words, Hume claims that we can’t know 
anything about the nature of the thick causal connections 
that exist in reality.   
In contrast to the traditional interpretation of Hume, 
then, New Humeans claim that there’s good evidence for 
thinking that Hume admits an idea of thick causation, and 
indeed believes in the existence of such connections. 
Here, for instance, are two passages that New Humeans 
sometimes offer as evidence for their position:  
 
It must certainly be allowed, that nature has kept us 
at a great distance from all her secrets, and has 
afforded us only the knowledge of a few superficial 
qualities of objects; while she conceals from us those 
powers and principles, on which the influence of these 
objects entirely depends. (EHU 4.16) 
                                                        
30 These include John P. Wright (1983), Donald Livingston (1984), Edward Craig (1987), Janet Broughton 
(1987), and Galen Strawson (2014). 
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And: 
 
The scenes of the universe are continually shifting, 
and one object follows another in an uninterrupted 
succession; but the power or force, which actuates the 
whole machine, is entirely concealed from us, and 
never discovers itself in any of the sensible 
qualities of body. (EHU 7.8) 
 
 Thus, according to the New Hume position, Hume admits 
the existence of thick causal connections in nature; he 
only means to claim that we can’t know anything about it.  
 As one might have anticipated, the main criticism of 
the New Hume is that Hume’s meaning-empiricism precludes 
the possibility of his believing in thick causation, for 
one can’t believe in something that one can’t have an idea 
of. Peter Kail, a proponent of the New Hume interpretation, 
puts the criticism as follows: 
 
[I]t appears Hume’s account of the derivation of the 
idea of necessity implies that no thought at all can 
be formed concerning genuine necessity and that the 
‘true meaning’ of necessity is merely that it is a 
feature of our psychology. Either way, the very 
possibility of the barest thought concerning genuine 
necessity is undercut, and with that any possibility 
of realism. No content can be given to putative 
thoughts with respect to objective causal necessity 
and hence no question concerning its existence can be 
intelligibly raised. For even to raise the question of 
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whether there is genuine causal power requires content 
for such thoughts. The only thought we can form with 
regard to the objective component to causal relations 
is, roughly, that they fall under a pattern of regular 
succession, and that, therefore, is in what causation 
consists. (2007: 81) 
 
 Thus, a central aspect of the nasty problem — Hume’s 
dismissing metaphysical terms as meaningless — factors as a 
major premise in the main criticism of the New Hume. But, 
as has been hinted at, Old Humeans have to meet the nasty 
problem no less than New Humeans, and many Old Humeans seem 
to have overlooked this fact. 
 In this dissertation, I note the important role that 
clear and distinct perception plays in Hume’s philosophy, 
and indicate how this helps us solve the nasty problem. 
When applied to the New Hume debate, I argue — with Old 
Humeans — that Hume doesn’t believe in thick causation. 
Hume believes that the term is meaningless, or, when used 
in a sense that’s meaningful, its meaning lacks a certain 
pedigree. In every case, Hume considers the idea associated 
with the term to be obscure and confused.  
 
 Conclusion 
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 In this chapter, I began by indicating the fundamental 
principles of Hume’s science of human nature. In addition, 
I explicated Hume’s meaning-empiricism, and the test for 
meaning that he derives from it. 
 We also saw that Hume claims that we have no idea of 
thick causation, and yet Hume explains why philosophers 
come to believe in the existence of thick causation. This 
is the nasty problem as applied to Hume’s discussion of 
causation. Furthermore, I indicated how this problem has 
implications for the New Hume debate, since it is part of 
the main line of criticism leveled against the skeptical 
realist position. 
 In the next chapter, I discuss a necessary preliminary 
to my discussion of Hume’s views on causation.  
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Chapter Two 
Hume’s Fork 
Introduction 
In Chapter One, we saw that Hume faces a nasty problem 
relevant to his discussion of causation. In this chapter, I 
discuss an important distinction in Hume, what has come to 
be known as “Hume’s Fork.” Hume’s Fork plays a central role 
in Hume’s account of causation, and so elucidating it is a 
necessary preliminary to Chapter Three. 
 
Initial Characterization 
Hume’s Fork is Hume’s distinction between relations of 
ideas and matters of fact. Hume presents the distinction at 
T 1.3.1.1 and at EHU 4. At EHU 4, for instance, he writes: 
 
All the objects of human reason or enquiry may 
naturally be divided into two kinds, to wit, Relations 
of Ideas, and Matters of Fact. Of the first kind are 
the sciences of Geometry, Algebra, and Arithmetic; and 
in short, every affirmation, which is either 
intuitively or demonstratively certain. That the 
square of the hypothenuse is equal to the square of 
the two sides, is a proposition, which expresses a 
relation between these figures. That three times five 
is equal to the half of thirty, expresses a relation 
between these numbers. Propositions of this kind are 
discoverable by the mere operation of thought, without 
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dependence on what is any where existent in the 
universe. Though there never were a circle or triangle 
in nature, the truths, demonstrated by EUCLID, would for 
ever retain their certainty and evidence. 
Matters of fact, which are the second objects of 
human reason, are not ascertained in the same manner; 
nor is our evidence of their truth, however great, of 
a like nature with the foregoing. The contrary of 
every matter of fact is still possible; because it can 
never imply a contradiction, and is conceived by the 
mind with the same facility and distinctness, as if 
ever so conformable to reality. That the sun will not 
rise to-morrow is no less intelligible a proposition, 
and implies no more contradiction, than the 
affirmation, that it will rise. We should in vain, 
therefore, attempt to demonstrate its falsehood. Were 
it demonstratively false, it would imply a 
contradiction, and could never be distinctly conceived 
by the mind. (EHU 4.1-2) 
 
In this passage, Hume claims that there are two kinds 
of propositions: relations of ideas and matters of fact.  
Relations of ideas, claims Hume, are propositions that 
(i) can be known by intuition or by demonstration, and that 
(ii) can be known a priori.1 Accordingly, Hume claims that: 
 
1. A proposition p is a relation between ideas just in 
case p can be intuitively or demonstratively known.2 
 
                                                        
1 Hume claims that (ii) follows from (i). 
2 Since relations between ideas are known or certain propositions, there can’t be false relations of ideas. 
Hence the proposition “2 + 2 = 5” is neither a relation between ideas nor a matter of fact, although “it’s 
not the case that 2 + 2 = 5” is a relation between ideas. We can speak of “2 + 2 = 5” as a relation between 
ideas in a derivative sense, inasmuch as it’s negation is a relation between ideas.  
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 Hume’s discussion of matters of fact, on the other 
hand, proceeds from a slightly different angle. Hume claims, 
for instance, that “the contrary of every matter of fact is 
still possible” and “can never imply a contradiction” (EHU 
4.2). Thus, Hume claims that: 
 
2. A proposition p is a matter of fact just in case ~p 
doesn’t entail a contradiction.3 
 
Consequently, the condition that Hume identifies when 
characterizing matters of fact isn’t the same condition, or 
even the same spectrum of conditions, that he identifies 
when characterizing relations of ideas. In the case of 
relations of ideas, Hume asks whether the relevant 
proposition can be intuitively or demonstratively known. In 
the case of matters of fact, he asks whether the relevant 
proposition’s denial entails a contradiction. But these two 
conditions aren’t obviously mutually exclusive.  
The chasm may be bridged, however, once we recognize 
that Hume claims that matters of fact can’t be intuitively 
                                                        
3 But consider the proposition “red is yellow.” On (2), this counts as a matter of fact, since “red isn’t 
yellow” doesn’t entail a contradiction. But wouldn’t Hume count “red is yellow” as a relation between 
ideas, in the derivative sense outlined in the previous footnote? Hume would consider it a relation 
between ideas, but he would insist that when “red” and “yellow” are clearly and distinctly perceived, one 
will discern that they’re contradictory notions. It nonetheless may be the case that the equivalence in (2) 
is too strong. Hume may intend only to identify a necessary condition of matters of fact.  
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or demonstratively known because they have denials that 
don’t imply a contradiction. For instance, Hume claims that 
matters of fact aren’t “ascertained in the same manner” 
(EHU 4.2) — that is, they aren’t intuitively or 
demonstratively known — because the “contrary of every 
matter of fact is still possible” (ibid.). This suggests, 
therefore, that Hume’s presupposing the following 
condition:  
 
3. A proposition p can be intuitively or demonstratively 
known only if ~p entails a contradiction. 
 
Given (1) and (3), therefore, it follows that: 
 
4. A proposition p is a relation between ideas only if 
~p entails a contradiction. 
 
Thus, relations of ideas are those propositions that 
have denials that entail a contradiction, whereas matters 
of fact are those propositions that have denials that don’t 
entail a contradiction. So understood, Hume’s Fork amounts 
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to a distinction between two mutually exclusive and 
exhaustive kinds of propositions. 
The preceding characterization may lead one to view 
Hume’s Fork as the familiar distinction between the 
logically necessary and the logically contingent.4 In modern 
parlance, a proposition is (narrowly) logically necessary 
just in case its denial entails a formal contradiction, and 
a proposition is (narrowly) logically contingent just in 
case it doesn’t entail a formal contradiction and its 
denial doesn’t entail a formal contradiction. The truths of 
logic, for instance, are necessary in this sense. 
Consequently, a natural reading of Hume’s Fork is that Hume 
intends to introduce the distinction between the narrowly 
logically necessary and the narrowly logically contingent. 
However, there’s another sense in which a proposition 
may be said to be logically necessary or logically 
contingent. It’s sometimes said that a proposition is 
(broadly) logically necessary just in case it’s true in 
every possible world, and that a proposition is (broadly) 
logically contingent just in case it’s true in some 
possible world but not true in every possible world. The 
truths of metaphysics are said to be necessary in this 
                                                        
4 In what follows, I use the term “contingent” in the technical sense of possibly p and possibly not-p. 
 53 
sense — as in the fact that no person is a prime number or 
that Hesperus is Phosphorus — and so this modality is 
sometimes called metaphysical necessity or metaphysical 
contingency, respectively. Accordingly, some may contend 
that Hume’s Fork amounts to the distinction between the 
metaphysically necessary and the metaphysically contingent. 
These are natural readings of Hume’s Fork, but they’re 
incorrect. In this chapter, I show why Hume’s Fork isn’t 
the distinction between the narrowly logically necessary 
and the narrowly logically contingent, and why it isn’t the 
distinction between the metaphysically necessary and the 
metaphysically contingent. In addition, I show that Hume’s 
Fork doesn’t amount to the distinction between the 
epistemically necessary and the epistemically contingent, 
as has been recently suggested by Peter Kail. I also 
criticize and reject a characterization of Hume’s Fork 
introduced by Georges Dicker. I then put forward an 
interpretation of my own. My conclusions in this chapter 
will better enable us to see the nature of Hume’s views on 
the causal relation. In order to get a proper handle on 
Hume’s Fork, I begin with Hume’s conception of 
demonstration. 
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Owen on Demonstration 
David Owen (1999) has convincingly argued that Hume 
inherits his conception of logic largely from Descartes. In 
the early modern period, “logic” was conceived as the study 
of “the principles and operations of the reasoning faculty, 
and the nature of our ideas” (T Intro. 5). In order, 
therefore, to best appreciate Hume’s views on logic and 
demonstration, we need to briefly discuss Descartes’s views 
on the matter. 
Owen argues that Descartes preferred a non-formal 
conception of reasoning. On this conception, inferences 
should be assessed by attending to the content of one’s 
ideas, rather than to the logical form of one’s argument. 
Owen claims that Descartes held to this conception because 
he was primarily interested in the discovery of new truths, 
as opposed to the mere preservation of truth. Hume’s 
conception of demonstration descends from this tradition.  
The dominant conception of inference and reasoning 
during Descartes’s time was syllogistic or term logic. Term 
logic assesses arguments by first identifying their logical 
form, and then by distinguishing valid from invalid forms. 
To give an example, consider this argument: 
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(A) Socrates runs. 
 Anything that runs, moves. 
 Therefore, Socrates moves. 
 
In assessing the propriety of (A), Aristotelian logicians 
begin by asking whether (A) has a valid or an invalid 
argument form. For instance, they might note that the first 
premise contains a singular term; that is, a proposition 
about a specific individual, in this case Socrates. While 
there’s some debate over how to handle singular 
propositions in term logic, the standard approach is to 
translate singular propositions into universal 
propositions.5 Accordingly, “Socrates runs” would be 
translated into “All things that are Socrates run.”  
Having made this translation, we are now in a position 
to identify the form of (A). According to the Aristotelian 
tradition, the form of this inference is: 
 
 (B) All S are R. 
                                                        
5 For instance, Kant writes that “Logicians are justified in saying that, in the employment of judgments in 
Syllogisms, singular propositions can be treated like those that are universal” (A71/B96). 
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  All R are M. 
  Therefore, all S are M.  
 
The scholastics called this argument form “Barbara,” and 
noted that it’s valid. Since (A) is an instance of (B), (A) 
is a valid argument. This is the manner in which a term 
logician would assess an inference. 
But now consider this argument: 
 
(C) Socrates runs. 
 Therefore, Socrates moves. 
 
Taken as it is, Aristotelians wouldn’t recognize (C) as 
instantiating a valid argument form. They might contend 
that it’s an enthymeme, and that when the missing premise 
is provided the argument may be shown to instantiate a 
valid argument form. But the point to observe at this 
juncture is that even if we don’t interpret (C) as an 
enthymeme, Descartes would take (C) to be a perfectly 
acceptable inference. For instance, Descartes was held to 
have argued: 
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(D) I think. 
 Therefore, I exist. 
 
Furthermore, Descartes was insistent that (D) shouldn’t be 
interpreted as an enthymeme. Thus, he writes: 
 
[W]hen we become aware that we are thinking things, 
this is a primary notion which is not derived by means 
of any syllogism. When someone says “I am thinking, 
therefore I am, or I exist,” he does not deduce 
existence from thought by means of a syllogism, but 
recognizes it as something self-evident by a simple 
intuition of the mind. This is clear from the fact 
that if he were deducing it by means of a syllogism, 
he would have to have had previous knowledge of the 
major premise “Everything which thinks is, or exists”; 
yet in fact he learns it from experiencing in his own 
case that it is impossible that he should think 
without existing. (Second Set of Replies: CSM II 100: 
AT VII 140). 
 
The reason that Descartes insists that (D) shouldn’t 
be interpreted syllogistically is that he believes that 
term logic is unhelpful — indeed, a positive hindrance — 
toward the discovery of new truths or the better security 
of old ones. Descartes writes that 
 
on the basis of their method, dialecticians are unable 
to formulate a syllogism with a true conclusion unless 
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they are already in possession of the substance of the 
conclusion, i.e. unless they have previous knowledge 
of the very truth deduced in the syllogism. It is 
obvious therefore that they themselves can learn 
nothing new from such forms of reasoning, and hence 
that ordinary dialectic is of no use whatever to those 
who wish to investigate the truth of things. Its sole 
advantage is that it sometimes enables us to explain 
to others arguments which are already known. It should 
therefore be transferred from philosophy to rhetoric. 
(Rule Ten: CSM I 36: AT X 406) 
 
In this passage, Descartes clearly takes issue with 
the term logician’s focus on the preservation of truth: 
when the premises are true the conclusion must be true. But 
the preservation of truth, as such, says nothing about 
whether the premises are in fact true; only when we know 
that the premises are true are we warranted in taking the 
conclusion to be true. But since the conclusion is already 
“contained” in the premises, Descartes contends that we 
never in fact learn anything new from syllogisms. Hence, 
Descartes contends that formal conceptions of inference are 
a positive hindrance to the discovery of new truths; 
demonstrations in term logic merely present truths that are 
already known.  
In addition, Descartes argued that formal conceptions 
of inference encourage us to blindly and dogmatically 
follow rules without properly engaging our intellect or 
reason. He, in turn, proposed rules of inference that would 
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help us engage our reason by forcing us to attend to the 
content of our ideas.  
For instance, Descartes proposed the following method 
of reasoning: inference should involve a chain of linked 
intuitions. To make this clear, consider the following 
schema:  
 
 K = M   (intuition) 
 M = L   (intuition) 
 K = L   (demonstration) 
 
 Descartes’s conception of demonstration involves four 
elements: (i) demonstrations commence when the mind attends 
to the content of some idea K. (ii) Upon clearly and 
distinctly perceiving the content of K, one intuits that K 
stands in relationship R to some intermediate idea M. (iii) 
Having clearly and distinctly perceived the content of M, 
one intuits that M stands in relationship R* to some third 
idea L.6 Finally, (iv) one attentively runs through (i)-
(iii) until the whole chain approaches the strength of an 
intuition. Here’s an example provided by Descartes: 
                                                        
6 R may be identical to R*.  In the above schema, for instance, the relevant relation is “equality.” 
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The self-evidence and certainty of intuition is 
required not only for apprehending single propositions, 
but also for any train of reasoning whatever. Take for 
example, the inference 2 plus 2 equals 3 plus 1: not 
only must we intuitively perceive that 2 plus 2 make 4, 
and that 3 plus 1 make 4, but also that the original 
proposition follows necessarily from the other two. 
(Rule Three: CSM I 14-5: AT X 369) 
 
Accordingly, when we fill out the above schema with 
Descartes’s example, we arrive at the following:  
 
 2 + 2 = 4   (intuition) 
 4 = 3 + 1   (intuition) 
 2 + 2 = 3 + 1  (demonstration) 
 
Descartes doesn’t wish to deny that demonstrations can 
be represented in syllogistic form.7 But, as noted above, 
the only benefit of doing so is the mere preservation of 
truth: 
 
[Dialecticians] prescribe certain forms of reasoning 
in which the conclusions follow with such irresistible 
necessity that if our reason relies on them, even 
                                                        
7 Descartes distinguishes between “analysis” and “synthesis.” Synthesis is putting arguments in syllogistic 
form in the typical Aristotelian manner. Analysis, on the other hand, is Descartes’s preferred method of 
attending to the content of one’s ideas.  
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though it takes, as it were, a rest from considering a 
particular inference clearly and attentively, it can 
nevertheless draw a conclusion which is certain simply 
in virtue of the form. But, as we have noticed, truth 
often slips through these fetters, while those who 
employ them are left entrapped in them. (Rule Ten: CSM 
I 36: AT X 405-6) 
 
Truth, therefore, often slips through the “fetters” of 
syllogistic reasoning. In turn, Descartes’s proposed method 
“guard[s] against our reason’s taking a holiday” (CSM I 36: 
AT X 406), so that we may discover and appreciate new 
truths. 
We’ve seen, therefore, that Descartes adopts a non-
formal conception of inference. Owen convincingly claims 
that Hume falls within this tradition. For instance, in 
explicating Hume’s example of a relation between ideas, the 
Pythagorean Theorem, Owen writes:  
 
[S]uppose we wanted to reason towards the proposition 
“the square of the hypotenuse is equal to the squares 
of the other two sides.” Hume says that this “cannot 
be known, let the terms be ever so exactly defined, 
without a train of reasoning or enquiry”…. If I am 
right, such a train would be constituted by a chain of 
ideas the first of which is the idea whose content is 
“the square of the hypotenuse” and the last of which 
is “the squares of the other two sides”. Connecting 
these ideas is a series of intermediate ideas. The 
link between each pair of adjacent ideas is a relation 
which must be seen to hold, and one that must enable 
us to see that the first idea stands in the relation 
of equality to the last idea. (1999: 2-3, cf. 19) 
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Thus, for Hume, a demonstration isn’t about form, it’s 
about intuiting the content of one’s ideas, and noting what 
relations hold (or don’t hold) among them. A proposition is 
intuitively known just in case it’s “discoverable at first 
sight” (T 1.3.1.2) or “comprehended in an instant” (T 
1.3.1.3), and a demonstration is simply a series of linked 
intuitions. Indeed, Owen’s account nicely explains why Hume 
uses the name “relations of ideas.”  
An implication of this interpretation is that “Hume’s 
distinction between demonstrative and probable inference is 
quite unlike our distinction between deductive and 
inductive inference” (1999: 5). Deduction is about the 
preservation of truth, whereas a demonstration for Hume is 
about the preservation of certainty (cf. 1999: 19). As Don 
Garrett helpfully puts it: “[A]n argument with false or 
weak premises may be deductively valid for us, although it 
would not have been demonstrative for Hume” (1997: 94). 
It’s helpful to keep this distinction in mind. 
Hume doesn’t receive this conception of inference 
directly from Descartes. Locke also preferred a non-formal 
conception of inference (cf. Owen 1999: Ch. 3). But a 
consequence of Locke’s empiricism was that the realm of 
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knowledge, as compared to Descartes, was seriously reduced. 
Knowledge for both Descartes and Locke consisted of those 
propositions that can be known with certainty, and anything 
that was less than certain was relegated to the domain of 
belief or opinion. Locke consequently made use of the 
notion of probability in his philosophy to account for the 
domain of rational belief. 
Probable reasoning for Locke also involves a chain of 
ideas, but the links or relations among them are based on 
experience rather than intuition. Hume follows Locke in 
this regard: knowledge is provided by relations of ideas, 
whereas matters of fact (as we shall see) culminate in 
belief. Thus Hume admits two faculties of reason: 
demonstrative and probable reason. 
 This, therefore, constitutes Hume’s conception of 
intuition and demonstration. But let’s return now to the 
sorts of propositions that Hume thinks can be intuitively 
and demonstratively known. Hume’s examples will shed light 
on whether or not we can understand Hume’s Fork as the 
distinction between the narrowly logically necessary and 
the narrowly logically contingent. For instance, Hume 
writes: 
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Three of these relations are discoverable at first 
sight, and fall more properly under the province of 
intuition than demonstration. When any objects 
resemble each other, the resemblance will at first 
strike the eye, or rather the mind; and seldom 
requires a second examination. The case is the same 
with contrariety, and with the degrees of any quality. 
No one can once doubt but existence and non-existence 
destroy each other, and are perfectly incompatible and 
contrary. And though it be impossible to judge exactly 
of the degrees of any quality, such as colour, taste, 
heat, cold, when the difference betwixt them is very 
small; yet it is easy to decide, that any of them is 
superior or inferior to another, when their difference 
is considerable. And this decision we always pronounce 
at first sight, without any enquiry or reasoning. (T 
1.3.1.2) 
  
Consider, for instance, the proposition “nothing red 
is green.” Hume claims that this can be intuitively known 
because our idea of red is contrary to our idea of green. 
Since it can be intuitively known, “nothing red is green” 
is a relation between ideas for Hume, and not a matter of 
fact.  
But notice that this proposition isn’t logically 
necessary in the narrow sense, and thus Hume’s Fork can’t 
be the distinction between the narrowly logically necessary 
and narrowly logically contingent. Indeed, Hume’s own 
examples at EHU 4.1 — the Pythagorean Theorem and the claim 
that 3 x 5 = 30 ÷ 2 — foreclose the possibility that Hume’s 
distinction concerns narrow logical possibility, for 
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mathematical propositions aren’t typically taken to be 
logically necessary in the narrow sense. 
Accordingly, this seems to lend support to the idea 
that Hume’s Fork concerns logical necessity in the broad 
sense. If this interpretation of Hume’s Fork is correct, 
then it has important implications for our discussion of 
causation. The reason is that if Hume’s Fork is the 
distinction between the metaphysically necessary and the 
metaphysically contingent, then skeptical realism is in 
trouble. For on this interpretation matters of fact are 
expressed as metaphysically possible propositions, but — as 
we’ll see in the next chapter — Hume unequivocally takes 
the causal relation to be a matter-of-fact relation. In 
that case, the causal relation isn’t metaphysically 
necessary, and so Hume must not believe in thick causation, 
for thick causal connections are metaphysically necessary. 
This argument has been thoroughly discussed by Peter 
Kail, who, as an advocate of the skeptical realist 
interpretation, aims to show that it’s misplaced. In the 
course of doing so, Kail comes to view Hume’s Fork as the 
distinction between the epistemically necessary and the 
epistemically contingent. While I find Kail’s rejection of 
the distinction in terms of metaphysical necessity correct, 
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I find his own characterization in terms of the epistemic 
misplaced. It’s worth considering this, then, as we aren’t 
far off from the correct interpretation of Hume’s Fork. 
 
Kail’s Lemma 
Thus far, we’ve seen that Hume’s Fork doesn’t amount 
to the distinction between the narrowly logically necessary 
and the narrowly logically contingent. On the contrary, the 
counterexamples of the previous section suggest that Hume’s 
Fork may involve the distinction between the metaphysically 
necessary and the metaphysically contingent. I explore this 
interpretation in this section. 
Understanding Hume’s Fork as the distinction between 
the metaphysically necessary and metaphysically contingent 
receives some support from Hume’s conceivability principle. 
This principle makes the following claim:  
 
 Conceivability Principle 
“Whatever can be conceiv’d by a clear and distinct 
idea necessarily implies the possibility of existence.” 
(T 1.2.4.11) 
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 According to the conceivability principle, since I can 
conceive of a golden mountain, a golden mountain can exist. 
This of course isn’t to say that there is any such mountain, 
only that its existence is possible.   
 In his Abstract to the Treatise, Hume explains the 
conceivability principle in a manner that seems to lend 
support to the view that the modality at issue here is 
metaphysical possibility. For instance, Hume writes that: 
 
The mind can always conceive any effect to follow from 
any cause, and indeed any event to follow upon 
another: whatever we conceive is possible, at least in 
a metaphysical sense: but wherever a demonstration 
takes place, the contrary is impossible, and implies a 
contradiction. (A 13) 
 
 Hume claims in this passage that if a proposition is 
conceivable, then it’s possible, at least in a metaphysical 
sense (ibid.). Thus Hume’s conceivability principle appears 
to claim that if p is conceivable, then p is metaphysically 
possible. This has implications for our understanding of 
Hume’s Fork for the following reason. 
 First, matters of fact are those propositions that 
have denials that don’t entail a contradiction. In other 
words, the denials of matters of fact are conceivable, and 
thus — by the conceivability principle — matters of fact 
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are metaphysically possible propositions. Second, relations 
of ideas are those propositions that have denials that 
entail a contradiction, and thus are impossible (in some 
sense).8 Thus, in light of Hume’s comments at A 13, it’s 
natural to interpret Hume’s Fork as the distinction between 
the metaphysically necessary and the metaphysically 
contingent.  
 If Hume’s Fork does amount to the distinction between 
the metaphysically necessary and the metaphysically 
contingent, then, as I intimated above, the skeptical 
realist interpretation is in trouble. Harold Noonan, for 
instance, notes that the separability and conceivability 
principles imply the denial of thick causal connections: 
 
Together these principles imply that if any objects 
are distinct they can exist separately — either can 
exist without the other. And it is this consequence 
Hume appeals to in rejecting the possibility of real 
connections between distinct existences, which 
rejection in turn underpins his rejection of necessary 
connections between causes and effects. (2007: 5-6)9  
 
                                                        
8 The conceivability principle isn’t helpful in drawing the conclusion that the denials of relations of ideas 
are metaphysically impossible. Instead, one needs to introduce an inconceivability principle: if p is 
inconceivable, then p is metaphysically impossible. Whether Hume endorses the inconceivability principle 
is controversial — cf. D. Tycerium Lightner (1997). In my view, Hume does endorse an inconceivability 
principle, but not one in which the modality involved is metaphysical. 
9 See also Peter Millican (2007). 
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 Peter Kail, however, has done the most to meet this 
objection. We’ve seen that thick causation involves the AP 
property, such that a knowledge of the cause enables one to 
infer the effect a priori. Accordingly, Kail writes:  
 
Hume takes acquaintance with necessary connection… to 
entail certain conceptual-cum-epistemological 
consequences. Roughly, acquaintance with necessary 
connection would entail (a) the possibility of a 
priori knowledge of the relevant cause’s effect and 
(b) the impossibility of conceiving the cause without 
its effect. (2003: 44) 
 
 But Hume claims that we can always conceive of the 
cause without the effect (A 13). Thus, Kail claims that we 
must face the following argument: 
 
[Hume presents] a modal principle (MP) to the effect 
that anything we can conceive is metaphysically 
possible. Second, we have a claim to the effect that 
we can always conceive some cause without its effect. 
Since we can always conceive some cause A 
independently of its effect B (and vice versa, and for 
any substitution of A and B) it follows, by the MP, 
that it is always metaphysically possible for A to 
exist independently of B. The MP will then entitle us 
to know that A and B are not necessarily connected (in 
the sense in which we are working). (2003: 47) 
 
We can put this argument as follows: 
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1. If p is conceivable, then p is metaphysically possible. 
2. We can always conceive a cause without its effect. 
3. Hence, there’s no metaphysically necessary connection 
between cause and effect. 
 
There’s good reason, then, to think that Hume isn’t a 
skeptical realist.  
Kail responds by challenging (1). Kail doesn’t deny 
that Hume’s conceivability principle concerns metaphysical 
possibility. Rather, Kail questions whether Hume intended 
the principle to apply to conceivability simpliciter. On 
the contrary, Kail claims that the conceivability principle 
applies only to “adequate” representations.10  
Hume doesn’t say much about what renders a perception 
“adequate,” and so Kail appeals to Locke in order to make 
sense of the notion. He (2003: 49) notes that, for Locke, 
an idea is adequate if it “perfectly represents those 
archetypes which the mind supposes them taken from,”11 
whereas inadequate ideas are “partial or incomplete.”12 
Hence, for Locke, inadequate ideas are ideas of a thing’s 
surface or sensible properties (what he calls the object’s 
                                                        
10 He also notes that Hume means “clear and distinct” by this expression, and so Kail at least goes further 
than most commentators in recognizing clear and distinct perception in Hume. 
11 Locke, Essay concerning Human Understanding, II.xxxi.6. 
12 Ibid., II.xxxi.1. 
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“nominal essence”), whereas adequate ideas are ideas of the 
object’s real essence. 
As evidence that Hume employs the notion, Kail appeals 
to the following passage: 
 
Wherever ideas are adequate representations of objects, 
the relations, contradictions and agreements of ideas 
are applicable to the objects; and this we may in 
general observe to be the foundation of all human 
knowledge…. The plain consequence is, that whatever 
appears impossible and contradictory upon the 
comparison of these ideas, must be really impossible 
and contradictory, without any further excuse or 
evasion. (T 1.2.2.1) 
 
Despite the fact that the term “adequate” doesn’t occur 
frequently in Hume, Kail has all the resources he needs to 
meet the objection. 
First, he notes that while some ideas may adequately 
represent their source (impressions), it’s an open question 
whether impressions adequately represent their source 
(external objects). Hume, it’s commonly held, is agnostic 
about whether or not external objects exist, “for the 
examination of our sensations belongs more to anatomists 
and natural philosophers than to moral; and, therefore, 
shall not at present be entered upon” (T 1.1.2.7). Thus the 
question is open as to whether we have adequate impressions 
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of external objects. Hume sometimes puts this in terms of 
whether we can discern the “essence” of objects:  
 
‘Tis easy to observe, that in tracing this relation, 
the inference we draw from cause to effect, is not 
deriv’d merely from a survey of these particular 
objects, and from such a penetration into their 
essences as may discover the dependence of the one 
upon the other. (T 1.3.6.1, my emphasis) 
 
And:  
 
Is it not probable, I ask, that the whole economy of 
the universe is conducted by a like necessity, though 
no human algebra can furnish a key, which solves the 
difficulty? And instead of admiring the order of 
natural beings, may it not happen, that, could we 
penetrate into the intimate nature of bodies, we 
should clearly see why it was absolutely impossible, 
that they could ever admit of any other disposition. 
(DNR 9.10, my emphasis)13 
 
According to Kail, Hume holds that we don’t perceive 
the essence of objects, and so we don’t have adequate ideas 
of them. Since we don’t have adequate ideas of objects, the 
conceivability principle doesn’t apply. Kail illustrates 
this with the following example: 
 
                                                        
13 “DNR” abbreviates Hume’s Dialogues concerning Natural Religion, and the number indicates the part 
and respective paragraph.  
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Suppose Edmund does not know that Hesperus is 
identical to Phosphorus…. Edmund further thinks that 
Hesperus has been destroyed, but Phosphorus survives. 
Is he thereby conceiving the simultaneous existence of 
Phosphorus and the non-existence of Hesperus. Well, if 
the two “ideas” are separable in the imagination, we 
can grant that such a possibility is conceivable but 
any possibility revealed is not metaphysical 
possibility. Instead, Edmund’s imagination reveals an 
epistemic possibility, that is a possibility relative 
to his limited information (and of course he is 
unaware that his information is so limited). This 
illustrates the point that it is only under situations 
of adequate information about the relevant objects 
that MP has a chance of being compelling. We need to 
know enough about the objects of conception before we 
can be sure of getting to a metaphysical possibility. 
Edmund is merely separating his Hesperus idea apart 
from his Phosphorus idea: he is not genuinely 
conceiving Hesperus apart from Phosphorus because his 
ideas of those objects are not adequate to the task. 
(2003: 50)14 
 
 First, let me note that Kail’s suggestion that the 
conceivability principle concerns epistemic possibility is 
incorrect. Kail provides the following two interpretations: 
 
4. If p is conceivable, then p is epistemically possible, 
 
and 
 
                                                        
14 Kail isn’t attributing the view that Hesperus is necessarily Phosphorus to Hume. That of course would be 
anachronistic. I take Kail to simply be using a common example — due to Kripke — to illustrate the 
importance of adequate conception in drawing metaphysical conclusions. 
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5. If p is adequately conceivable, then p is 
metaphysically possible. 
 
Accordingly, if Kail’s interpretation is correct, then 
since we don’t have adequate impressions of objects (or at 
least we don’t know as much), Hume’s Fork, on Kail’s view, 
is merely the distinction between the epistemically 
necessary and the epistemically possible. Needless to say, 
I wish to argue that Hume’s conceivability principle is 
neither (4) nor (5). Let’s begin with (4). 
 Hume doesn’t understand his conceivability principle 
as (4) because this would render Hume’s Fork subject-
relative. There’s no indication, however, that he so 
understands his Fork. Suppose, as is the case, that both of 
my brothers have college degrees, and I know as much. It 
follows that the denial of this isn’t epistemically 
possible for me, for I know that both of my brothers 
graduated from college. Epistemic possibility is here 
understood in the traditional sense, as that which is 
possible given what I already know. This implies that the 
proposition “both of my brothers have college degrees,” 
does not express a matter of fact, but a relation between 
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ideas, at least for me. However, for those who don’t know 
this, it would count as a matter of fact.  
But Hume clearly intends this to be a matter of fact 
proposition, and one that isn’t subject-relative. Thus 
Hume’s Fork — and the conceivability principle upon which 
it relies — doesn’t concern epistemic possibility. 
 As for (5), I wish to argue that while Hume uses the 
term “metaphysical,” he doesn’t mean it in the sense that 
we use it today. Hume’s use is idiosyncratic. And here a 
comparison with Descartes may again shed some helpful light 
on Hume’s usage. In the Third Meditation of his Meditations 
on First Philosophy, for instance, Descartes writes that 
 
[S]ince I have no cause to think that there is a 
deceiving God, and I do not yet even know for sure 
whether there is a God at all, any reason for doubt 
which depends simply on this supposition is a very 
slight and, so to speak, metaphysical one. (Third 
Meditation: CSM II 25: AT VII 36, emphasis mine) 
 
 In this passage Descartes claims that his most 
powerful reason for skepticism — the mere possibility that 
there’s an evil demon deceiving him — while a reason for 
doubt, is farfetched and “metaphysical.” In other words, 
it’s not impossible, and so by the parameters that he’s set 
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for himself it needs to be addressed, but it’s far from a 
serious matter.  
 This is the sense of “metaphysical” that Hume’s using 
when he states his conceivability principle at A 13. If p 
is conceivable, then p’s not “metaphysically” impossible. 
Here Hume’s use actually approaches “logical possibility” 
more than anything else, but the specific modality at issue 
here remains to be elucidated, and I shall do so below. 
This reading also explains Hume’s use of “at least” in the 
passage under discussion, which is clearly employed to 
denote a less stringent form of modality. And so, Hume’s 
interest in the “metaphysical” isn’t the contemporary one, 
as he so forcefully indicates: 
 
When we run over libraries, persuaded of these 
principles, what havoc must we make? If we take in our 
hand any volume; of divinity or school metaphysics, 
for instance; let us ask, Does it contain any abstract 
reasons concerning quantity or number? No. Does it 
contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter 
of fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the 
flames: For it can contain nothing but sophistry and 
illusion. (EHU 12.34) 
 
 Thus, Hume’s Fork and his conceivability principle 
don’t concern epistemic necessity and possibility. Moreover, 
neither concerns metaphysical necessity or possibility. 
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Before I provide my own interpretation of Hume’s Fork, 
however, there’s one more prominent interpretation that 
requires discussion. I turn to this in the next section. 
 
Dicker’s Interpretation 
 In his book Hume’s Epistemology and Metaphysics: An 
Introduction, Georges Dicker characterizes Hume’s Fork by 
identifying two sets of contrasting features. With respect 
to relations of ideas, for instance, Dicker (1998: 40) 
claims that relations of ideas are: 
 
C1. self-evident or demonstrable, and that they 
C2. don’t assert or imply existence. 
 
In contrast, Dicker claims that matters of fact 
 
C3. do assert or imply existence, and that they 
C4. are neither self-evident nor demonstrable.  
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Dicker’s interpretation, then, characterizes Hume’s Fork as 
two sets of two opposing prongs. In this way, Dicker paints 
Hume’s Fork more in the fashion of a utensil, than in the 
fashion of a road, as in Frost’s famous “yellow wood.”  
But Hume never ate from this Fork, and for good reason. 
In order to see why this characterization is inadequate, 
it’s necessary that I first explain some of Dicker’s 
terminology. In particular, I need to introduce his use of 
the terms “assert” and “imply.” Accordingly, my focus in 
this section will be on Dicker’s criteria (C2) and (C3). 
A proposition “asserts” existence, claims Dicker, just 
in case a non-abstract object must exist in order for the 
proposition to be true. He counts “physical objects or 
minds or physical or mental events or states” (1998: 36) as 
non-abstract. As an example, consider the proposition 
“Trump has a toupee.” In order for this proposition to be 
true, Trump must exist.15 On the other hand, the Pythagorean 
Theorem can be true no matter what non-abstract objects 
happen to exist in the world. Dicker seeks to avoid 
controversial metaphysical issues such as whether 
mathematical objects exist, and so the question as to 
whether or not the Pythagorean Theorem asserts the 
                                                        
15 It also must be the case that the toupee exists. 
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existence of mathematical entities such as numbers is 
bracketed. This is why he limits matters to non-abstract 
objects. Accordingly, “Trump has a toupee” asserts 
existence, whereas the Pythagorean Theorem doesn’t.  
As Dicker emphasizes, Hume seems to claim that matters 
of fact assert existence, whereas relations of ideas don’t. 
For instance, Hume claims that relations of ideas don’t 
depend “on what is any where existent in the universe,” and 
“[t]hough there never were a circle or triangle in nature, 
the truths, demonstrated by EUCLID, would for ever retain 
their certainty and evidence” (EHU 4.1).  
In addition, Hume’s example of a matter of fact — the 
proposition “the sun will not rise tomorrow” (EHU 4.2) — 
asserts existence, for it asserts the existence of the sun 
and the earth. Moreover, throughout the first Enquiry, Hume 
frequently employs expressions such as “matter of fact or 
real existence” (EHU 5.1.8; cf. EHU 4.1.3, 4.2.19, 5.2.20). 
Dicker reads this as Hume’s claim that matters of fact 
assert existence.  
However, a problem for Dicker’s interpretation is that 
not all propositions that Hume regards as matters of fact 
assert existence. An important example is the causal maxim: 
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Causal Maxim 
“[W]hatever begins to exist, must have a cause of 
existence.” (T 1.3.3.1)16 
 
Another is the uniformity principle: 
 
Uniformity Principle 
“[T]he course of nature continues always uniformly the 
same.” (T 1.3.6.4)17 
 
As will become apparent in Chapter Three, Hume regards 
both principles as matters of fact. But notice that neither 
asserts the existence of anything.  
 Dicker recognizes this, and so he argues that the 
causal maxim and the uniformity principle are matters of 
fact because they “imply” existence. It’s important to 
realize that this is a sense of implication distinct from 
logical entailment or material implication. Here’s Dicker’s 
account of what the relevant notion of implication is: 
 
This is any proposition that, taken together with a 
proposition(s) reporting what is observed at a given 
time t, or a set of times t1, t2,… tn, implies the 
existence of some non-abstract entity which need not 
                                                        
16 As is common, I shall sometimes express the causal maxim as every event has a cause. 
17 Hume sometimes describes this claim as “instances, of which we have had no experience, must 
resemble those of which we have had experience” (T 1.3.6.4) or “the future will resemble the past” (EHU 
4.2.36). 
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be observed at t, or any of t1, t2,… tn. (Dicker 1998: 
38)18 
 
 In other words, a proposition p impliesd another 
proposition q just in case (i) there’s another proposition 
r that reports an observation at a time (or set of times), 
such that (ii) p and r logically imply q. A final condition 
is that (iii) q must make an existential claim, and one 
that need not be observed in order for p and r to logically 
imply q. There are a number of things worth noting here. 
First, Dicker refers to the proposition that implies 
the existence of some non-abstract entity, when taken 
together with a proposition or propositions reporting 
what’s observed, as a bridging proposition. Here’s his 
example (ibid.): 
 
Every event has a cause (bridging proposition). 
Event e was observed at t (observation). 
_____________________________________ 
\ Event e had a cause, c (item that need not be 
observed). 
                                                        
18 Dicker’s use of “implies” in this quotation is synonymous with “logically implies.” This isn’t to be 
confused with the sense of “implies” for which the quotation constitutes a definiens. 
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Second, in order for a proposition to be a bridging 
proposition, it must be capable of factoring into an 
argument, the conclusion of which must concern the 
existence of some non-abstract entity. In the example that 
Dicker provides, the entity appears to be an event, e, and 
so Dicker must regard events as non-abstract. 
 Third, Dicker says that the state of affairs expressed 
by the conclusion “need not be observed” (ibid.). What 
Dicker intends by this is that the state of affairs may be 
observed, but that its being observed isn’t required. In 
this way Dicker can rule out propositions such as every 
effect has a cause (1998: 58) as qualifying as a matter of 
fact proposition. For consider this argument: 
 
 Every effect has a cause (bridging proposition). 
 Effect e is observed (observation). 
_____________________________________ 
\ Effect e has a cause, c. 
 
 To know that e was an effect, and so to be able to 
correctly assert the second premise, we’d have to observe 
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that it has a cause. Thus Dicker’s condition that the 
conclusion needn’t be observed enables him to rule out 
every effect has a cause as a matter of fact proposition, 
for Hume clearly wouldn’t regard it as one.  
Fourth, the bridging proposition impliesd the existence 
of some non-abstract entity only when taken together with 
some other proposition about something observed, such that 
the two logically imply the conclusion. Nonetheless, 
Dicker’s explicit that it doesn’t always need to be a 
single instance of observation, for he also offers this as 
an example (1998: 39):  
     
The future will resemble the past (bridging 
proposition). 
Past lightning flashes have been followed by 
thunderclaps, and there is now a flash of lightning 
(observations made at t1, t2,… tn). 
_____________________________________ 
\ There will be a thunderclap (the as yet unobserved 
event). 
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In this case, there are many past observations of lightning 
followed by observations of thunderclaps. 
On Dicker’s interpretation, therefore, matters of fact 
assert or implyd existence, whereas relations of ideas don’t. 
Accordingly, for Dicker, assertion and implication are 
characteristics that differentiate relations of ideas from 
matters of fact (1998: 38). 
But Dicker’s account of Hume’s Fork is incorrect, for 
relations of ideas can also serve as bridging propositions. 
Consider the following inference: 
 
If a is taller than b, and b is taller than c, then a 
is taller than c (bridging proposition). 
a is taller than b (observation).  
b is taller than c (observation).  
_____________________________________ 
\ a is taller than c (unobserved). 
  
Hume would classify the first premise of the above 
argument as a relation between ideas, because it can be 
known a priori by way of demonstration. And yet, given the 
second and third premises, it impliesd the conclusion.  
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Moreover, it may be the case that b is a tree at the 
crest of a hill, and initially I happen to observe that 
tree a is taller than tree b. Moving around the side of the 
hill, such that tree c comes into view just as tree a moves 
out of view, I may see that b is taller than c. In this 
case, I can know that a is taller than c without actually 
perceiving that a is taller than c. This shows that the 
proposition that a is taller than c needn’t be observed. 
Accordingly, some relations of ideas may serve as 
bridging propositions, and so some relations of ideas implyd 
existence. But in that case there’s no reason to classify 
propositions like the causal maxim and the uniformity 
principle as matters of fact, while excluding relations of 
ideas — such as the one just provided — that may also serve 
as bridging propositions. In other words, Dicker’s criteria 
(C2) and (C3) can’t do the work they’re intended to do, and 
so are irrelevant to understanding Hume’s Fork. 
Put differently, Dicker claims that relations of ideas 
satisfy (C2): they don’t assert or implyd existence. In 
addition, Dicker claims that matters of fact satisfy (C3): 
they assert or implyd existence. In this way, (C2) and (C3) 
do some work for Dicker in differentiating relations of 
ideas from matters of fact.  
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But I’ve argued that (C2) is false: some relations of 
ideas implyd existence. In addition, we’ve seen that some 
matters of fact — for example, the causal maxim and the 
uniformity principle — don’t assert existence. Thus, 
whether a proposition asserts or impliesd existence isn’t 
relevant to understanding Hume’s Fork. 
We’ve seen, then, that Dicker’s interpretation of 
Hume’s Fork does little to advance our understanding of it. 
In the next section, I indicate the correct account of 
Hume’s Fork.  
 
Polishing Hume’s Fork 
Thus far, we’ve seen that Hume’s Fork doesn’t amount 
to the distinction between the logically necessary and the 
logically contingent (narrowly or broadly construed), or 
the distinction between the epistemically necessary and the 
epistemically contingent. In addition, we saw that Hume’s 
Fork doesn’t involve Dicker’s criteria of assertion and 
implication. In this section, I indicate what Hume’s Fork 
amounts to. 
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In order to make some headway, it will be helpful to 
consider Hume’s characterization of the distinction in the 
Treatise. At T 1.3.1.1, Hume writes: 
 
There are seven different kinds of philosophical 
relation… These relations may be divided into two 
classes; into such as depend entirely on the ideas, 
which we compare together, and such as may be chang’d 
without any change in ideas. (T 1.3.1.1)19 
 
Consider, first, Hume’s characterization of matters of 
fact in the above passage. Hume claims that these are 
relations that “may be chang’d without any change in [the] 
ideas” (ibid.). Thus take, for example, one’s idea of the 
Dalai Lama and one’s idea of the Pope, and suppose that the 
Dalai Lama is ten feet from the Pope. The question that one 
needs to ask oneself, at this point, is whether one can 
coherently replace this relation — being at a distance of 
ten feet — with an incompatible relation.20 Is it, for 
                                                        
19 I explain what Hume means by a “philosophical” relation in Chapter Three. 
20 There are two important claims made here that might otherwise go unnoticed: First, the question is 
whether one can coherently replace the relevant relation. Hume understands coherence in terms of 
whether or not the proposition entails a contradiction. Second, the question concerns the possible 
replacement of incompatible relations. For instance, the relation “being at a distance of less than twenty 
feet” isn’t incompatible with the relation “being at a distance of ten feet,” and thus showing that the 
latter can be replaced with the former would indicate that the proposition “the Dalai Lama is ten feet 
from the Pope” is a matter of fact proposition. But this is too weak of a test, and, while Hume doesn’t 
make this qualification explicit, it’s clear that he intends his test to apply only to incompatible relations. 
For instance, the question should be framed in terms of whether one can replace “being at a distance of 
ten feet” with “being at a distance of a thousand feet.” Indeed, given his characterization at EHU 4.1-2, 
Hume likely intends that incompatible relation would constitute the proposition’s denial (for example, 
“isn’t at a distance of ten feet”).  
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instance, coherent to suppose that the Dalai Lama is at a 
distance of a thousand feet from the Pope? Certainly. Thus, 
in this case, the ideas involved stay the same — one’s idea 
of the Dalai Lama and one’s idea of the Pope — and yet the 
relation can be coherently changed. This means that the 
relation “being at a distance of ten feet” and the relation 
“being at a distance of a thousand feet” are matter of fact 
relations, and thus the claim that the Dalai Lama is ten 
feet from the Pope is a matter of fact proposition.  
 Let’s turn, then, to Hume’s characterization in the 
Treatise of relations of ideas as those relations which 
“depend entirely on the ideas, which we compare together” 
(ibid.). As an illustration, Hume provides the idea of a 
triangle: 
 
It is from the idea of a triangle, that we discover 
the relation of equality, which its three angles bear 
to two right ones; and this relation is invariable, as 
long as our idea remains the same. (T 1.3.1.1) 
 
In fact, there are really two ideas involved here: one’s 
idea of the three angles of a triangle and one’s idea of 
two right angles.21 Hume claims here that, so long as we 
                                                        
21 It can’t just be one idea of a triangle because no triangle can have two right angles. Moreover, Hume’s 
interest is with a relation and a comparison (which demands at least two objects).  
 89 
don’t alter either of these ideas, the relation — in this 
case, equality22 — must remain the same. That is to say, we 
can’t coherently replace this relation with an incompatible 
relation, such as inequality. It’s on account of this that 
Hume claims that relations of ideas are “unalterable” and 
“invariable” (T 1.3.3.2, T 1.3.3.1, respectively). 
 What, then, does the distinction between relations of 
ideas and matters of fact amount to? Hume’s Fork amounts to 
the distinction between the conceptually necessary and the 
conceptually contingent. Relations of ideas, claims Hume, 
are conceptually necessary propositions, whereas matters of 
fact are conceptually contingent propositions.  
 In modern parlance, Kit Fine describes the relevant 
modality in this way: 
 
Consider the case of conceptual necessity — the 
necessity that holds in virtue of the identity of 
concepts. It will be necessary in this sense that 
nothing is both red and green, though not necessary 
that I am a person. (2002: 254) 
 
 In Humean terms, concepts are ideas, and thus when 
Hume claims that relations of ideas are relations that can 
be changed only when one alters at least one of the 
                                                        
22 This is the philosophical relation of “proportion in quantity or number.” 
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component ideas, he’s claiming that relations of ideas are 
conceptually necessary truths. Matters of fact, then, 
aren’t conceptually necessary truths; that is, they’re 
conceptually contingent truths (if true at all). 
 We can now see why Hume sometimes describes matters of 
fact propositions as a “real existence or matter of fact” 
(EHU 5.8). Pace Dicker, Hume doesn’t claim that matters of 
fact assert existence. He’s merely claiming that matters of 
fact are conceptually contingent truths. That is to say, 
they aren’t knowable solely on the basis of the concepts or 
ideas involved. It’s for this reason, for instance, that 
Hume can claim that the causal maxim is about a “real 
existence,” even though it doesn’t entail the existence of 
any non-abstract object. It’s a real existence because it’s 
true but it could have been false. It’s a contingent fact 
about the world, and our knowledge of its truth depends 
upon our experience of the world. 
Accordingly, Hume’s Fork is the distinction between 
the conceptually necessary and the conceptually contingent. 
A conceptually necessary proposition is a proposition 
that’s true solely in virtue of the concepts or ideas 
involved, and thus can be known solely on the basis of the 
concepts involved. In turn, a conceptually contingent 
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proposition is one that isn’t true (if true at all) solely 
on the basis of the concepts or ideas involved. It 
therefore can’t be known — or so Hume claims — solely on 
the basis of the concepts involved; experience of its truth 
is needed in order to know it.  
But what, then, are we to make of Hume’s previous 
characterization of relations of ideas as having denials 
that entail a contradiction, and matters of fact as having 
denials that don’t entail a contradiction?  
Take, for instance, the proposition “nothing red is 
green.” Is this a relation between ideas or a matter of 
fact for Hume? Hume’s procedure is as follows. First, 
consider it’s denial: “it’s not the case that nothing red 
is green.” The proposition’s denial, by itself, doesn’t 
logically entail a contradiction, and so it’s narrowly 
logically possible. 
But that’s no matter, for Hume’s interested in 
attending to the concepts or ideas involved. Hume 
associates an idea of red with the word “red,” and idea of 
green with the word “green.” Thus, like Descartes and as 
emphasized by Owen (1999), we shouldn’t be distracted by 
the formal properties of the proposition, but should 
instead attend to the concepts or ideas that factor into it. 
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In this way, Hume claims that one can intuit that the 
content of our idea of red isn’t identical to the content 
of our idea of green, and thus that nothing can be both red 
and green at the same time. Hume’s test, therefore, is 
phenomenological or psychological, not formal. 
This also explains why Hume’s Fork shouldn’t be 
characterized as the distinction between the analytic and 
the synthetic, as it’s traditionally understood. Hume, for 
instance, would count a proposition such as my house 
resembles your house as a relation between ideas (assuming 
its truth), or a proposition such as the Winklevosses 
resemble one another as a relation between ideas. This is 
because I can’t change the relation — resemblance — without 
also changing one of the ideas. But of course such claims 
aren’t analytic.  
Accordingly, the way to determine whether a 
proposition is a relation between ideas or a matter of fact 
is first to ask whether its denial entails a contradiction. 
The way to discern whether or not its denial entails a 
contradiction is to attend to the ideas involved, and if 
one conceives of a contradiction, then one’s original 
proposition is a relation between ideas. If one doesn’t 
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conceive a contradiction, then one’s original proposition 
is a matter of fact.  
But more can be said about this process, and what more 
is said is illuminating, for it reveals how central a role 
the notion of clear and distinct perception plays in Hume’s 
philosophy. In order to indicate as much, however, I need 
to anticipate some of the conclusions of this dissertation. 
I turn to this in the next section. 
 
Chalmers on Conceivability 
 David Chalmers (2002) has introduced terminology that 
can help situate Hume’s Fork, and the procedure that Hume 
recommends that distinguishes relations of ideas and 
matters of fact. We’ve seen that central to Hume’s method 
is the notion of conceivability. In particular, Hume first 
asks us to conceive of the proposition’s denial. But what 
is it to do this? Chalmers can help us answer this question, 
because he has distinguished three sets of contrasting 
kinds of conceivability.  
Chalmers first distinguishes between what he calls 
positive conceivability and negative conceivability. A 
proposition is negatively conceivable, just in case it’s 
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not ruled out a priori. The test for ruling out something a 
priori is whether or not the proposition entails a 
contradiction. Thus, Chalmers writes that “S is negatively 
conceivable when S is not ruled out a priori, or when there 
is no… contradiction in S” (2002: 149). The proposition 
“there are two polar bears in my backyard” is negatively 
conceivable, for no contradiction follows from this claim. 
In turn, positive conceivability requires that one form 
“some sort of positive conception of a situation in which S 
is the case” (2002: 150). In other words, positive 
conceivability involves imagining the relevant state of 
affairs.23 
At first sight, Hume’s characterization of his Fork 
seems to suggest that he intends it to be understood in 
terms of negative conceivability. He claims, as we saw at 
the beginning of this chapter, that relations of ideas have 
denials that entail a contradiction, whereas matters of 
fact don’t. But in fact positive conceivability is more 
fundamental to Hume. A few sections back, it was noted that 
demonstration, for Hume, is non-formal, and that it 
involves conceiving the content of one’s ideas and the 
relations between them. Accordingly, for Hume, one 
                                                        
23 Chalmers distinguishes between perceptual imaginings and modal imaginings. The former involve a 
perceptual mental image, whereas the latter doesn’t. In light of Hume’s copy principle, the relevant sense 
for Hume is perceptual imagining, whereas Descartes would be concerned with modal imagining. 
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ascertains that some proposition is negatively conceivable 
by first positively conceiving the proposition’s 
constituent ideas, and positively conceiving that no 
contradiction follows. In this way, Hume builds claims 
about negative conceivability on claims about positive 
conceivability. 
Chalmers’s second distinction is between prima facie 
conceivability and ideal conceivability. He writes that “S 
is prima facie conceivable for a subject when S is 
conceivable for that subject on first appearances,” and 
that “S is ideally conceivable when S is conceivable on 
ideal rational reflection” (2002: 147). It may be the case, 
for instance, that a proposition is prima facie conceivable 
but not ideally conceivable. Chalmers provides the 
following example: 
 
An example is provided by any mathematical statement M 
whose truth-value is currently unknown, but which will 
later be proved to be true. Here ~M is prima facie 
conceivable in the sense above (i.e., prima facie 
negatively conceivable) at least for current subjects. 
But it is not ideally conceivable, as ideal reflection 
will rule out ~M a priori. (ibid.) 
 
 Goldbach’s conjecture, for instance — the claim that 
every integer greater than two can be expressed as the sum 
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of two primes — is either true or false. Moreover, since we 
don’t know whether it’s true or false, its truth or falsity 
is prima facie conceivable. Nonetheless, since it’s either 
true or false, ideal rational reflection will come down on 
only one side of the question of its truth or falsity.  
 Hume clearly intends ideal conceivability when putting 
forward his Fork. For instance, “arguments that have the 
form of denying the antecedent are fallacious” would itself 
constitute a relation between ideas for Hume, but as logic 
teachers are well aware, some logic students conceive such 
arguments to be valid. Thus what interests Hume is ideal 
conceivability, not prima facie conceivability.  
But, as Chalmers notes, “the notion of ideal rational 
reflection remains to be clarified” (2002: 148). What 
renders something an instance of ideal conceivability?  
Chalmers introduces — but doesn’t commit to — a number 
of possible candidates. For instance, he writes that ideal 
conceivability may be defined in terms of an ideal reasoner 
or in terms of undefeatability by better reasoning. But my 
interest at present isn’t how we should characterize it, 
but how Hume characterizes ideal rational reflection. And 
here we do have an answer. 
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Hume’s criterion for ideal rational reflection hinges 
on the notion of clear and distinct perception. For 
instance, when presenting his Fork in the Enquiry, he 
claims that p’s a matter of fact proposition just in case 
~p “is conceived by the mind with the same facility and 
distinctness,” and is such that it’s “no less intelligible” 
(EHU 4.2, emphasis mine). In turn, p’s a relation between 
ideas just in case ~p can’t be “distinctly conceived by the 
mind” (ibid., emphasis mine). Thus, for Hume, a proposition 
can be prima facie conceivable but not ideally conceivable, 
for instance when it’s initially conceived obscurely or 
confusedly. When it’s conceived clearly and distinctly, it 
may turn out that the proposition isn’t conceivable after 
all. Here, then, is one instance in which clear and 
distinct perception factors into Hume’s philosophy. Indeed, 
it’s central to understanding Hume’s conceivability 
principle and the nature of Hume’s Fork. 
Chalmers’s final distinction involves the distinction 
between primary and secondary conceivability. A proposition 
is primarily conceivable “when it is conceivable that S is 
actually the case” (2002: 157) — that is, it’s conceivable 
that S is the case in the actual world, as opposed to some 
merely logically possible world. In turn, a proposition is 
secondarily conceivable “when S conceivably might have been 
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the case” (ibid.).24 In other words, the proposition is 
conceived to be the case in some logically possible world 
other than the actual world. 
Chalmers provides the following example to illustrate 
the distinction between primary/secondary conceivability: 
 
Primary conceivability is grounded in the idea that, 
for all we know a priori, there are many ways the 
world might be. The oceans might contain H2O, or they 
might contain XYZ; the evening star and the morning 
star might be the same or distinct; and so on. We can 
think of these ways the world might be as epistemic 
possibilities, in a broad sense according to which it 
is epistemically possible that S if the hypothesis 
that S is not ruled out a priori. (ibid.) 
 
As this passage suggests, the distinction between the 
primary and secondarily conceivable is motivated by Saul 
Kripke’s discussion of the necessary a posteriori. Let me 
(very) briefly note Kripke’s claims in this regard.  
Kripke (1972: 48) claims that proper names are rigid 
designators. In other words, proper names pick out the same 
object in every possible world in which they exist.25 Thus 
the proper names “Hesperus” and “Phosphorus” each pick out 
                                                        
24 Chalmers also calls primary conceivability “epistemic conceivability,” and secondary conceivability 
“subjunctive conceivability.” It’s worth noting that if this is the sense of epistemic possibility that Kail has 
in mind in our discussion above, then our accounts don’t differ. But Kail nowhere indicates that he intends 
Chalmers’s idiosyncratic sense of epistemic possibility. 
25 Kripke also thinks that some descriptions can serve as rigid designators — for example, “The Holy 
Roman Empire” — but we needn’t worry about this complication here. 
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Venus, and they do so in every possible world in which the 
object — Venus — exists. Consequently, Kripke claims that 
the identity claim “Hesperus is Phosphorus” is necessarily 
true.26 But, as Kripke notes, the fact that Hesperus and 
Phosphorus are one and the same was something that we 
discovered to be true, and thus is known a posteriori. 
Kripke concludes that certain identity statements are 
necessary a posteriori.   
The point that Chalmers is making — see also Kripke 
(1972: 100-105) — is that there’s some sense in which it’s 
conceivable that Hesperus isn’t identical to Phosphorus. 
For most people in the past believed that Hesperus wasn’t 
identical to Phosphorus, and thus in some sense conceived 
them to be nonidentical. Chalmers claims that the sense of 
“conceivable” at work here is primary conceivability. The 
ancients conceived Hesperus and Phosphorus to be actually 
distinct, not distinct in some logically possible world 
other than the actual world.  
When it comes to secondary conceivability, however, 
Chalmers presents the following example: 
 
                                                        
26 More rigorously put, Kripke claims that “Hesperus is Phosphorus” is weakly necessary — that is, it’s true 
in every possible world in which the object (Venus) exists.   
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Take an imagined situation in which the morning star 
is distinct from the evening star. Along with Kripke, 
we can say that if this situation had obtained, it 
would not have been the case that Hesperus was not 
Phosphorus. So when this situation is considered as 
counterfactual, it is revealed not as a situation in 
which Hesperus is not Phosphorus, but rather, as a 
situation in which at least one of the objects is 
distinct from both Hesperus and Phosphorus (at least 
if we take for granted the actual-world knowledge that 
Hesperus is Phosphorus, and if we accept Kripke’s 
intuitions). The reason is that (if Kripke is right) 
the application of a term like “Hesperus” to a 
counterfactual situation depends on whether the actual 
Hesperus (i.e., the planet Venus) is present within 
that situation, and of course the actual Hesperus and 
the actual Phosphorus are one and the same. So, when 
considered as counterfactual, this conceivable 
situation does not verify “Hesperus is not Phosphorus.” 
More generally (if Kripke is right), there is no 
coherently imaginable situation, considered as a 
counterfactual, that verifies “Hesperus is not 
Phosphorus.” If so, “Hesperus is not Phosphorus” is 
not secondarily positively conceivable. (2002: 158-9) 
 
 Thus Chalmers claims that the proposition “Hesperus 
isn’t Phosphorus” isn’t secondarily conceivable. Since both 
“Hesperus” and “Phosphorus” refer to the same object, Venus, 
I can’t imagine a world in which Hesperus isn’t Phosphorus. 
When I conceive of a logically possible world and claim 
that “Hesperus isn’t Phosphorus,” I must be conceiving of a 
situation in which one of the objects isn’t Venus, or so 
Chalmers and Kripke claim.  
Whatever the merits of Kripke’s account, the point to 
observe is that, if correct, then necessarily false 
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propositions for Kripke aren’t secondarily conceivable. 
Thus, if Hume intends the denials of matters of fact — say, 
the denial of “the fire caused the water to boil” — to be 
secondarily conceivable, then the connection between the 
cause and the effect can’t be necessary. In other words, if 
Hume intends secondary conceivability, then the skeptical 
realist interpretation is incorrect.  
 But there’s no reason to think that Hume intends 
secondary conceivability. Indeed, everything Hume says 
suggests that he intends primary conceivability, and to 
read Kripke’s views on naming into Hume would be 
anachronistic. Nonetheless, Chalmers’s distinctions are 
helpful in situating how Hume understands his Fork and the 
conceivability principle implicit in it. We may say that 
Hume’s sense of conceivability is primary positive 
conceivability. The negations of matters of fact are 
primarily positively conceivable, whereas the negations of 
relations of ideas aren’t primarily positively conceivable.  
In brief, I’ve claimed that Hume’s Fork maps on to the 
distinction between the conceptually necessary and the 
conceptually possible.   
 
 Conclusion 
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 In this chapter, I initially characterized Hume’s Fork 
as follows: (i) relations of ideas are propositions that 
have denials that entail a contradiction and (ii) are 
propositions that can be known a priori. In turn, matters 
of fact have (i) denials that don’t entail a contradiction 
and (ii) are knowable only a posteriori. This means that 
relations of ideas are known by intuition or by 
demonstration, and that matters of fact aren’t known in 
either of these ways. 
 Hume’s Fork, I’ve argued, isn’t the distinction 
between the narrowly logically necessary and the narrowly 
logically contingent, and isn’t the distinction between the 
metaphysically necessary and the metaphysically contingent. 
Moreover, I’ve argued that it’s not the distinction between 
the epistemically necessary and the epistemically 
contingent, nor should it be understood in terms of 
Dicker’s criteria of assertion and implication. 
 Having dispensed with these accounts, I argued that 
Hume’s Fork amounts to the distinction between the 
conceptually necessary and the conceptually contingent. 
This fits nicely with Hume’s understanding of demonstration 
as conceptually based, as Owen has shown. In addition, I 
indicated the role that clear and distinct perception plays 
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in Hume’s characterization of relations of ideas and 
matters of fact: the denials of relations of ideas aren’t 
primarily positively ideally conceivable, in that ideal 
conception is a matter of clearly and distinctly perceiving 
whether a contradiction follows from their denials. Matters 
of fact, on the other hand, have denials that are clearly 
and distinctly primarily positively conceivable.  
All of this has important implications for the New 
Hume debate, for it leaves room for the thesis that Hume 
believes in metaphysically necessary causal connections. 
The reason is that it leaves room for an account in the 
spirit of Kripke, such that our conceptual conclusions 
don’t always match up with the metaphysics involved. 
Reading this into Hume would of course be anachronistic, 
but perhaps Hume himself presents some indication that he 
conceives of matters in this way. More on this in 
subsequent chapters. 
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Chapter Three 
Thin Causation 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter, we saw that Hume divides all 
of human knowledge into two distinct kinds: matters of fact 
and relations of ideas. Hume claims that relations of ideas 
are conceptual truths, whereas matters of fact aren’t. In 
addition, Hume claims that relations of ideas can be known 
a priori, whereas matters of fact can only be known a 
posteriori. 
It’s easy to see how Hume could justify the truth of 
relations of ideas, for relations of ideas are knowable 
solely on the basis of the concepts involved. It’s less 
clear, however, how Hume could justify the truth of matters 
of fact, for these are propositions that can’t be known 
solely on the basis of the concepts involved. It’s these 
very considerations that lead Hume to entertain the causal 
relation, for he claims that the justification of matters 
of fact is based on causation.  
Hume claims that inferences concerning matters of fact 
require a knowledge of the various causal relationships 
that exist in the world. For instance, he writes that:  
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‘Tis evident, that all reasonings concerning matter of 
fact are founded on the relation of cause and effect, 
and that we can never infer the existence of one 
object from another, unless they be connected together, 
either mediately or immediately. In order therefore to 
understand these reasonings, we must be perfectly 
acquainted with the idea of a cause. (A 8) 
 
Hume provides a helpful illustration to make his point. 
Suppose that Jim stumbles upon a watch while walking across 
some deserted island. Upon picking up the watch and having 
a look, Jim exclaims, “There had once been humans beings on 
this island” (EHU 4.4). In this way, Jim infers that there 
must have been humans on the island on the basis of his 
seeing the watch. 
Notice that Jim’s conclusion — that at some point in 
time there were humans on this island — is a matter of fact 
proposition. It’s denial doesn’t entail a contradiction, 
and consequently it’s neither intuitively nor 
demonstratively known. According to Hume, then, in order 
for Jim to adequately reason to this conclusion, Jim must 
be implicitly asserting some causal connection between the 
existence of watches and the existence of human beings. The 
connection between watches and human beings isn’t a 
conceptual link: simply attending to the qualities 
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contained in the idea of a watch won’t lead Jim to the idea 
of a specific cause (or vice versa). Thus, in order to be 
justified, inferences about matters of fact must assume 
some causal connection, and so Hume turns his attention to 
the nature of our idea of a cause. 
This indicates, therefore, that the causal relation 
does important work for Hume. All nonconceptual knowledge 
depends upon a knowledge of various causal connections.1 
This raises the interesting question as to whether Hume’s 
discussion of causation actually indicates that he’s more 
interested in epistemology than metaphysics, for here his 
interest is in how we know, and less about what there is. 
 In this chapter, however, I shall spell out Hume’s 
account of causation. We shall see that Hume claims that 
our idea of causation is an idea of thin causation — that 
is, a knowledge of the cause isn’t sufficient to infer, a 
priori, the effect. These considerations lead us into some 
familiar territory, such as Hume’s infamous problem of 
induction and Hume’s two definitions of a cause. I say what 
I can with respect to each of these topics. 
 
                                                        
1 The only exception for Hume is substantive knowledge based on perception or memory — for example, 
my knowing that a crane is flying past my window because I’m seeing it fly past my window, or because I 
remember that it flew past my window (T 1.3.2.2). 
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Single Instances of Causation 
Hume commences his analysis of the causal relation by 
reiterating his test for meaning: 
 
To begin regularly, we must consider the idea of 
causation, and see from what origin it is deriv’d. 
‘Tis impossible to reason justly, without 
understanding perfectly the idea concerning which we 
reason; and ‘tis impossible perfectly to understand 
any idea, without tracing it up to its origin, and 
examining that primary impression, from which it 
arises. (T 1.3.2.4) 
 
 As we saw in the case of substance in Chapter One, 
Hume seeks to find the impression associated with the word 
“cause.” He begins by picking out a particular instance of 
causation, such as:   
 
billiard ball A’s striking billiard ball B, and 
causing B to move. 
 
By proceeding in this way, Hume begins his analysis of 
causation by considering it as a philosophical relation. In 
order to understand Hume’s procedure, therefore, I need to 
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say a few words on Hume’s distinction between natural and 
philosophical relations. 
Hume introduces this distinction by noting the 
following: 
 
The word relation is commonly us’d in two senses 
considerably different from each other. Either for 
that quality, by which two ideas are connected 
together in the imagination, and the one naturally 
introduces the other… or for that particular 
circumstance, in which, even upon the arbitrary union 
of two ideas in the fancy, we may think proper to 
compare them. In common language the former is always 
the sense, in which we use the word, relation; and 
‘tis only in philosophy, that we extend it to mean any 
particular subject of comparison, without a connecting 
principle. (T 1.1.5.1) 
 
 The first sense of “relation” that Hume identifies in 
this passage is what he calls a natural relation. Natural 
relations are relations that involve some kind of 
psychological association. As one might expect, therefore, 
such relations are “natural” to the extent that they 
involve ideas that are naturally related — that is, 
spontaneously and without reflection — on account of some 
observed quality. Hume famously refers to these relations 
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as “principles of the association of ideas,” and considers 
this concept to be one of his chief contributions (A 31).2 
As an example, Hume mentions the relation of 
resemblance. “The imagination,” he writes, “runs easily 
from one idea to any other that resembles it,” and “this 
quality alone is to the fancy a sufficient bond and 
association” (T 1.1.4.2). Nonetheless, Hume’s quick to 
point out that this bond or association isn’t an 
“inseparable” bond or association. Rather, the association 
is nothing more than a commonly prevailing “gentle force” 
(T 1.1.4.1), one that introduces ideas “with a certain 
degree of method and regularity” (EHU 3.1). Betraying his 
affinity for Newton, Hume goes on to put the matter as 
follows: 
 
Here is a kind of attraction, which in the mental 
world will be found to have as extraordinary effects 
as in the natural, and to shew itself in as many and 
as various forms. Its effects are every where 
conspicuous; but, as to its causes, they are mostly 
unknown, and must be resolved into original qualities 
of human nature, which I pretend not to explain. (T 
1.1.4.6) 
 
                                                        
2 Hume often describes natural and philosophical relations as relations between ideas; but as Hume’s 
views on belief make evident, he also conceives of these relations as extending to impressions. 
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Philosophical relations, on the other hand, are those 
relations that lack a psychological association. These are 
called “philosophical” because they’re relations that occur 
to someone who is engaged in philosophical reflection.3 Put 
differently, philosophical relations are “comparisons” or 
“arbitrary unions” in the imagination (T 1.1.5.1, emphasis 
mine). 
By way of an example, imagine a unicorn. The mere fact 
that you’re entertaining the idea of a unicorn doesn’t lead 
you to think of an antelope. If it does, then you probably 
have some odd fascination with unicorns and antelopes, such 
that, for you, these two ideas are naturally related. But 
in all likelihood this isn’t the case. In other words, it’s 
safe to say that your idea of a unicorn and your idea of an 
antelope aren’t naturally related. Nonetheless, now that 
you’re considering both unicorns and antelopes (now that 
you have both ideas before your mind), you may notice some 
similarities between them — for example, the fact that both 
unicorns and antelopes have (or usually have) horns. This 
aspect of similarity or resemblance is a philosophical 
relation, for it’s based on a reflective comparison, one 
that’s not grounded merely in a psychological association. 
                                                        
3 Presumably one needn’t actually be engaged in philosophical reflection. All that Hume intends here is 
that, as in philosophy, philosophical relations are the product of reflection. 
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At this point it’s worth recognizing an important 
corollary of this distinction. I have used the relation of 
resemblance as an example of both a natural and a 
philosophical relation. This is because Hume believes that 
natural relations also sometimes function as philosophical 
relations, although not all philosophical relations 
function as natural relations. For instance, Hume 
identifies the following as philosophical relations: 
resemblance, contiguity, causation, proportion in quantity 
or number, degree in quality, identity, and contrariety (T 
1.1.5). However, the first three relations — resemblance, 
contiguity, and causation — can also function as natural 
relations (T 1.1.4). Indeed, Hume claims that resemblance, 
contiguity, and causation are the only natural relations. 
Thus, to return to our singular case of causation, 
Hume initially considers this as a philosophical relation. 
What sort of comparison or arbitrary relations can we 
discern about some particular cause and effect? Hume 
writes:   
  
Let us therefore cast our eye on any two objects, 
which we call cause and effect, and turn them on all 
sides, in order to find that impression, which 
produces an idea of such prodigious consequence. (T 
1.3.2.5) 
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In considering this single instance of causation 
(recall billiard ball A and billiard ball B), Hume claims 
that there’s no discernible quality that makes A the cause 
and B the effect. He writes: 
 
At first sight I perceive, that I must not search for 
[our impression of cause and effect] in any of the 
particular qualities of the objects; since, which-ever 
of these qualities I pitch on, I find some object, 
that is not possest of it, and yet falls under the 
denomination of cause or effect. And indeed there is 
nothing existent, either externally or internally, 
which is not to be consider’d either as a cause or an 
effect; tho’ ‘tis plain there is no one quality, which 
universally belongs to all beings, and gives them a 
title to that denomination. (T 1.3.2.5) 
 
 Hume thus claims that there’s no simple perceptual 
property that renders something a cause or an effect. 
Instead, Hume claims that causation consists in a relation 
between objects, and thus it’s this “relation that we must 
now endeavor to discover” (T 1.3.2.6).  
 In considering a single instance of causation, Hume 
manages to identify two essential relations that constitute 
our idea of causation: these are the relations of 
contiguity and temporal succession. As for contiguity: 
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I find in the first place, that whatever objects are 
consider’d as causes or effects, are contiguous; and 
that nothing can operate in a time or place, which is 
ever so little remov’d from those of its existence…. 
We may therefore consider the relation of CONTIGUITY as 
essential to that of causation. (T 1.3.2.6) 
 
 Causes, therefore, must be contiguous in time and 
place with their effects. Hume’s condition of contiguity, 
however, has come under some scrutiny. Barry Stroud (1977: 
43-44), for instance, claims that Hume isn’t entitled to 
make this claim, for Hume also admits that: 
 
Tho’ distant objects may sometimes seem productive of 
each other, they are commonly found upon examination 
to be link’d by a chain of causes, which are 
contiguous among themselves, and to the distant 
objects; and when in any particular instance we cannot 
discover this connexion, we still presume it to exist.  
(T 1.3.2.6) 
  
 Stroud correctly argues that, given that Hume admits 
that we sometimes perceive instances of causation in which 
contiguity isn’t perceived, Hume can’t infer that all 
causation involves contiguity. But, as J. L. Mackie (1980: 
19) correctly retorts, Stroud mistakes Hume’s intentions. 
Mackie claims that Hume isn’t making a claim about 
causation as it exists in the objects; he’s merely making a 
claim about our idea of causation. Since we presume a 
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contiguity to exist when we don’t perceive one, we take 
contiguity to be an essential element in our idea of 
causation. And it’s our idea of causation that interests 
Hume at this point. 
 Hume’s second essential element that factors into our 
idea of causation is temporal succession. This holds that 
the cause must precede the effect in time. Hume recognizes 
that this condition is controversial: 
 
The second relation I shall observe as essential to 
causes and effects, is not so universally acknowledg’d, 
but is liable to some controversy. ‘Tis that of 
priority of time in the cause before the effect. Some 
pretend that ‘tis not absolutely necessary a cause 
shou’d precede its effect; but that any object or 
action, in the very first moment of its existence, may 
exert its productive quality, and give rise to another 
object or action, perfectly co-temporary with itself.  
(T 1.3.2.7) 
 
In short, Hume recognizes that some philosophers 
accept the possibility of co-temporaneous causation, that 
is, causation in which the cause is co-temporaneous with 
the effect. Despite the opinion of these philosophers, 
however, Hume thinks that temporal succession should be 
included in our idea of causation. Considering Hume’s 
argument for this claim would take us too far afield, but 
in brief Hume argues that co-temporaneous causation would 
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imply the nonexistence of time. Since time clearly exists, 
Hume argues that co-temporaneous causation isn’t possible. 
Thus, temporal succession should be included among our idea 
of a cause. 
So far, Hume’s identified two essential components of 
our idea of causation — contiguity and temporal succession. 
When we confine ourselves to single instances of causation, 
Hume claims that this is as far as we can go (T 1.3.2.9). 
Nothing else is relevant to our search when we consider a 
single case of causation. 
But contiguity and temporal succession don’t furnish a 
complete idea of causation. A complete idea for Hume is an 
idea that contains all of its component ideas. There’s some 
other element, Hume contends, that “enters into our idea of 
cause and effect” (T 1.3.2.13). This missing element is 
none other than the idea of necessary connection. We 
suppose, that is, that there’s a necessary connection 
between cause and effect. Thus, Hume writes: 
 
Shall we then rest contented with these two relations 
of contiguity and succession, as affording a complete 
idea of causation? By no means. An object may be 
contiguous and prior to another, without being 
considered as its cause. There is a necessary 
connexion to be taken into consideration; and that 
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relation is of much greater importance, than any of 
the other two above mentioned. (T 1.3.2.11) 
  
 In order to discern the nature of our idea of 
necessary connection, Hume believes that we must take an 
oblique or circuitous route. We must “beat about all the 
neighboring fields, without any certain view of design” (T 
1.3.2.13). The “neighboring fields” that Hume considers are 
the causal maxim — that every event must have a cause — and 
the nature of causal inference. In the end, Hume asks why 
it is that we suppose that the causal maxim is 
demonstrable: Why do we think that what exists must have a 
cause? In order to answer this question, Hume proceeds to 
study the nature of our causal inferences, which eventually 
leads him to our idea of a necessary connection. 
Accordingly, I turn to the nature of our causal inferences 
in the next section.  
 
 Multiple Instances of Causation 
 Hume has identified three essential elements to our 
idea of causation: (i) spatial and temporal contiguity, 
(ii) temporal succession, and (iii) necessary connection. 
But Hume doesn’t know what to make of our idea of necessary 
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connection. For this reason, Hume doesn’t immediately 
proceed to an analysis of this idea; instead, he intends to 
“beat about all the neighbouring fields, without any 
certain view or design” (T 1.3.2.13), in the hope of 
discovering the nature of this idea. The neighboring field 
that’s most relevant is his discussion of causal inference 
and his attendant discussion of belief, which is the result 
of our causal inferences. 
 Hume’s account of belief involves three elements: 
First, belief always involves a perception of an 
impression-like force — namely, a sensation or a memory. 
Second, this force is transferred to an idea that’s 
conjoined to it, such that, third, belief is the having of 
a vivacious idea. Thus Hume defines a belief as “a lively 
idea related to or associated with a present impression” (T 
1.3.7.5). 
Since all causal inferences result in belief, Hume 
contends that all causal inferences must begin with a 
perception of impression-like force: an impression or an 
idea of memory (T 1.3.4.1). If the inference doesn’t begin 
with a perception of impression-like force, then the 
inference is merely hypothetical, and thus can’t culminate 
in belief (T 1.3.4.2). For ease of exposition, I shall 
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refer to the impression-like content that factors into 
causal inference as an “impression.” 
 In a causal inference, the mind undergoes a transition 
from an impression to the idea believed. Hume first 
reiterates a point he made above, that the transition or 
inference isn’t due to a “penetration into their essences” 
(T 1.3.6.1). That is, we don’t infer the effect because of 
some discernible quality about the case (or vice versa). 
 Hume thinks that this can be easily shown. The idea of 
a cause is distinct from the idea of its effect, and so, by 
the separability principle, cause and effect are separable. 
No contradiction follows from our supposing that the effect 
doesn’t follow from the cause. Hume’s claiming that cause 
and effect aren’t related in the manner of relations of 
ideas, and thus the inference involved is one of 
probability and not knowledge. 
 The transition, then, must be based on experience. We 
remember past experiences of regularity — that is, we 
perceive that like causes are contiguous and successive 
with respect to like effects. Moreover, we observe that 
these conjunctions are constant (T 1.3.6.2). Hume therefore 
identifies this as an additional essential element of our 
concept of a cause: namely, a constant conjunction between 
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cause and effect. We delineate something as a cause or an 
effect only if the two relations of contiguity and 
succession are preserved in several instances (T 1.3.6.3). 
 But on what basis does the mind move from a knowledge 
of constant conjunction to belief in the unobserved, that 
is, a necessary connection? Hume puts this question in 
terms of whether causal inference is founded on reason or 
the imagination. He argues that reason can’t be the source 
of this inference, and this leads to his infamous problem 
of induction. I turn to an explication of this argument in 
the next section.  
 
The Problem of Induction 
 Hume claims that inferences based on sense experience 
aren’t based on reason, for this leads to a circularity. 
This, in short, is Hume’s infamous problem of induction. 
Because he thinks they’re not based on reason, they must be 
based on the imagination (T 1.3.6.12). 
Hume summarizes his contentions about inferences 
concerning matters of fact as follows: 
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When it is asked, What is the nature of all our 
reasonings concerning matter of fact? the proper 
answer seems to be, that they are founded on the 
relation of cause and effect. When again it is asked, 
What is the foundation of all our reasonings and 
conclusions concerning that relation? it may be 
replied in one word, EXPERIENCE. But if we still carry on 
our sifting humour, and ask, What is the foundation of 
all conclusions from experience? this implies a new 
question, which may be of more difficult solution and 
explication. (EHU 4.14) 
 
Hume asserts that claims about matters of fact are 
founded on the relation of cause and effect. As we saw 
above, Jim finds a watch on some deserted island, and 
claims, “There had once been human beings on this island” 
(EHU 4.1.4).4 In order for Jim to reason to this claim from 
his observation of the watch, he must implicitly assert 
some causal connection between the existence of watches and 
human beings.  
Second, Hume observes that the relation of cause and 
effect depends upon experience (EHU 4.7). Simply attending 
to the qualities contained in the idea of “watch,” or “this 
watch,” will not lead your thought to a specific cause; nor 
will simply dwelling on the qualities of the idea of “human 
being” lead you to an idea of “this watch,” and so Jim must 
                                                        
4 Some of Hume’s examples in this section of the Enquiry suggest that, in speaking in terms of how cause 
and effect factor into inductive reasoning, the notions of cause and effect are quite broad. The claim “My 
friend is in France” is said to be the effect of “My friends (trustworthy) testimony of this claim.” Obviously, 
claiming one will be in France does not cause one to be in France, properly speaking, though we do 
sometimes speak loosely and say something like, “My friends (trustworthy) testimony to this effect.” 
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have had some previous experience that connected the two. 
What this leads to is the natural idea that our idea of a 
causal connection emerges when we witness a constant 
conjunction of events of two types, and some degree of 
contiguity and priority between the cause and effect, and 
are thus propelled by custom into belief about a necessary 
connection. 
The relevant notion for our current purposes, however, 
is constant conjunction. Consider the following cases:  
 
A. a1 strikes b1 in circumstances c1, and b1 moves in 
manner k; 
B. a2 strikes b2 in circumstances c1, and b2 moves in 
manner k; 
C. a3 strikes b3 in circumstances c1, and b3 moves in 
manner k. 
 
Here we have a case of constant conjunction (assuming that 
there are no other cases of a’s striking b’s in 
circumstances c1 that fail to react in manner k). Suppose 
someone were to conclude, based on A, B, and C, that, if a4 
strikes b4 in circumstances c1, then b4 will move in manner 
k. This is a case of inductive reasoning, or reasoning 
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concerning a matter of fact. But such a conclusion, on 
Hume’s understanding, involves an inference of the 
following kind: from “I have found that such an object has 
always been attended with such an effect” to “I foresee, 
that other objects, which are, in appearance, similar, will 
be attended with similar effects” (EHU 4.16). In short, the 
implicit premise is that the future will resemble the past, 
or, better, that nature is uniform. For Hume our 
experiential conclusions, our inductive reasoning about 
matters of fact, all function in this way.  
 Where’s the problem? Let’s call the implicit premise 
that factors into inductive reasoning — namely that objects 
similar in appearance will be attended with similar effects 
(and vice versa) — H. Can we be certain of the truth of H? 
Given the distinctions noted above, one can only possibly 
justify H by way of intuition, demonstration, or 
probability. Since it’s conceivable that similar causes 
will not always have similar effects, intuition and 
demonstration are not possible forms of justification.  
 
When I see, for instance, a billiard-ball moving in a 
straight line towards another; even suppose motion in 
the second ball should by accident be suggested to me, 
as the result of their contact or impulse; may I not 
conceive, that a hundred different events might as 
well follow from that cause? May not both these balls 
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remain at absolute rest? May not the first ball return 
in a straight line, or leap off from the second in any 
line or direction? All these suppositions are 
consistent and conceivable. (EHU 4.10) 
 
Since probability is itself a species of inductive 
reasoning, justifying H by way of probability would entail 
one’s employing H in justifying H, which is clearly 
circular.5 This is the problem of induction, and it’s quite 
formidable.  
But is this really a problem, as Hume thinks? Nelson 
Goodman doesn’t think so. Indeed, Goodman claims to 
“dissolve” Hume’s problem. But Goodman’s mistaken. As it 
happens, Goodman’s dissolution is very much similar to 
Hume’s solution. It will therefore benefit us to consider 
Goodman’s dissolution. 
 
 Goodman’s Dissolution 
 Nelson Goodman claims that Hume’s problem of induction 
— what he calls “the old problem of induction” — has been 
solved, or rather “dissolved” (1979: 59). Goodman observes 
that Hume’s problem of induction is the problem of 
                                                        
5 “But you must confess, that the inference is not intuitive; neither is it demonstrative: Of what nature is it 
then? To say it is experimental, is begging the question. For all inferences from experience suppose, as 
their foundation, that the future will resemble the past, and that similar powers will be conjoined with 
similar sensible qualities” (EHU 4.21). 
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justifying judgments about unobserved cases. The problem, 
as Goodman puts it, is that “such judgments are neither 
reports of experience nor logical consequences of it” 
(ibid.). Goodman primarily focuses on predictions — that is, 
inferences to future cases — and so I shall also limit my 
discussion to prediction. Thus: 
 
Predictions, of course, pertain to what has not yet 
been observed. And they cannot be logically inferred 
from what has been observed; for what has happened 
imposes no logical restrictions on what will happen. 
(ibid.) 
 
 The question, then, becomes: Why prefer one prediction 
over rival predictions? Suppose that I predict that my 
youngest son will spill his drink sometime tomorrow, but a 
soothsayer predicts that he won’t. Do we have any grounds 
for supposing that my prediction is more probable than the 
soothsayer’s? After all, the soothsayer has never met my 
son and merely makes his or her prediction by looking into 
a crystal ball, which is hardly a reliable belief forming 
process. Moreover, I have experienced for nearly two years 
of his existence, my youngest son spilling the overwhelming 
majority of the drinks that have been handed to him. Indeed, 
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he’s likely doing just that right now. Certainly my 
prediction is more probable than the soothsayer’s, right?  
 Goodman believes, however, that this way of putting 
things confuses matters. He claims that Hume’s description 
of what occurs in induction also answers the justificatory 
problem. Indeed, the latter isn’t really a problem to be 
solved, and so Goodman takes himself to have “dissolved” 
the problem. In short, Goodman claims that once we see how 
induction works (a descriptive claim), we will see that no 
further justification is needed (a normative claim).  
 Goodman’s dissolution of the old problem of induction 
begins with an analogy to the justification of deduction. 
He explains: 
 
How do we justify a deduction? Plainly, by showing 
that it conforms to the general rules of deductive 
inference. An argument that so conforms is justified 
or valid, even if its conclusion happens to be false. 
An argument that violates a rule is fallacious even if 
its conclusions happens to be true. To justify a 
deductive conclusion therefore requires no knowledge 
of the facts it pertains to. Moreover, when a 
deductive argument has been shown to conform to the 
rules of logical inference, we usually consider it 
justified without going on to ask what justifies the 
rules. Analogously, the basic task in justifying an 
inductive inference is to show that it conforms to the 
general rules of induction. Once we have recognized 
this, we have gone a long way towards clarifying our 
problem. (1979: 63) 
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 Thus Goodman claims that particular deductions are 
justified because they conform to the general rules of 
deduction. Suppose, then, that we have a particular 
deductive argument, A. Goodman claims that: 
 
1. A is justified 
 
because 
 
2. A conforms to the (justified) rules, R, of deductive 
inference.  
 
He recognizes that in order for R to justify A, R must 
itself be justified. Thus, he writes: 
 
Yet, of course, the rules themselves must eventually 
be justified. The validity of a deduction depends not 
upon conformity to any purely arbitrary rules we may 
contrive, but upon conformity to valid rules. When we 
speak of the rules of inference we mean the valid 
rules — or better, some valid rules, since there may 
be alternative sets of equally valid rules. But how is 
the validity of rules to be determined? (ibid.) 
 
His answer to this last question is:  
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Principles of deductive inference are justified by 
conformity with accepted deductive practice. Their 
validity depends upon accordance with the particular 
deductive inferences we actually make and sanction. If 
a rule yields unacceptable inferences, we drop it as 
invalid. Justification of general rules thus derives 
from judgments rejecting or accepting particular 
deductive inferences. (1979: 63-4) 
 
Thus the rules of deduction are justified by not 
yielding any unacceptable inferences.  
 
I have said that deductive inferences are justified by 
their conformity to valid general rules, and that 
general rules are justified by their conformity to 
valid inferences. But this circle is a virtuous one. 
The point is that rules and particular inferences 
alike are justified by being brought into agreement 
with each other. A rule is amended if it yields an 
inference we are unwilling to accept; an inference is 
rejected if it violates a rule we are unwilling to 
amend. The process of justification is the delicate 
one of making mutual adjustments between rules and 
accepted inferences; and in the agreement achieved 
lies the only justification needed for either. (1979: 
64) 
 
 This is Goodman’s method of reflective equilibrium, 
later appropriated by John Rawls. Goodman claims that the 
circularity exhibited here is a virtuous one. 
Naturally, Goodman claims that what holds for 
deduction also holds for induction. 
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All this applies equally well to induction. An 
inductive inference, too, is justified by conformity 
to general rules, and a general rule by conformity to 
accepted inductive inferences. Predictions are 
justified if they conform to valid canons of 
induction;6 and the canons are valid if they accurately 
codify accepted inductive practice. (ibid.) 
 
This is Goodman’s dissolution of the problem. A particular 
inductive inference is justified if it conforms to the 
inductive canon, and the inductive canon is justified if it 
doesn’t yield any unacceptable inferences.  
 Hume’s problem remains, however. It’s easiest to see 
why if we discuss matters in terms of deduction. Goodman 
offers us the following picture: 
 
3. A is justified 
 
because 
 
4. A conforms to rules of deductive inference R. 
 
                                                        
6 Goodman (1979: 65) recognizes that, unlike deduction, there aren’t any well-established principles or 
canons of inductive inference. 
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And 
 
5. R is justified 
 
because 
 
6. R conforms to accepted deductive practice P. 
 
The idea is that P contains many different argument 
forms — modus ponens (MP), modus tollens (MT), disjunctive 
syllogism (DS), hypothetical syllogism (HS), and so on — 
and that none of these forms leads to “unacceptable 
inferences.” In other words, no form has a counterexample 
(or widely recognized counterexample). Consider MP: 
 
(MP) 
(i) p É q 
(ii) p 
(iii) Therefore, q 
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To say that (MP) lacks a counterexample is to say that 
there’s no substitution instance in which its premises are 
true and its conclusion false. Over the course of human 
history, we’ve never found an “unacceptable” inference that 
had this form. In light of this, we exalt it to the status 
of a rule of deductive inference.  
 Things are rather different, of course, with something 
like the fallacy of denying the antecedent. That is: 
 
(DA) 
(i) p É q 
(ii) ~p 
(iii) Therefore, ~q 
 
This is no less a candidate as a rule of deductive 
inference, but we don’t accept it as one because it has 
counterexamples. For instance, a counterexample to (DA) is: 
 
(i) If 1 + 1 = 3, then I’m not God. 
(ii) It’s not the case that 1 + 1 = 3 
(iii) Therefore, I’m God. 
 
 131 
Although I myself believe this conclusion, the inference, 
unfortunately, isn’t acceptable. Thus (MP) constitutes a 
valid rule of deductive inference — alongside (MT), (DS), 
(HS), and so forth — but (DA) doesn’t.  
 But notice that the move from (5) to (6) stipulates 
that R is justified because R conforms to accepted 
deductive practice P. In other words, when we take (MP) as 
the relevant rule, 
 
7. (MP) is justified 
 
because 
 
8. (MP) conforms to accepted deductive practice.  
 
(8) implies that (MP) has no counterexamples, and thus that 
all (MP) instantiations are valid (or that all [MP] 
instantiations so far observed have been valid).  
But notice that here we must rely on induction. Thus, 
on Goodman’s account, we have: 
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9. All (MP) instantiations are valid (or all [MP] 
instantiations so far observed have been valid). 
 
is justified because  
 
10. Some past argument, B, has form MP and doesn’t 
have true premises and a false conclusion, and 
11. Some past argument, C, has form MP and doesn’t 
have true premises and a false conclusion, and 
12. Some past argument, n, for any number of n, has 
form MP and doesn’t have true premises and a false 
conclusion.7 
 
Clearly, the inference from (10)-(12) to (9) is an 
inductive argument. Thus Goodman’s dissolution requires 
that argument forms be justified on account of accepted 
practice, and yet the way that they are justified by 
accepted practices relies on induction. 
 Thus, if Goodman were right, deduction would rely on 
induction, and induction itself is justified by reflective 
equilibrium. The justification of induction involves a 
                                                        
7 And there’s no argument that we have observed that has form MP that has true premises and a false 
conclusion. 
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circularity, but one that Goodman regards as virtuous. In 
short, we observe that certain inductive principles of 
inference work — that is, they lack counterexamples or 
common occurrences of counterexamples. This is the 
pragmatist strand in Goodman. Since they work, we can then 
use them to make further inferences. 
 According to Helen Beebee (2006: 66-74), Hume isn’t an 
inductive skeptic, for the problem of induction is intended 
to show only that inductive inferences aren’t justified by 
our reason. Rather, induction is “more animal than divine” 
(2006: 11), and thus Hume’s interest has more to do with 
the source of justification than with its existence. 
Consider, for instance, Hume’s remarks on the causal maxim, 
which is a proposition he takes to be inductively grounded: 
 
I only maintain’d, that our certainty of the falsehood 
of that proposition proceeded neither from intuition 
nor demonstration; but from another source. That 
Caesar existed, that there is such an island as 
Sicily; for these propositions, I affirm, we have no 
demonstrative nor intuitive proof. Wou’d you infer 
that I deny their truth, or even their certainty? 
There are many different kinds of certainty; and some 
of them as satisfactory to the mind, tho perhaps not 
so regular, as the demonstrative kind. (L 1.91)8 
 
                                                        
8 “L” refers to the volume containing Hume’s letters, and the numbers indicate the volume and the letter, 
respectively. 
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Hume doesn’t deny that everything that exists has a cause; 
he merely denies that our knowledge or certainty of this 
truth is demonstrative or intuitive.  
 The same point is reiterated in A Letter to a 
Gentleman, where, again, he’s responding to critics. There 
he writes: 
 
The author is charged with opinions leading to 
downright atheism, chiefly by denying this principle, 
that whatever begins to exist must have a cause of 
existence. To give you a notion of the extravagance of 
this charge, I must enter into a little detail. It is 
common for philosophers to distinguish the kinds of 
evidence into intuitive, demonstrative, sensible, and 
moral; by which they intend only to mark a difference 
betwixt them, not to denote a superiority of one above 
another. Moral certainty may reach as high a degree of 
assurance as mathematical; and our senses are surely 
to be comprised amongst the clearest and most 
convincing of all evidences. Now, it being the 
author’s purpose, in the pages cited in the specimen, 
to examine the grounds of that proposition; he used 
the freedom of disputing the common opinion, that it 
was founded on demonstrative or intuitive certainty; 
but asserts, that it is supported by moral evidence, 
and is followed by a conviction of the same kind with 
these truths, that all men must die, and that the sun 
will rise tomorrow. (LG 21)9 
 
Hume’s point is that the causal maxim is known with moral 
certainty, not any other species of certainty. Indeed, “a 
                                                        
9 “LG” abbreviates Hume’s A Letter to a Gentleman, the numbers indicating the paragraph. 
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man must have lost all common sense to doubt” the causal 
maxim, claims Hume (ibid.).  
According to Beebee, then, Hume believes that the 
uniformity principle is justified because it’s reliable — 
“causal reasoning tracks the truth” (2006: 73). Accordingly, 
the problem of induction, while a bit of an aside to our 
aims here, is merely intended by Hume to show that 
induction is based on the imagination, not reason. 
 
 Thin Necessary Connection 
 Thus, to return to our idea of necessary connection, 
Hume claims that the essential elements in our idea of 
causation are the following: (i) spatial and temporal 
contiguity, (ii) temporal succession, (iii) necessary 
connection, and (iv) constant conjunction. But we still 
don’t know what our idea of necessary connection consists 
in, and Hume claims that the transition from an impression 
to belief isn’t founded on reason.  
Thus, at this point, we merely perceive a constant 
conjunction of like causes and like effects. Hume claims, 
however, that the world “can never produce any new quality 
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in the object, which can be the model of our idea of 
necessary connection” (T 1.3.14.20). In other words: 
 
There is, then, nothing new either discover’d or 
produc’d in any objects by their constant conjunction, 
and by the uninterrupted resemblance of their 
relations of succession and contiguity. (T 1.3.14.19) 
 
 Nonetheless, Hume claims that the observation of these 
constant conjunctions “produces a new impression in the 
mind, which is its real model” (T 1.3.14.20). 
 
For after we have observ’d the resemblance in a 
sufficient number of instances, we immediately feel a 
determination of the mind to pass from one object to 
its usual attendant, and to conceive it in a stronger 
light upon account of that relation…. Necessity, then, 
is the effect of this observation, and is nothing but 
an internal impression of the mind, or a determination 
to carry our thoughts from one object to another. 
Without considering it in this view, we can never 
arrive at the most distant notion of it, or be able to 
attribute it either to external or internal objects, 
to spirit or body, to causes or effects. (ibid.) 
 
 Hume claims, in other words, that our perceiving a 
constant conjunction between like causes and like effects 
produces a new impression — a felt determination or 
propensity of the mind. This is an impression of reflection 
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(T 1.3.14.22). It’s the feeling that like effects will be 
followed by like causes.  
Accordingly, our causal inferences are based on our 
experience of past constant conjunctions of contiguity and 
succession. Our idea of necessary connection is copied from 
an impression of reflection, which is produced on account 
of our experiencing these past constant conjunctions. 
For Hume, then, our idea of necessary connection is an 
outcome of our causal inferences, rather than vice versa. I 
perceive a constant conjunction of like objects, and this 
forms the “customary transition” of inferring similar 
objects from similar causes.  
 Hume summarizes his conclusions pertaining to his 
discussion of causation with his two definitions, which I 
briefly detailed in Chapter One. These two definitions are: 
 
First Definition of a Cause 
We define a cause to be, An object precedent and 
contiguous to another, and where all the objects 
resembling the former are plac’d in a like relation of 
priority and contiguity to those objects, that 
resemble the latter. (T 1.3.14.35) 
 
Second Definition of a Cause 
We define a cause to be, An object precedent and 
contiguous to another, and so united with it in the 
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imagination, that the idea of the one determines the 
mind to form the idea of the other, and the impression 
of the one to form a more lively idea of the other. (T 
1.3.14.35) 
 
 There has been considerable debate over Hume’s two 
definitions of a cause. One common charge is that Hume’s 
definitions aren’t extensionally equivalent, and thus as 
definitions they’re suspect.  
 But Hume’s procedure here isn’t all that surprising. 
Recall that Hume takes the term “relation” to be ambiguous. 
This may refer either to natural relations or philosophical 
relations. Philosophical relations are arbitrary 
comparisons that don’t rely on any psychological 
association, whereas natural relations are principles of 
association within the imagination (T 1.3.6.13).  
 Moreover, causation functions both as a philosophical 
and a natural relation. And thus the term “causation” is 
itself ambiguous, depending upon which kind of relation — 
philosophical or natural — one intends. Thus it’s not 
surprising that Hume offers two definitions. 
 Thus, taken as a philosophical relation, and 
considering only that which is pertinent to the objects, 
causation is simply spatial contiguity and temporal 
succession, as per the first definition. When we speak of a 
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cause in this sense, nothing pertaining to the imagination 
is relevant. On the other hand, when we consider it as a 
natural relation, we see that the customary transition of 
the mind needs to come into play, which is made explicit in 
the second definition. 
 Strictly speaking, then, there’s no necessary 
connection in objects. However, the second definition more 
accurately reflects our idea of causation, for our idea of 
causation includes the idea of necessary connection. This 
idea of a necessary connection is based on an impression of 
reflection, not an impression of sensation. It seems 
evident, therefore, that Hume endorses a thin idea of 
necessary connection, as it’s a feature of our minds and 
not objects, grounded as it is in our experience, not the 
world. 
 
 Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I have outlined Hume’s account of our 
idea of causation. Hume claims that our idea of causation 
is composed of three elements: (i) contiguity in time and 
place, (ii) temporal succession, and (iii) necessary 
connection, and that the latter results from the constant 
conjunction of the former two. 
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 His account of necessary connection is thin: that is, 
our idea of necessary connection is based on no more than 
an impression of reflection, and thus is produced by our 
minds rather than an impression of sensation. The idea of a 
necessary connection is ultimately grounded in us, in 
particular in the operations of our minds. It is not 
ultimately grounded in the world of objects. 
 This account is very much the standard one. It’s what 
Old Humeans appeal to in defending their position. In the 
next chapter, I consider how Old Humeans rely on Hume’s 
account to argue against the New Hume interpretation, and 
consider the various responses on the part of New Humeans. 
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Chapter Four 
Thick Causation 
Introduction 
In Chapter Three, we saw that Hume claims that our 
idea of necessary connection is copied from an impression 
of reflection — namely, a felt determination of the mind. 
Since this impression is the product of our experiencing a 
constant conjunction of like events, Hume takes our idea of 
necessary connection to be thin. 
Hume’s account of necessary connection constitutes the 
basis for the most forceful and persistent criticism of the 
New Hume interpretation. Briefly put, the objection is that 
Hume can’t believe in thick causation, for one can believe 
in thick causation only if one can have an idea of thick 
causation. But, the argument goes, Hume denies that we have 
any idea of thick causation. Hume, as we’ve seen, takes the 
idea of necessary connection that factors into our idea of 
causation to be thin, not thick. Thus Hume can’t believe in 
thick causation. In this chapter, I consider the main lines 
of argument in this debate.  
 
The Criticism Stated 
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Ken Winkler (1991) has argued that Hume’s theory of 
ideas — the view that all ideas originate in experience — 
forecloses on the possibility of any idea of thick 
causation.1 Since Hume can’t have an idea of thick causation, 
he can’t believe in thick causation. Winkler explains: 
 
Every thought or perception must be derived from 
impressions, and although Hume is vague about the 
constraints on derivation — the creative power of the 
mind amounts… “to no more than the faculty of 
compounding, transposing, augmenting, or diminishing 
the materials afforded us by the senses and experience” 
— a “thought” or “perception” whose derivation fails 
to satisfy those constraints is not a thought or 
perception at all. (1991: 560) 
 
This reading gains support from the observation that the 
“scope of the theory [of ideas] seems to be universal, and 
its force unforgiving: it seems to say that any alleged 
thought or conception lacking an appropriate pedigree is 
unintelligible or meaningless” (1991: 552). 
 Accepting the gauntlet, Galen Strawson (2014: 14), a 
New Humean, has formulated the challenge to New Humeans in 
terms of three fundamental interpretative claims, epistemic, 
semantic, and ontological: 
 
                                                        
1 Winkler’s article is what gave rise to the name “The New Hume.” 
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E. All we can ever know of causation is regular 
succession.  
S. All we can legitimately manage to mean by expressions 
like “causation in the objects” is regular succession.  
O. All that causation actually is, in the objects, is 
regular succession. 
 
Strawson contends that proponents of the Old Hume 
argue from (E) to (S), and then from (S) to (O). He puts 
the argument as follows (2014: 15): 
 
1. E. 
2. If E is true, then S is true. 
3. If S is true, then O is true. 
4. Therefore, O. 
 
First, Old Humeans interpret Hume as claiming that all 
that we can know about causation is that it consists of 
regular succession. This is the account of causation that I 
attributed to Hume in Chapter Three. From it, I concluded 
that Hume’s view of causation is thin.  
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In addition, Old Humeans argue that (2) follows from 
Hume’s meaning-empiricism: if the only idea we can have of 
causation is an idea of thin causation, then that’s all 
that we can ever manage to mean by the term. The reason is 
that on Hume’s meaning-empiricism, the meaning of a term is 
provided by its associated idea.  
This brings us to the third premise. As (3) indicates, 
proponents of the Old Hume contend that the semantic claim 
has ontological implications. Here, for instance, is how 
Strawson puts the point: 
 
Why does (O) follow from (S)? Because, given (S), when 
the phrase “causation in the objects” comes out of our 
mouths or pens, or occurs in our thought, it 
inevitably just means regular succession. So (O) 
causation in the objects — here is the phrase, meaning 
“regular succession” — just is regular succession. 
After all, regular succession is regular succession. 
(2007: 34) 
 
The idea is that, given (S), the phrase “causation in the 
objects” is synonymous with the phrase “regular succession 
in the objects.” Thus (O), the claim that “causation in the 
objects is regular succession,” turns out to be trivial. 
For if we replace “causation in the objects” with “regular 
succession in the objects” in (O), then we get “regular 
succession is regular succession.”  
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Thus Old Humeans claim that Hume can’t even think 
about or contemplate thick causation. Helen Beebee puts the 
point this way: 
 
If we hold [Hume] to the doctrine that the impression-
source of an idea provides its meaning, and put it 
together with the thesis that the impression-source of 
the idea of necessary connection is the “feeling” we 
get when we infer effects from causes, we appear to 
rule out the possibility of our even being able to 
contemplate the possibility that there are real 
necessary connections in nature. We have no idea that 
corresponds to the expression “real necessary 
connection in nature,” since the alleged idea does not 
have its source in any sensory impression. Rather, 
when we say or think that one event is necessarily 
connected to another, and hence that the first caused 
the second, what we really turn out to mean by that 
claim must have something to do with the transition of 
the mind from the observation of the first event to 
the expectation that the second event will follow, and 
nothing to do with any alleged real connection between 
the two events. (2006: 9)  
 
Likewise, Peter Kail calls this the “semantic threat” to 
causal realism, and notes that “if we cannot detect power — 
have an impression of it — it seems as if we cannot form 
any thought at all and so uses of the word ‘power’ are mere 
noise” (2007a: 31). 
Consequently, New Humeans have devoted much of their 
attention to showing how Hume can make room within his 
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theory of ideas for an idea of thick causation. In the next 
section, I turn to these considerations. 
 
Strawson’s Case for Skeptical Realism 
Strawson’s 1989 book, The Secret Connexion: Causation, 
Realism, and David Hume, has arguably done more than anyone 
else to generate interest in the New Hume.2 Accordingly, I 
shall primarily focus on the main line of response offered 
by Strawson. Strawson explains and defends the skeptical 
realist position. 
Strawson commences his case for skeptical realism by 
noting the well-known fact that Hume was dissatisfied with 
the reception of the Treatise. Upon its first publication, 
it received very little attention, and what attention it 
did receive was largely hostile. Thus, when Hume 
essentially rewrote the material of Book One of the 
Treatise, and then published it as his first Enquiry, he 
asked his publisher to include the following disclaimer: 
 
Most of the principles, and reasonings, contained in 
this volume, were published in a work in three volumes, 
called A Treatise of Human Nature: a work which the 
author projected before he left college, and which he 
                                                        
2 In addition, see John Wright’s 1983 book, The Sceptical Realism of David Hume.  
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wrote and published not long after. But not finding it 
successful, he was sensible of his error in going to 
the press too early, and he cast the whole anew in the 
following pieces, where some negligences in his former 
reasoning and more in the expression, are, he hopes, 
corrected. Yet several writers, who have honoured the 
author’s philosophy with answers, have taken care to 
direct all their batteries against the juvenile work, 
which the author never acknowledged, and have affected 
to triumph in any advantages, which, they imagined, 
they had obtained over it: a practice very contrary to 
all rules of candour and fair-dealing, and a strong 
instance of those polemical artifices, which a bigoted 
zeal thinks itself authorized to employ. Henceforth, 
the author desires, that the following pieces may 
alone be regarded as containing his philosophical 
sentiments and principles. (EHU Advertisement) 
 
 Strawson takes Hume’s denouncement of the Treatise in 
this Advertisement very seriously, and consequently derives 
an exegetical or interpretative principle from it: 
 
Strawson’s Exegetical Principle 
We have an obligation to read the Enquiry back into 
the Treatise, and not vice versa. 
 
 Accordingly, Strawson claims that, if a passage in the 
Treatise appears incompatible with a passage in the Enquiry, 
it is to be discarded. He claims that only if (i) the 
passage in the Enquiry is unclear, and (ii) the passage in 
the Treatise isn’t incompatible with something else in the 
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Enquiry that’s in dispute — only then can we rely on the 
Treatise. 
 Accordingly, Strawson claims that the “negligences in… 
expression” (ibid.) that Hume mentions in the Advertisement 
are “doubtless his phrasings of epistemological points in a 
dramatically ontological idiom” (2007: 49, fn. 4). Consider, 
for instance, Hume’s use of the term “external.” His use 
seems to suggest that, when he writes of “external objects” 
he’s referring to objects that exist in the natural world, 
independent from the mind. This, however, is at odds with 
his relegating questions of external existence to the realm 
of the natural philosophers. Instead, he likely intends to 
use the term to refer to objects that we regard as external, 
and wishes to say nothing about whether such objects really 
are externally existing objects. Accordingly, this would be 
a case in which Hume’s language misleads; for his point is 
epistemological, not ontological. Consequently, Strawson 
notes that “Hume deserves [our] sympathy, for it is bad to 
be attacked for views one never held, and worse to be 
praised and famous for holding them” (2014: 11). 
Strawson claims that the criticism of the New Hume 
presented above rests on this very misunderstanding. That 
is to say, it mistakes an epistemological claim for an 
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ontological claim. According to Strawson, Winkler’s 
argument stipulates that an idea of thick causation is 
unintelligible for Hume. But Strawson argues that there are 
two relevant senses of the terms “intelligible” and 
“unintelligible.” These, says Strawson, are as follows. 
In the modern sense, Strawson says, something is 
unintelligible just in case it’s incoherent or doesn’t make 
sense. Thus, anything unintelligible in this sense can’t 
exist, for, like a square a circle, it lacks consistency. 
But Strawson argues that Hume intends “unintelligible” in a 
sense distinct from this, one that doesn’t prevent us from 
having an idea of thick causation. Hume “means that we 
cannot form an idea of it… that has any positive 
descriptive content on the terms of the theory of ideas. To 
say this, however, is not to say that we cannot refer to it, 
or that the notion of it is incoherent” (2007: 35). Thick 
causation is unintelligible, but not in the sense of its 
being incoherent. Rather, it’s unintelligible in the sense 
that it can’t be adequately understood, or understood in a 
particular way. This is the second sense of 
“unintelligible.” In order to understand the way in which 
our idea of thick causation is unintelligible, we need to 
turn to the eighteenth-century distinction between positive 
and relative ideas. 
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Proponents of the New Hume point to the distinction 
between positive/direct and relative ideas in order to make 
room within Hume’s meaning-empiricism for an idea of thick 
causation. This distinction is also sometimes described as 
the distinction between conceiving and supposing an idea, 
and it has been most fully articulated by Daniel Flage.3 
To see this distinction at work, consider Thomas 
Reid’s distinction between direct and relative conceptions 
in his Essays on the Active Powers of the Human Mind. Reid 
writes: 
 
Of some things, we know what they are in themselves; 
our conception of such things I call direct. Of other 
things, we know not what they are in themselves, but 
only that they have certain properties or attributes, 
or certain relations to other things; of these our 
conception is only relative.4 
 
An example that Reid provides is the following: 
 
[I]n the university library, I call for the book, 
press L, shelf 10, No. 10; the library keeper must 
have such a conception of the book I want, as to be 
able to distinguish it from ten thousand that are 
under his care. But what conception does he form of it 
from my words? They inform him neither of the author, 
nor the subject, nor the language, nor the size, nor 
                                                        
3 See Daniel Flage (1981), (1982), and (2007). 
4 Reid, Essays on the Active Powers of the Human Mind, 1.1, p. 9. 
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the binding, but only of its mark and place. His 
conception of it is merely relative to these 
circumstances; yet this relative notion enables him to 
distinguish it from every other book in the library.5 
 
In this passage, Reid tells the librarian the book he 
desires by noting certain properties of it — it’s the book 
that has the attributes of “press L, shelf 10, No. 10.” In 
specifying the book in this way, the librarian doesn’t have 
any “picture” of the book before his or her mind. But, as 
Reid notes, the librarian must still have some “conception 
of the book I want” (ibid.). In short, Reid claims that the 
librarian lacks a direct idea of the book, although he or 
she does have a relative idea of it.  
Flage notes that Reid wasn’t the first to employ this 
distinction in early modern thought. Locke, Flage says, and 
Berkeley, made use of it, and Descartes and Spinoza likely 
did as well (2007: 139-140).  
In addition, Flage contends that the direct/relative 
idea distinction is analogous to Bertrand Russell’s later 
distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge 
by description.6 A relative idea, claims Flage, is the 
“cognitive analogue of a definite description,” and thus he 
describes his account as the describing model of relative 
                                                        
5 Ibid., pp. 9-10. 
6 See Bertrand Russell (1912). 
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ideas (2007: 138). As for Hume, Flage argues that while 
“positive ideas are nothing more than copies of impressions 
or compilations of simple ideas copied from impressions, 
relative ideas allow one to single out ideational or 
nonideational objects on the basis of putative relations to 
positive impressions or ideas” (ibid.). 
There are three passages in Hume that constitute 
evidence for thinking that Hume recognized and employed the 
distinction between positive and relative ideas. Toward the 
end of his brief discussion of our idea of existence and of 
external objects in Part Two of the Treatise, Hume writes: 
 
The farthest we can go towards a conception of 
external objects, when suppos’d specifically different 
from our perceptions, is to form a relative idea of 
them, without pretending to comprehend the related 
objects. (T 1.2.6.9)  
 
 In this passage, Hume claims that when conceived as 
something different in kind from our perceptions, we can’t 
form a positive idea of external objects.7 But, Hume claims, 
we can form a relative idea of them. In this case, a 
candidate correlate description of our relative idea of 
                                                        
7 Cf. Berkeley’s “Master Argument” in his Principles of Human Knowledge, Part I, 22-3. 
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external objects would be something on the order of, “the 
resembling cause of our perceptions.”8 
A second piece of evidence that Hume recognizes and 
employs the positive/relative idea distinction is based on 
the following passage: 
 
To make this evident, let us remember, that as every 
idea is deriv’d from a preceding perception, ‘tis 
impossible our idea of a perception, and that of an 
object or external existence can ever represent what 
are specifically different from each other. Whatever 
difference we may suppose betwixt them, ‘tis still 
incomprehensible to us; and we are oblig’d either to 
conceive an external object merely as a relation 
without a relative, or to make it the very same with a 
perception or impression. (T 1.4.5.19) 
 
 Hume’s claim that we can conceive of an external 
object as a “relation without a relative” seems to indicate 
that he permits relative ideas. The relation in this case 
would be something like “causing our perceptions,” and “the 
relative[s]” would be the objects that satisfy this 
relation. Thus we can only conceive of the object in terms 
of how it’s related to our perceptions, as opposed to our 
conceiving of it in itself.  
 Finally, a third piece of evidence that Hume endorses 
the positive/relative idea distinction is the passage: 
                                                        
8 Cf. Kail (2007a: 60). 
 154 
 
According to these explications and definitions, the 
idea of power is relative as much as that of cause; 
and both have a reference to an effect, or some other 
event constantly conjoined with the former. When we 
consider the unknown circumstance of an object, by 
which the degree or quantity of its effect is fixed 
and determined, we call that its power: And 
accordingly, it is allowed by all philosophers, that 
the effect is the measure of the power. But if they 
had any idea of power, as it is in itself, why could 
not they measure it in itself? The dispute whether the 
force of a body in motion be as its velocity, or the 
square of its velocity; this dispute, I say, need not 
be decided by comparing its effects in equal or 
unequal times; but by a direct mensuration and 
comparison. (EHU 7.2.29, fn. 17) 
 
 These passages are the only places in which Hume 
seemingly mentions relative ideas. In them, he seems to 
grant their legitimacy.  
New Humeans emphasize this distinction and claim that 
Hume has the resources to avoid the criticism of their 
position advanced above. Thus Strawson claims that Hume’s 
belief in thick causal connections is based on a relative 
idea of causal power. While we can’t positively conceive of 
causal power — and thus it’s not “intelligible” in this 
sense — we can still suppose its existence on the basis of 
what we do perceive: the regular, constant connections, 
between like causes and like effects.  
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Accordingly, Strawson claims that our relative idea of 
thick causation is expressed in the description “that in 
reality in virtue of which reality is regular in the way 
that it is” (2007: 37).  
As evidence, Strawson notes numerous cases in which 
Hume seems to refer to both secret powers and hidden 
connections, and our “profound ignorance” with respect to 
these secret powers and hidden connections. Hume speaks, 
for example, of “the power or force, which actuates the 
whole machine” (EHU 7.8), of “that very circumstance in the 
cause, by which it is enabled to produce the effect” (EHU 
7.17), and of various “secret springs and principles” (EHU 
1.15). Accordingly, Strawson claims that 
 
Anything that is to count as a genuine conception of 
something must be descriptively contentful on the 
terms of the theory of ideas: it must have directly 
impression-based, impression-copy content. By contrast, 
a supposition that something exists or is the case can 
be a genuine supposition, genuinely about something, 
and hence intelligible in our present-day sense, 
without being contentful (or meaningful or 
intelligible) on the terms of the theory of ideas.” 
(2007: 37) 
 
Thus, Strawson claims that there’s room within Hume’s 
theory of ideas for an idea of thick causal power. Indeed, 
Hume supposes — that is, assumes and believes that there 
 156 
are such powers — “not only in common life but also as a 
philosopher” (2014: 3). Thick causal power is 
unintelligible in the sense that we can’t have a positive 
idea of it and can’t understand how it operates, although 
it’s intelligible in the sense that we can still refer to 
it. This, in the main, is Strawson’s response to the 
criticism of Old Humeans. 
 
Kail’s Nuanced Realism 
 Peter Kail has put forward a more nuanced skeptical 
realism than that of Strawson. According to Kail, realism 
can be understood only when contrasted with some specified 
kind of anti-realism (and vice versa). The contrasting 
anti-realism that Kail has in mind when discussing Hume’s 
realism is the view that Hume’s theory of ideas debars us 
from having any coherent thought about thick causation. 
Realism, accordingly, is the view that Hume’s theory of 
ideas does permit a coherent thought about thick causation. 
As Kail explains: 
 
At a minimum, realism holds that we can form thoughts 
that reach beyond the deliverances of impressions and 
thereby allow for the possibility of an ontology that 
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includes genuine causal power and external objects. 
(2007b: 255) 
 
 Accordingly, Kail’s realism is more nuanced than 
Strawson’s, for realism on Kail’s interpretation isn’t 
necessarily about Hume’s assuming the existence of thick 
causal connections, let alone his believing or justifiably 
believing in them. Thus, for Kail, as long as Hume 
countenances a coherent thought about thick causation, he’s 
a realist. This is compatible with his being an error 
theorist, Kail claims, or his being agnostic about thick 
causal powers, or his assuming such powers (2007b: 255-6).   
 How does Kail account for thought — coherent, 
contentful thought — about thick causal power? He begins 
with the following concept: 
 
 Reference-Fixer for “Power” (RFP) 
That which, were we to grasp it, would furnish the 
capacity to (a) “read off” what effect some object 
must have and (b) find it impossible to conceive of 
the cause without its effect. 
 
Kail explains the notion as follows: 
 
The RFP is not an idea of necessity or a relative idea 
of necessity. We have no understanding of what feature 
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it is that would yield those consequences. It does not 
“represent” if by that one takes it to be a copy of 
genuine necessity… The RFP tells us that power is that 
which would yield such and such consequences while 
giving us no conception of what that might be…. 
Nevertheless, the formal specification of the RFP 
allows us to form thoughts precisely about that of 
which we can have no conception. (2007b: 256) 
 
 Thus Kail claims that a “thought of a certain kind” 
fixes the reference of thick causal power, but this thought 
isn’t an idea of causal power, since it isn’t copied from 
an impression.  
 Accordingly, Kail distinguishes between an “idea” and 
a “thought” in Hume’s philosophy. He claims that Hume’s 
copy principle is primarily a genetic claim — about how 
ideas arrive in the mind — and not necessarily a semantic 
claim. Thus, it’s a mistake to attribute some kind of 
meaning-empiricism to Hume. While ideas are copies of 
impressions, Kail admits, his interpretation of Hume leaves 
room for thoughts that outrun ideas. Consequently, “the RFP 
is… a way of capturing that of which we have no idea so 
that a ‘thought of a certain kind’ can be had concerning it” 
(2007: 268, fn. 14).  
 But the claim that Hume lacks a theory of meaning is 
misleading. It’s true that Hume doesn’t devote as much 
attention — say, as Locke — to spelling out his theory of 
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meaning. But Hume clearly does suggest a strongly Lockean 
conception of meaning, for instance in his discussion of 
abstract ideas canvassed in Chapter One. In addition, at T 
1.1.1.1, Hume claims that we think and reason with ideas, 
suggesting that all thoughts involve ideas, and thus that 
there can’t be “thoughts of a certain kind” that outrun our 
ideas, as Kail suggests. Needless to say, in Chapter Six I 
will be able to make sense of a distinction that Kail seems 
to be aiming at with his distinction between ideas and 
thoughts, but one that can be understood solely in terms of 
Hume’s theory of ideas. 
 Returning to Kail’s discussion of the RFP, Kail notes 
that the felt determination of the mind is the clue to 
understanding our thought of thick causal power. He notes 
that the determination of the mind “effects an immediate 
and non-reasoned transition from cause to effect” (2007b: 
258). For instance, when we see a brick rapidly approaching 
a window, we immediately think that the window will break, 
and this “phenomenological immediacy of the inference 
mimics that of simply reading the effect from its cause” 
(ibid.). Accordingly, Kail claims that the determination of 
the mind can account for condition (a) of the RFP, namely 
that we can “read off” the effect from the cause. 
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 With respect to condition (b) — that we be incapable 
of conceiving the cause without the effect — Kail notes 
that Hume provides a psychological explanation. He quotes 
the following passage: 
 
‘Tis natural for men, in their common and careless way 
of thinking, to imagine they perceive a connexion 
betwixt such objects as they have constantly found 
together; and because custom has render’d it difficult 
to separate the ideas, they are apt to fancy such a 
separation to be in itself impossible and absurd. (T 
1.4.3.9) 
 
In this passage, Hume seems to suggest that conceiving of 
the cause without the effect is psychologically impossible. 
Kail claims that this satisfies condition (b) of the RFP, 
that we be incapable of conceiving the cause without the 
effect. Hence, conditions (a) and (b) of RTF are fulfilled, 
and so Kail contends that Hume does have room within his 
meaning-empiricism for a thought of thick causal power. 
 The problem with Kail’s interpretation is that the 
thought of thick causal power isn’t about the cause and 
effect being psychologically impossible to separate, but 
that they be conceptually impossible. Even if it’s 
psychologically impossible, this doesn’t mean that it’s 
conceptually impossible. And indeed Hume denies that it’s 
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conceptually impossible to separate the cause from the 
effect. Thus, while Kail is correct to note that the 
determination of the mind “mimics” a thought of thick 
causation, such mimicking doesn’t amount to a necessary 
connection. Thus, Kail hasn’t provided reasons for thinking 
that Hume has room within his theory of ideas for a thought 
about thick causation. 
 
 Retrospective Reinterpretation 
Thus far, we’ve seen that proponents of the New Hume — 
most notably, Strawson — appeal to a number of passages in 
which Hume seemingly refers to “secret powers” and “hidden 
connections” as evidence of their interpretation. Winkler 
(1991), in turn, claims that these seeming avowals of 
causal realism aren’t as unambiguous as one might think. 
For instance, he (1991: 544) claims that most of these 
seeming avowals occur prior to Hume’s two definitions of a 
cause at EHU 7. Accordingly, Winkler suggests that these 
avowals need to be retrospectively reinterpreted in light 
of Hume’s later two definitions. Thus, at EHU 8, Hume 
writes that: 
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It is universally allowed that matter, in all its 
operations, is actuated by a necessary force, and that 
every natural effect is so precisely determined by the 
energy of its cause that no other effect, in such 
particular circumstances, could possibly have resulted 
from it. (EHU 8.4) 
 
 But, Winkler notes, now that Hume’s two definitions 
are behind us, Hume’s quick to note his meaning in making 
this claim. He writes: 
 
Our idea… of necessity and causation arises entirely 
from the uniformity observable in the operations of 
nature, where similar objects are constantly conjoined 
together, and the mind is determined by custom to 
infer the one from the appearance of the other. These 
two circumstances form the whole of that necessity, 
which we ascribe to matter. Beyond the constant 
conjunction of similar objects, and the consequent 
reference from one to the other, we have no notion of 
any necessity or connexions. (EHU 8.6) 
 
 As further evidence that Hume wants his seeming 
avowals retrospectively reinterpreted, Winkler points to an 
informative footnote. At EHU 4, and thus prior to his two 
definitions, Hume writes: 
 
[N]otwithstanding this ignorance of natural powers and 
principles, we always presume, when we see like 
sensible qualities, that they have like secret powers, 
and expect that effects, similar to those which we 
have experienced, will follow from them. (EHU 4.16) 
 163 
 
Hume addends the following footnote to this passage: 
 
The word, power, is here used in a loose and popular 
sense. The more accurate explication of it would give 
additional evidence to this argument. See Section 7. 
(EHU 4.16, fn. 7)9 
 
 Thus Winkler contends that when we see putative 
avowals of causal realism — when we see references to 
hidden powers and secret connections — we need to read 
Hume’s later account of causation back into these passages.  
When we reinterpret Hume’s seeming avowals in this way, 
Winkler contends that the evidence for causal realism 
disappears. Consider, for instance, the following passage: 
 
As nature has taught us the use of our limbs, without 
giving us the knowledge of the muscles and nerves, by 
which they are actuated; so has she implanted in us an 
instinct, which carries forward the thought in a 
correspondent course to that which she has established 
among external objects; though we are ignorant of 
those powers and forces, on which this regular course 
and succession of objects totally depends. (EHU 5.22) 
 
 Strawson claims that this counts as “decisive” 
evidence that Hume believes in thick causation (2014: 185), 
                                                        
9 See also Kenneth Winkler, “Causal Realism and Hume’s Revisions of the Enquiry,” unpublished.  
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as he appears to suggest that he’s assuming secret powers 
which explain the regularities we observe. But Winkler 
contends that when this passage is reinterpreted in light 
of Hume’s settled position, we get a very different picture.  
According to Winkler, this passage “can be read as 
saying that we are ignorant of certain objects whose 
behavior is constantly conjoined with the behavior of the 
objects we observe” (1991: 547). In short, Hume isn’t 
claiming that there’s some power X, in the natural world. 
He’s only claiming that there’s some X that, if we could 
discover it, we would see that it’s constantly conjoined to 
the effects that we do perceive. Thus, for Winkler, Hume’s 
merely claiming that our knowledge of what the cause is may 
become more sophisticated, although what constitutes a 
cause remains the same. 
Consider, for a second example, Hume’s claims about a 
“secret opposition of contrary causes”: 
 
A peasant can give no better reason for the stopping 
of any clock or watch than to say that it does not 
commonly go right: But an artist easily perceives, 
that the same force in the spring or pendulum has 
always the same influence on the wheels; but fails of 
its usual effect, perhaps by reason of a grain of dust, 
which puts a stop to the whole movement. From the 
observation of several parallel instances, 
philosophers form a maxim, that the connexion between 
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all causes and effects is equally necessary, and that 
its seeming uncertainty in some instances proceeds 
from the secret opposition of contrary causes. (EHU 
8.13) 
 
In speaking of a “secret opposition of contrary 
causes,” in this passage, Hume’s referring to something in 
the cause that we currently can’t discern. In addition, his 
point is that if we could observe it, we would see that 
it’s constantly conjoined with the regularities that we do 
observe.  
Thus, Winkler seems to be right in many cases. When we 
retrospectively reinterpret Hume’s seeming avowals, he 
isn’t referring to thick causal connections. However, while 
Winkler’s reinterpretation seems to work in some instances, 
perhaps most instances, it doesn’t seem to work with all 
passages. At times, Hume does seem to be referring to 
secret powers or connections. Consider, for instance, the 
following passages, in the Dialogues concerning Natural 
Religion: 
 
Chance has no place, on any hypothesis, sceptical or 
religious. Everything is surely governed by steady, 
inviolable laws. And were the inmost essence of things 
laid open to us, we should then discover the scene, of 
which, at present, we can have no idea. Instead of 
admiring the order of natural beings, we should 
clearly see, that it was absolutely impossible for 
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them, in the smallest article, ever to admit of any 
other disposition. (DNR 6.12) 
 
and 
 
It is observed by arithmeticians, that the products of 
9 compose always 9 or some lesser product of 9, if you 
add together all the characters, of which any of the 
former products are composed. Thus, of 18, 27, 36, 
which are products of 9, you make 9 by adding 1 to 8, 
2 to 7, 3 to 6. Thus, 369 is a product also of nine; 
and if you add 3, 6, and 9, you make 18, a lesser 
product of 9. To a superficial observer, so wonderful 
a regularity may be admir’d as the effect either of 
chance, or design; but a skillful algebraist 
immediately concludes it to be the work of necessity, 
and demonstrates, that it must for ever result from 
the nature of these numbers. Is it not probable, I ask, 
that the whole economy of the universe is conducted by 
a like necessity, though no human algebra can furnish 
a key which solves the difficulty? And instead of 
admiring the order of natural beings, may it not 
happen that, could we penetrate into the intimate 
nature of bodies, we should clearly see why it was 
absolutely impossible, they could ever admit of any 
other disposition? (DNR 9.10) 
 
 These passages clearly indicate that Hume isn’t merely 
referring to some X that, when discovered, will be seen to 
be constantly conjoined to the regularities that we observe. 
Rather, he’s referring to some X that, if discovered, would 
reveal the conceptual necessities that exist between causes 
and effects. Thus, while Winkler’s reinterpretation of 
Hume’s putative avowals of secret powers and hidden 
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connections correctly interprets some of the passages in 
Hume as not expressing belief in thick causation, his 
interpretation isn’t sufficient to interpret all seeming 
“thick causation” passages as not really such. 
 
A Footnote 
 A second objection, also advanced by Winkler, is that 
at one point Hume seems to deny that we can have a relative 
idea of power. The relevant passage is:  
 
The “By Which” Passage (BWP) 
[I]f a cause be defined, that which produces any 
thing; it is easy to observe, that producing is 
synonymous to causing. In like manner, if a cause be 
defined, that by which any thing exists; this is 
liable to the same objection. For what is meant by 
these words, by which? (EHU 8.25, fn. 19) 
 
Here Hume seems to identify a relative idea similar to 
Strawson’s: “that which produces anything” or “that by 
which any thing exists” (ibid.). But he claims that the “by 
which” — or Strawson’s “in virtue of” — relation is 
meaningless, and thus one can’t form a relative idea of 
thick causal power. 
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Hume’s point in this passage echoes a criticism put 
forward by Berkeley in connection with his discussion of 
“notions.” With respect to material substance, Berkeley 
writes: 
 
But let us examine a little the received opinion. It 
is said extension is a mode or accident of matter, and 
that matter is a substratum that supports it. Now I 
desire that you would explain what is meant by 
matter’s supporting extension: say you, I have no idea 
of matter, and therefore cannot explain it. I answer 
that you have no positive idea, yet if you have any 
meaning at all, you must at least have a relative idea 
of matter.10 
 
Thus, it’s argued that Hume can’t admit a relative idea of 
thick causation, because a relative idea is a “relation 
without a relative,” and Hume denies any such relation in 
the case of thick causal connections. This is a serious 
objection that New Humeans – or at least those that rely on 
a relative idea of causal power — haven’t adequately 
addressed. I shall have more to say about this aspect in 
Chapter Six. 
 In recent years, however, a new objection to the New 
Hume interpretation has emerged in the literature. I turn 
to this in the next section. 
                                                        
10 A Treatise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, Part I, 16. 
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Liberty and Necessity 
In recent years, Peter Millican (2009) has put forward 
an argument in defense of the Old Hume.11 His argument 
relies on Hume’s discussion of liberty and necessity — that 
is, on Hume’s discussion surrounding the issue of free will. 
In this section, I consider Millican’s argument.  
Hume discusses the issue of free will at T 2.3.1, EHU 
8, and briefly in the Abstract. For ease of exposition, I 
will focus largely on the Enquiry. There are no noteworthy 
differences between the three accounts. 
Hume begins his discussion by noting that, in disputes 
that have persisted for a long time, we should expect some 
agreement on the meaning of our terms, and so be able to 
“pass from words to the true and real subject of the 
controversy” (EHU 8.1). He explains: 
 
For how easy may it seem to give exact definitions of 
the terms employed in our reasoning, and make these 
definitions, not the mere sound of words, the object 
of future scrutiny and examination? But if we consider 
the matter more narrowly, we shall be apt to draw a 
quite opposite conclusion. From this circumstance 
alone, that a controversy has long been kept a foot, 
and remains still undecided, we may presume, that 
                                                        
11 Cf. Millican (2007). 
 170 
there is some ambiguity in the expression, and that 
the disputants affix different ideas to the terms 
employed in the controversy… [N]othing, one would 
think, could preserve the dispute so long undecided, 
but some ambiguous expressions, which keep the 
antagonists still at a distance, and hinder them from 
grappling with each other. (ibid.) 
 
 Thus Hume claims that the dispute over free will has 
persisted because the terms are ambiguous. The various 
sides have been talking past one another. 
 But then Hume seems to make a contrary claim. He soon 
claims that in fact we’re all “of the same opinion” on this 
matter (EHU 8.2), and that the dispute has “hitherto turned 
merely upon words” (EHU 8.3).  
 
[A]ll mankind, both learned and ignorant, have always 
been of the same opinion with regard to this subject, 
and that  few intelligible definitions would have 
immediately put an end to the whole controversy…. I 
hope, therefore, to make it appear, that all men have 
ever agreed in the doctrines both of necessity and of 
liberty, according to any reasonable sense, which can 
be put on these terms; and that the whole controversy 
has hitherto turned merely upon words. (EHU 8.2-3) 
 
 Hume appears to be making contrary claims. First, he 
seems to claim that disputants in this debate are talking 
past one another; the words we employ are ambiguous. On the 
other hand, Hume claims that we’re all “of the same opinion” 
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on the matter (ibid.). But if the terms are ambiguous, how 
can we all be of the same opinion? This is a problem that 
needs to be addressed, but I won’t be in a position to do 
so until Chapter Six.  
 Hume continues his discussion by noting what necessity 
in nature is commonly thought to consist in.  
 
It is universally allowed, that matter, in all its 
operations, is actuated by a necessary force, and that 
every natural effect is so precisely determined by the 
energy of its cause, that no other effect, in such 
particular circumstances, could possible have resulted 
from it. (EHU 8.4) 
 
But he quickly observes that this isn’t the correct account 
of necessity. Instead, he presents his regularity theory of 
causation and his account of causal inference. In short, 
Hume provides his two definitions of a cause. Thus, beyond 
“the constant conjunction of similar objects, and the 
consequent inference from one to the other, we have no 
notion of any necessity, or connexions” (EHU 8.5). 
 Having done so, Hume spends a number of pages showing 
how human volition satisfies these two definitions. Indeed, 
he claims that everyone acknowledges that voluntary human 
actions satisfy these two conditions. Thus he writes: 
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It is universally acknowledged, that there is a great 
uniformity among the actions of men, in all nations 
and ages, and that human nature remains still the same, 
in its principles and operations. The same motives 
always produce the same actions: The same events 
follow from the same causes. Ambition, avarice, self-
love, vanity, friendship, generosity, public spirit; 
these passions, mixed in various degrees, and 
distributes through society, have been, from the 
beginning of the world, and still are, the source of 
all the actions and enterprizes, which have ever been 
observed among mankind. (EHU 8.7)12 
 
His point is that everyone agrees that there’s a constant 
conjunction between our motives and actions, and that these 
constant conjunctions lead us to predict things about our 
behavior and mental states. Thus, in addition to causation 
in nature, there’s causation in human nature.  
 Despite this universal agreement that voluntary human 
actions are necessary, Hume wonders why this hasn’t settled 
the matter. He writes: 
 
I have frequently considered, what could possibly be 
the reason, why all mankind, though they have ever, 
without hesitation, acknowledged the doctrine of 
necessity, in their whole practice and reasoning, have 
yet discovered such a reluctance to acknowledge it in 
words, and have rather shown a propensity, in all ages, 
to profess the contrary opinion. (EHU 8.21) 
                                                        
12 He presents his account of how voluntary human actions are explicable in terms of constant 
conjunction at EHU 7-17, and how voluntary human actions ground a customary inference at EHU 17-20. 
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 In other words, despite the fact that everyone agrees 
on the doctrine of necessity, Hume wonders why some have 
argued against it. His explanation is that a stronger 
conception of necessity has entrapped them — thick 
necessity.  
 
[M]en still entertain a strong propensity to believe, 
that they penetrate farther into the powers of nature, 
and perceive something like a necessary connexions 
between the cause and the effect. When again they turn 
their reflections towards the operations of their own 
minds, and feel no such connexions of the motive and 
the action; they are thence apt to suppose, that there 
is a difference between the effects, which result from 
material force, and those which arise from thought and 
intelligence. (ibid.) 
 
In other words, Hume claims that since people associate 
necessity with thick necessity, when they introspect and 
find that they appear to have the power of contrary choice, 
they claim that voluntary human actions aren’t governed by 
necessities. Instead, they claim to be free.  
 But Hume then seeks to show that, in fact, advocates 
of liberty actually have nothing else in mind than his own 
account of causation in terms of constant conjunction and a 
customary transition. 
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[W]hat is meant by liberty, when applied to voluntary 
actions? We cannot surely mean, that actions have so 
little connexions with motives, inclinations, and 
circumstances, that one does not follow with a certain 
degree of uniformity from the other, and that one 
affords no inference by which we can conclude the 
existence of the other. [T]hese are plain and 
acknowledged matters of fact. (EHU 8.23) 
 
In addition, he claims that the alternative to his view of 
necessity is mere chance, and that no one thinks that 
freedom consists in mere chance.13 Accordingly, he claims 
that 
 
all mankind have ever agreed in the doctrine of 
liberty as well as in necessity, and that the whole 
dispute, in this respect also, has been hitherto 
merely verbal. (ibid.) 
 
 This is Hume’s discussion of liberty and necessity. He 
claims, therefore, that the dispute is “merely verbal,” and 
that in fact all have agreed that voluntary human actions 
are just a matter of constant conjunction and a customary 
transition of the mind. 
                                                        
13 Hume thus endorses compatibilism. He advocates for a “hypothetical liberty” (EHU 8.23) according to 
which we are free if we can act on our wishes, so long as we’re “not a prisoner and in chains” (ibid.). 
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 Accordingly, Millican contends that Hume’s discussion 
on this topic presents a problem for the New Hume 
interpretation: 
 
For the New Humean position is clearly that of Hume’s 
opponent, who claims that there is something more to 
“genuine necessity” than is captured by Hume’s two 
definitions (namely an AP power or whatever). Hume 
takes himself to have a quick and decisive answer to 
this claim, in denying that there can be any such 
conception. (2009: 698) 
  
Thus Millican argues that, if the New Hume interpretation 
is correct, then the debate over liberty and necessity 
can’t be “merely verbal.” But Hume of course claims that it 
is. So Hume doesn’t think that there’s any idea of thick 
causation. 
 
Thus Hume’s main argument concerning “liberty and 
necessity” utterly explodes the New Humeans’ position. 
For Hume is here denying exactly what they assert, 
namely, that we can coherently ascribe to things some 
kind of “upper-case” Causation or “thick” necessity 
that goes beyond his two definitions. If we could 
indeed do this, then his imagined opponent would be 
able to ascribe that thick necessity to matter but not 
to minds, and thus undermine Hume’s claim of 
equivalence between the necessities of the two domains, 
which is the entire point of his argument. (2009: 699) 
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 I concur with Millican that Hume’s discussion of free 
will and necessity is problematic for the New Humeans. In 
Chapter Six, I shall revisit the above issue. 
 
 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I noted the main lines of discussion 
surrounding our putative idea of thick causation. The 
traditional interpretation is that Hume’s theory of ideas 
has no room for such an idea, whereas more recently some 
commentators have argued the opposite.  
Most notable in this regard is Strawson, who claims 
that Hume admits a relative idea of thick causation. In 
this way Hume can refer to thick causal connections, the 
nature of which we can’t adequately grasp. I presented 
numerous objections to this view, and assessed them. 
In addition, I presented Kail’s weaker version of 
skeptical realism. And, finally, I discussed Hume on the 
debate over liberty and necessity, and presented Millican’s 
criticism of skeptical realism, which is based on Hume’s 
discussion. 
In the next chapter, I begin the journey toward a 
solution to the nasty problem, and an overall assessment of 
 177 
the New Hume debate. As we shall see, central to adequately 
understanding Hume is an appreciation of the role of clear 
and distinct perception in his thought. 
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Chapter Five 
Clear and Distinct Perception in Hume 
 Introduction 
 In Chapter One, we saw that Hume faces a nasty problem 
relevant to his discussion of causation. We saw, for 
instance, that Hume’s committed to our having and our 
lacking an idea of thick causation. In this chapter, I 
argue that a fully adequate answer to this problem requires 
a proper grasp of the role of clear and distinct perception 
in Hume’s philosophy.  
It’s a striking fact that no one, no commentary on or 
critic of Hume, addresses the role of clear and distinct 
perception in his philosophy. At most one will find rare, 
isolated remarks; remarks that merely intimate some latent 
use of the distinction in Hume.1 Nonspecialists on Hume may 
not find this surprising, as the notion of clear and 
distinct perception seems as far removed from Hume as the 
principle of utility is from the categorical imperative. 
But my inclination is that this is more a matter of neglect 
than ignorance, on the specialists’ part. 
                                                        
1 Examples include Galen Strawson (2014: xi), D. Tycerium Lightner (1997: 114), Daniel Flage (2007: 146), 
and P. J. E. Kail (2003: 49). A more focused analysis is provided in Kenneth Winkler, “Causal Realism and 
Hume’s Revisions in the Enquiry,” unpublished, particularly in relation to Hume’s growing dissatisfaction 
with the obscurity of Locke. This list is by no means exhaustive.  
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 My aim in this chapter is to show the important role 
that clear and distinct perception plays in Hume’s 
philosophy. I argue that Hume takes our impressions to be 
clear and distinct, whereas our ideas are obscure and 
confused. Hume’s modus operandi, moreover, is to render our 
ideas clear and distinct by discerning the impressions from 
which they’re copied. This interpretation, therefore, 
attributes prime of place to Hume’s copy principle. 
 So characterized, Hume appears to reverse the 
rationalist project proposed by Descartes. Descartes wants 
to turn away from the senses (which he regards as obscure 
and confused) and toward the ideas of the intellect (which 
he considers to be clear and distinct). This contrast 
between Hume and Descartes, however, is only partly 
accurate. In the remainder of the chapter, I shall explain 
the extent to which Hume rejects the project inaugurated by 
Descartes: it may come as a surprise that Hume isn’t as far 
off from Descartes as one might initially think. For these 
reasons, I begin with Descartes.   
 
 Descartes’s Meditations 
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 Descartes’s Meditations on First Philosophy contains 
six Meditations, each written from the perspective of a 
fictional meditator. This work constitutes a nice summary 
of Descartes’s overall project. Since Meditations I and II 
are the most important for our purposes, I shall confine my 
main line of discussion to them.  
 In Meditation I, the meditator begins by noting the 
many falsehoods he’s believed since childhood. As a result, 
he expresses his desire to place his beliefs on a stable, 
indeed unshakeable, foundation, and so he adopts the method 
of assuming everything to be false that isn’t known with 
certainty. If a proposition can be doubted, he says, then 
belief in it should be suspended (CSM II 12: AT VII 18). In 
this way, the meditator hopes to find some indubitable 
Archimedean starting point, upon which he can securely 
hoist his subsequent beliefs (CSM II 16: AT VII 24). 
 In an effort to discern what can be known indubitably, 
the meditator introduces three reasons for doubt. The first 
reason for doubt is that “from time to time I have found 
that the senses deceive, and it is prudent never to trust 
completely those who have deceived us even once” (CSM II 
12: AT VII 18). It sometimes happens, for instance, that 
when viewed at a distance, round buildings look square, or 
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sticks look bent when submerged in water. Thus the fact 
that the senses are fallible constitutes the meditator’s 
first reason for doubt.  
 The meditator doesn’t think this form of skepticism 
sweeps away large portions of his belief system, however. 
For while the senses may deceive us occasionally “with 
respect to objects which are very small or in the distance” 
(ibid.), there are numerous instances in which doubt about 
the senses doesn’t arise. Such examples include “that I am 
here, sitting by the fire, wearing a winter dressing-gown, 
holding this piece of paper in my hands” (CSM II 13: AT VII 
18). Only mad people would doubt such things, claims the 
meditator, and “I would be thought equally mad if I took 
anything from them [that is, mad people] as a model for 
myself” (CSM II 13: AT VII 19). Thus, while the fallibility 
of the senses provides some reason for doubt, such grounds 
aren’t devastating. 
This brings the meditator to his second and more 
troublesome reason for doubt: 
 
As if I were not a man who sleeps at night, and 
regularly has all the same experiences while asleep as 
madmen do when awake — indeed sometimes even more 
improbable ones. How often, asleep at night, am I 
convinced of just such familiar events — that I am 
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here in my dressing-gown, sitting by the fire — when 
in fact I am lying undressed in bed! […] As I think 
about this more carefully, I see plainly that there 
are never any sure signs by means of which being awake 
can be distinguished from being asleep. The result is 
that I begin to feel dazed, and this very feeling only 
reinforces the notion that I may be asleep. (ibid.) 
 
 While the first reason for doubt isn’t reason enough 
to doubt that “I am here in my dressing-gown, sitting by 
the fire,” such claims don’t survive the Dream Argument. 
There appears to be no criterion by which one can 
distinguish dream-perceptions from wakeful-perceptions, and 
so the meditator can’t be certain that he’s in his 
dressing-gown, sitting by the fire.  
 But again, the doubt occasioned by the Dream Argument 
has its limitations, for the meditator observes that “it 
must be admitted that certain… simpler and more universal 
things are real” (CSM II 14: AT VII 20). These simpler and 
more general things include “arithmetic, geometry and other 
subjects of this kind, which deal only with the simplest 
and most general things, regardless of whether they really 
exist in nature or not” (ibid.). Indeed, the meditator 
holds that the simpler and more universal things are real 
even in the midst of a dream. Thus a square has no more 
than four sides, and two plus three equals five, “whether I 
am awake or asleep” (ibid.). 
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 Consequently, the meditator has found a means of 
escape from the skeptics initial two reasons for doubt. But 
problems come to a head when the meditator considers the 
third and most devastating ground for doubt: 
 
[F]irmly rooted in my mind is the long-standing 
opinion that there is an omnipotent God who made me 
the kind of creature that I am. How do I know that he 
has not brought it about that there is no earth, no 
sky, no extended thing, no shape, no size, no place, 
while at the same time ensuring that all these things 
appear to me to exist just as they do now? What is 
more, since I sometimes believe that others go astray 
in cases where they think they have the most perfect 
knowledge, may I not similarly go wrong every time I 
add two and three or count the sides of a square, or 
in some even simpler matter, if that is imaginable? 
(CSM II 14: AT VII 21). 
 
 This third argument — the Deceiving God Argument — 
challenges the credentials of what’s taken to be our most 
secure and perfect knowledge. Not even mathematical 
knowledge is immune from doubt. By the end of Meditation I, 
then, the meditator has been reduced to a state of 
indecision, uncertainty, and universal doubt. 
 Charles Larmore has observed that the skeptical 
arguments introduced by Descartes in Meditation I aren’t 
original to him, and that the significance of these 
arguments has more to do with the “manner in which they are 
 184 
deployed” (2006: 18). As he emphasizes, Descartes’s aim is 
to place pressure on the contention that the senses are 
sources of certainty and knowledge. According to Larmore 
(2006: 19), Descartes’s aim is to challenge the 
Aristotelian empiricism prevalent at the time, by showing 
that it leads to skepticism; and thus it’s the Aristotelian 
who is ultimately reduced to uncertainty.2  
As evidence of this reading, consider that prior to 
offering his three reasons for doubt, the meditator 
observes that “[w]hatever I have up till now accepted as 
most true I have acquired either from the senses or through 
the senses” (CSM II 17: AT VII 18). In addition, in the 
Synopsis that precedes Meditation I, Descartes writes that: 
 
Although the usefulness of such extensive doubt is not 
apparent at first sight, its greatest benefit lies in 
freeing us from all our preconceived opinions, and 
providing the easiest route by which the mind may be 
led away from the senses. (CSM II 9: AT VII 12) 
 
 Thus Descartes believes that the senses distract the 
mind from attaining truth and certainty, and thus the aim 
of his method of doubt is to force his readers away from 
                                                        
2 Larmore (2006: 19) cites Aristotle’s De Anima, “[S]ince no one can ever learn anything without the use of 
perception, it is necessary even in speculative thought to have some mental image to contemplate” 
(432a7). It’s just such reliance on sense perception that Descartes takes issue with. 
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the senses. In addition, and while Larmore doesn’t make 
this explicit, it’s clear that Descartes more generally 
intends to stop us from relying on images, whether they are 
presented via sensation or the imagination.3 
Having done so, Descartes proceeds in Meditation II to 
show how certainty and knowledge can be attained. This is 
achieved via the perceptions of the intellect. Thus, 
famously, Descartes writes: 
 
I have convinced myself that there is absolutely 
nothing in the world, no sky, no earth, no minds, no 
bodies. Does it not follow that I too do not exist? 
No: if I convinced myself of something then I 
certainly existed. But there is a deceiver of supreme 
power and cunning who is deliberately and constantly 
deceiving me. In that case I too undoubtedly exist, if 
he is deceiving me; and let him deceive me as much as 
he can, he will never bring it about that I am nothing 
so long as I think that I am something. So after 
considering everything very thoroughly, I must finally 
conclude that this proposition, I am, I exist, is 
necessarily true whenever it is put forward by me or 
conceived in my mind. (CSM II 17: AT VII 25) 
 
 The meditator claims, therefore, that he clearly and 
distinctly perceives his own existence — that is, he 
clearly and distinctly perceives that he’s a thinking thing.  
                                                        
3 This explains, for instance, the purpose of Descartes’s Dream and Deceiving God Arguments. Descartes’s 
turn away from the imagination is of course significant in light of Hume’s later use of the imagination. 
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 Accordingly, Descartes initiates a line of rationalist 
thought (in the early period) that privileges the 
perceptions of the intellect over the perceptions of the 
senses and the imagination. For Descartes, clear and 
distinct perceptions are provided by the intellect, whereas 
the ideas of the senses and the imagination are obscure and 
confused. Consider, in light of this, the meditator’s 
discussion of a piece of wax in Meditation II. 
The meditator has us “consider the things which people 
commonly think they understand most distinctly of all,” 
namely “the bodies which we touch and see” (CSM II 20: AT 
VII 30). In the case of a piece of wax, we perceive its 
color, shape, and smell, alongside its other sensible 
properties, and falsely take ourselves to be perceiving 
these clearly and distinctly. When the wax is moved towards 
the fire and begins to melt, however, its color, shape, and 
smell begin to change. Nonetheless, we still regard the 
melted wax as the same piece of wax, and thus hold that the 
wax must not be identical to any of its sensible properties. 
The conclusion that the meditator draws from this simple 
example is the following: 
 
[T]he perception I have of it is a case not of vision 
or touch or imagination — nor has it ever been, 
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despite previous appearances — but of purely mental 
scrutiny; and this can be imperfect or confused, as it 
was before, or clear and distinct as it is now, 
depending on how carefully I concentrate on what wax 
consists in. (CSM II 21: AT VII 31) 
 
Thus Descartes privileges the intellect over the 
senses and the imagination. The latter, of course, serve 
their respective roles for Descartes, but in the main it’s 
the intellect that furnishes clear and distinct perceptions. 
As we shall see soon, however, Hume dispenses with the 
intellect as a faculty of the mind, and instead claims that 
clarity and distinctness reside in the senses.  
However, while it’s clear that Descartes believes that 
the senses generate confused and obscure perceptions and 
that the intellect provides clear and distinct perceptions, 
we haven’t yet discussed what clarity and distinctness are 
for Descartes. I address this question in the next section.  
 
Clear and Distinct Perception in Descartes 
The only definition of clear and distinct perception 
that Descartes offers is presented in his Principles of 
Philosophy. 
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I call a perception “clear” when it is present and 
accessible to the attentive mind — just as we say that 
we see something clearly when it is present to the 
eye’s gaze and stimulates it with a sufficient degree 
of strength and accessibility. I call a perception 
“distinct” if, as well as being clear, it is so 
sharply separated from all other perceptions that it 
contains within itself only what is clear. (CSM I 207-
9: AT IIIA 22) 
 
In other words, a perception is clear just in case it’s 
“present and accessible to the attentive mind,” and 
distinct just in case it’s (a) clear and (b) “sharply 
separated” from all other perceptions. It follows, then, 
that while distinctness entails clarity, clarity doesn’t 
entail distinctness.4 
As an example of a clear but confused perception, 
Descartes provides the following case: 
 
[W]hen someone feels an intense pain, the perception 
he has of it is indeed very clear, but is not always 
distinct. For people commonly confuse this perception 
with an obscure judgment they make concerning the 
nature of something which they think exists in the 
painful spot and which they suppose to resemble the 
sensation of pain; but in fact it is the sensation 
alone which they perceive clearly. Hence a perception 
can be clear without being distinct, but not distinct 
without being clear. (CSM I 208: AT VIIIA 22) 
 
                                                        
4 Perceptions which aren’t clear are obscure, and perceptions which aren’t distinct are confused. 
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In this case, one’s perception of pain is clear, but when 
one judges it (or supposes it) as existing in the body, its 
confused. 
While Descartes presents this helpful example to 
illustrate distinctness, his discussion of clarity is, so 
to speak, less than clear. In the Fifth Set of Objections, 
for instance, Gassendi argues that Descartes lacks a 
suitable criterion for distinguishing clear and distinct 
ideas from those that only appear to be clear and distinct. 
Descartes admitted, after all, that there was a time when 
he regarded sensory ideas to be clear and distinct, when in 
fact they weren’t. 
James Humber (1989), however, has convincingly argued 
that Descartes’s criterion of clear and distinct perception 
is none other than his method for producing such 
perceptions.5 In Meditation II and The Search for Truth, for 
instance, Descartes seeks to get clear on what the term “I” 
denotes. His initial response in both works is that “I” 
denotes a man, but he then contends that this answer is 
obscure. Moreover, Descartes claims that the obscurity of 
this answer stems from an inattentive mind. But a clear 
perception, Descartes explicitly states, is one that’s 
                                                        
5 This is plausible in light of the fact that Descartes was preoccupied with the importance of method. See 
his Rules for the Direction of the Mind and Discourse on Method. 
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present and accessible to an attentive mind. And again, in 
The Search for Truth, Eudoxus asks Polyander what he is, 
and Polyander replies that he’s a man. Eudoxus, however, 
responds: 
 
You are not paying attention to my question, and the 
reply you give me, however simple it may seem to you, 
would plunge you into very difficult and complicated 
problems, were I to press you even a little. If, for 
example, I were to ask even Epistemon himself what a 
man is, and he gave the stock reply of the scholastics, 
that a man is a “rational animal,” and if, in order to 
explain these two terms (which are just as obscure as 
the former), he were to take us further, through all 
the levels which are called “metaphysical,” we should 
be dragged into a maze from which it would be 
impossible to escape. (CSM II 410: AT X 515-6)6 
 
Thus, to say that “I” denotes a man, or to provide the 
answer of “rational animal” to the question, “What is man?” 
is to give the “stock reply of the scholastics.” Such 
responses, Descartes says, drag us into a philosophical 
maze, one that’s “impossible to escape.” In short, Eudoxus 
(and by implication Descartes) is arguing that the standard 
response of the scholastics isn’t conducive to ascertaining 
the truth; indeed, Eudoxus thinks it prevents us from 
attaining that end.7 
                                                        
6 Emphasis mine. 
7 The importance of discerning new truths was discussed in Chapter Two. 
 191 
Accordingly, an attentive mind is a mind that doesn’t 
give the conditioned response, but rather considers and 
attends to the content of one’s ideas. As Humber (1989: 
488) notes, Polyander is inattentive because he’s attending 
solely to the words or terms, and not to the meanings of 
such terms. His response is thus superficial, for “when 
Polyander says that he is a man he is not thinking about 
what he is saying, i.e., he is not paying attention to 
content. Rather, he is merely hearing words and responding 
as he had been trained from youth to reply” (ibid). Since 
Polyander has no clear understanding of what he’s saying, 
he can have no assurance that what he’s claiming is true. 
As Descartes puts it: 
 
[B]ecause of the use of language, we tie all our 
concepts to the words used to express them; and when 
we store the concepts in our memory we always 
simultaneously store the corresponding words. Later on 
we find the words easier to recall than the things; 
and because of this it is very seldom that our concept 
of a thing is so distinct that we can separate it 
totally from our concept of the words involved. The 
thoughts of almost all people are more concerned with 
words than with things; and as a result people very 
often give their assent to words they do not 
understand, thinking they once understood them, or 
that they got them from others who did understand them 
correctly…. [W]hat has been said appears to be 
sufficiently intelligible to help us distinguish those 
of our concepts which are clear and distinct from 
those which are obscure and confused. (CSM I 221: AT 
VIIIA 38) 
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For Descartes, then, an attentive mind is a mind that 
attends to its ideas, and not merely to the words that are 
employed.  
This, in fact, is a recurrent theme among early modern 
philosophers. Berkeley, for instance, frequently emphasizes 
the distracting nature of words. He writes: 
 
Unless we take care to clear the first principles of 
knowledge, from the embarrass and delusion of words, 
we may make infinite reasonings upon them to no 
purpose; we may draw consequences from consequences, 
and be never the wiser. The farther we go, we shall 
only lose our selves the more irrecoverably, and be 
the deeper entangled in difficulties and mistakes. 
Whoever therefore designs to read the following sheets, 
I entreat him to make my words the occasion of his own 
thinking, and endeavor to attain the same train of 
thoughts in reading, that I had in writing them. By 
this means it will be easy for him to discover the 
truth or falsity of what I say. He will be out of all 
danger of being deceived by my words, and I do not see 
how he can be led into an error by considering his own 
naked, undisguised ideas.8 
 
Thus Berkeley, like Descartes, warns us of the danger of 
words, and calls us to consider our own “naked” ideas. 
In sum, Descartes claims that perceptions are clear to 
the extent that they are present and accessible to the 
                                                        
8 Berkeley, A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, Introduction 25. 
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attentive mind — in other words, the ideas are perspicuous 
to those who aren’t led astray by the words associated with 
them. In the next section I indicate the importance of this 
notion for Hume. 
 
Hume’s Microscope of the Moral Sciences 
In the previous two sections, I indicated the role 
that clear and distinct perception plays in Descartes’s 
philosophy. In this section, I indicate the important role 
that clear and distinct perception plays in Hume’s 
philosophy. 
In order to make clear that the notion is of moment in 
Hume, I turn to his conceivability principle. Hume 
sometimes states this principle in a loose way, and 
sometimes in a rigorous way. Thus, at one point, he 
describes it as follows: “whatever we can imagine, is 
possible” (T 1.4.6.35). It’s important to recognize, 
however, that this is a loose formulation of the 
conceivability principle. When Hume states it more 
rigorously, he explicitly applies it only to clear and 
distinct perceptions.  
Consider a more rigorous formulation of the principle: 
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“’Tis an establish’d maxim in metaphysics, that 
whatever the mind clearly conceives includes the idea 
of possible existence, or in other words, that nothing 
we imagine is absolutely impossible.” (T 1.2.2.8) 
 
In this formulation, Hume limits the scope of the principle 
to clear perceptions: everything that’s clearly conceivable 
is possible. This, however, isn’t his final word on the 
principle. He soon further qualifies it, adding a condition 
of distinctness. I take the following to be his settled 
account: “Whatever can be conceiv’d by a clear and distinct 
idea necessarily implies the possibility of existence” (T 
1.2.4.11).9 
 These different formulations of his conceivability 
principle indicate that Hume sometimes writes loosely, and 
that in the background is the caveat that his principle 
applies only to clear and distinct perceptions. It’s 
important to keep this in mind, for Hume doesn’t always 
state his views as rigorously as a referee of a journal of 
philosophy in the twenty-first century would insist on.10  
                                                        
9 Hume even extends this principle to manners of perception: “Whatever is clearly conceiv’d may exist; 
and whatever is clearly conceiv’d, after any manner, may exist after the same manner. This is one 
principle, which has been already acknowledg’d” (T 1.4.5.5). 
10 Hume also sometimes uses terms that are synonymous with “clear” and “distinct,” but which aren’t 
always recognized as such. In this he’s following Locke. For instance, Locke uses words like “exact,” 
“precise,” or “determinate” to indicate that a perception is clear and distinct. In his Epistle to the Reader 
(added to the fourth edition of his Essay concerning Human Understanding), Locke’s explicit that his use 
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  There is clear evidence, then, that Hume recognizes 
and employs the concept of clear and distinct perception. 
But how central is the notion to his project? In order to 
guage its importance for Hume, the Introduction to the 
Treatise needs to be considered.  
Hume opens the Introduction by noting the “present 
imperfect condition of the sciences” (T Intro. 2). Indeed, 
even a casual observer “may judge from the noise and 
clamour, which they hear, that all goes not well within” 
(ibid.). Thus Hume claims that the present state of 
philosophy is in disarray. He offers a litany of charges 
against the status quo. 
 
Principles taken upon trust, consequences lamely 
deduc’d from them, want of coherence in the parts, and 
of evidence in the whole, these are every where to be 
met with in the systems of the most eminent 
philosophers, and seem to have drawn disgrace upon 
philosophy itself…. There is nothing which is not the 
subject of debate, and in which men of learning are 
not of contrary opinions. The most trivial question 
escapes not our controversy, and in the most momentous 
we are not able to give any certain decision. Disputes 
are multiply’d, as if every thing was uncertain; and 
these disputes are manag’d with the greatest warmth, 
as if every thing was certain. (T Intro. 1-2) 
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
of “determinate” is synonymous with “clear and distinct.” Hume, too, often uses terms like “exact,” 
“precise,” and “determinate.” It’s not clear whether he always uses these as synonyms of “clear and 
distinct,” but at times he seems to. 
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 Hume echoes this assessment in the first Enquiry. In 
its very first section, for instance, he contrasts an 
“abstruse” or speculative kind of philosophy with a more 
practical and down-to-earth kind of philosophy. His aim in 
the section is to discern whether it’s worth the time to 
pursue more speculative philosophy. He notes that many 
people decry the speculative philosophy because it’s 
“painful and fatiguing” (EHU 1.10); indeed, it’s painful 
and fatiguing because it’s immersed in obscurity. Hume 
explains that the “chief obstacle, therefore, to our 
improvement in the moral or metaphysical sciences is the 
obscurity of the ideas, and the ambiguity of the terms” 
(EHU 7.2). Elsewhere, Hume claims that “moral ideas are apt, 
without extreme care, to fall into obscurity and confusion” 
(EHU 7.2),11 and that “[f]ew men can think long without 
running into a confusion of ideas, and mistaking one for 
another” (EHU 9.5, fn. 20). His aim, therefore, is “to 
bring light from obscurity” (EHU 1.10).  
 Hume then opens the Enquiry by noting that the aim of 
his project is to bring clarity to our metaphysical 
discourse. In addition, for Hume, the most obscure and 
uncertain of concepts in metaphysics is our idea of 
causation. Thus, he writes:  
                                                        
11 By “moral ideas” Hume means ideas about moral beings, such as human beings. 
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There are no ideas, which occur in metaphysics, more 
obscure and uncertain, than those of power, force, 
energy, or necessary connection, of which it is every 
moment necessary for us to treat in all our 
disquisitions. We shall, therefore, endeavour, in this 
section, to fix, if possible, the precise meaning of 
these terms, and thereby remove some part of that 
obscurity, which is so much complained of in this 
species of philosophy. (EHU 7.3)12 
 
Since the idea of causal power is obscure, the meaning of 
the term must be more precisely determined. But the meaning 
of a word is supplied by its associated idea, and thus to 
render “causation” more precise is to more clearly perceive 
the associated idea. In addition, Hume suggests that 
there’s a division between two kinds of meaning: precise 
and imprecise meaning. As we shall see, Hume also calls 
this distinct or indistinct meaning, depending on the 
distinctness of the associated idea. 
 How, then, is this to be done? How are we to render 
our meaning more precise? Just as the new concepts and 
instruments of science employed by Newton enables advances 
in the realm of the natural world, the empirical realm, so 
new conceptual instruments and principles employed by Hume 
can be used with the aim of making advances in the newfound 
                                                        
12 This “species” of philosophy, of course, is the speculative philosophy mentioned at EHU 1. 
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science of human nature. What Hume calls his “microscope of 
the moral sciences” is simply his copy principle, and Hume 
claims that this principle can help render our ideas clear 
and distinct. 
 
[W]hen we have pushed up definitions to the most 
simple ideas, and find still some ambiguity and 
obscurity; what resource are we then possessed of? By 
what invention can we throw light upon these ideas, 
and render them altogether precise and determinate to 
our intellectual view? Produce the impressions or 
original sentiments, from which the ideas are copied. 
These impressions are all strong and sensible. They 
admit not of ambiguity. They are not only placed in a 
full light themselves, but may throw light on their 
correspondent ideas, which lie in obscurity. And by 
this means, we may, perhaps, attain a new microscope 
or species of optics, by which, in the moral sciences, 
the most minute, and most simple ideas may be so 
enlarged as to fall readily under our apprehension, 
and be equally known with the grossest and most 
sensible ideas, that can be the object of our enquiry. 
(EHU 7.4; cf. EHU 2.9 and EHU 8.25) 
 
By applying his “microscope” to obscure ideas, we can more 
clearly and distinctly discern their exact nature. In other 
words, progress can be made.  
 In the background here is Hume’s belief that 
impressions are all clear and distinct, whereas ideas are 
“naturally faint and obscure” (EHU 2.9). But, since ideas 
are copies of impressions, if we apply the microscope and 
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discern their origin in experience, we can render our ideas 
clear and distinct. 
Thus, “since all impressions are clear and precise, 
the ideas, which are copy’d from them, must be of the same 
nature, and can never but from our fault, contain any thing 
so dark and intricate” (T 1.3.1.7). Indeed, “[t]he 
examination of the impression bestows a like clearness on 
the idea; and the examination of the idea bestows a like 
clearness on all our reasoning” (T 1.3.2.4). This is the 
basis of Hume’s methodology in a nutshell. 
So not only does Hume have a role for the notion of 
clear and distinct perception in his thought, it’s central 
to his most pivotal empiricist principle: the copy 
principle. In the next section, I indicate how the role of 
clear and distinct perception helps us understand his test 
for meaning. 
 
Impression Hunts 
 In Chapter One it was noted that Hume’s meaning-
empiricism — the view that the meaning of a term is its 
associated idea, which is grounded in experience — led to 
Hume’s well-known test for meaning: 
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When we entertain, therefore, any suspicion that a 
philosophical term is employed without any meaning or 
idea (as is but too frequent), we need but enquire, 
from what impression is that supposed idea derived? 
(EHU 2.21) 
 
Hume claims here that the way to tell whether a word 
lacks an associated idea is to determine whether it has an 
associated impression. In other words, in order to know 
whether some term has an associated idea, we need to go on 
an impression hunt. 
 The notion of clear and distinct perception can help 
us grasp the nature of these impression hunts. Consider, 
for example, Hume’s impression hunt for our idea of 
necessary connection. In general, commentators have 
understood an impression hunt as an examination of the 
contexts in which the associated term’s employed. These 
contexts constitute “neighboring fields.” Thus Hume 
considers the causal maxim and causal inference, because, 
as far as “necessary connection” is concerned, they reside 
in neighboring fields. 
 This procedure is as fine as it goes, but Hume needn’t 
regard an impression hunt as restricted to contexts in 
which the word is used. Since Hume recognizes and employs a 
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clear and distinct/obscure and confused perception 
distinction, we can also understand impression hunts as 
informed with this distinction. In short, if for some word 
we have an obscure or confused idea of its meaning, our 
obscure or confused idea serves as our analysandum, and the 
impression hunt aims to reduce this obscurity and confusion. 
The impression hunts help to more clearly understand and 
demarcate the concept. 
 As an example, consider Hume’s discussion of substance. 
Locke, as we’ve seen, admitted a relative idea of substancet. 
But he also held that substancet was something “we know not 
what”13 and of which “we have no clear” or “distinct Idea.”14 
At most, we have only an “obscure and relative Idea of 
Substance in general.”15 Hume’s view is similar. He notes 
that philosophers who believe in the existence of substancet 
deny that it’s a color, or a sound, or a taste, and so on. 
But they must have some idea of what a substancet is. Hume’s 
point isn’t to deny an idea of substancet. His point is to 
claim that the only distinct idea of substance is an idea 
of substanceb.  
 Some commentators have suggested that Hume must have 
some “bare” idea of necessary connection, one that serves 
                                                        
13 An Essay concerning Human Understanding, II.xxiii.2. 
14 Ibid., II.xxiii.4. 
15 Ibid., II.xxiii.3. 
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as the object of his polemic. Janet Broughton (2007), for 
instance, claims that Hume admits a bare idea of necessary 
connection — which isn’t identical to the thin idea of 
necessary connection that he settles on — which is the aim 
of all of our studies. She cites this passage from Hume: 
 
We wou’d not willingly stop before we are acquainted 
with that energy in the cause, by which it operates on 
its effect; that tie, which connects them together; 
and that efficacious quality, on which the tie depends. 
This is our aim in all our studies and reflections… (T 
1.4.7.5) 
 
Based on such remarks, Broughton claims that Hume admits an 
idea of thick causation. It’s this idea that serves as his 
philosophical target. Likewise Peter Kail observes that 
“Hume’s negative arguments… actually imply a certain anemic 
grasp of causal powers” (2007: xxxiii). 
 The point to observe is that the clear and 
distinct/obscure and confused perception distinction can 
help us make sense of these claims. Hume wishes to render 
our obscure and confused ideas clear and distinct.  
 
Complicating the Picture 
 203 
 In the previous section, I argued that Hume puts clear 
and distinct perception to considerable use. Impressions — 
which are our sensations, passions, and emotions — are 
clear and distinct; and our ideas are rendered clear and 
distinct by discerning the impressions from which they’re 
copied. In this way, Hume reverses the rationalist project 
of Descartes, who held that the ideas of the intellect 
provide clear and distinct perceptions, whereas the senses 
provide obscure and confused perceptions. 
 However, this characterization is too simplistic.16 As 
it happens, Descartes has a place for clear and distinct 
sensations, and in this respect Hume isn’t as far removed 
from Descartes as one might think.  
 Marleen Rozemund (2006), for instance, contends that 
Descartes both broadens and narrows the conception of the 
mind prevalent in the Aristotelianism of his time. 
According to Rozemund, the scholastics believed that the 
intellect and the will alone belong to the soul or mind, 
and that the senses and the imagination inhere in the soul-
body composite (2006: 50). In support of this, consider 
this passage from Aquinas: 
 
                                                        
16 See Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (1992: 371) for a similar point. 
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Certain powers are related to the soul alone as their 
subject, such as the intellect and the will. And such 
powers necessarily remain in the soul when the body is 
destroyed. But other powers inhere in the composite as 
their subject, such as all the powers of the sensitive 
and nutritive parts.17 
 
 Thus, for Aquinas, only the intellect and the will 
properly belong to the soul alone, whereas the sensitive 
and the nutritive powers reside in the composite of body 
and soul. Aquinas, of course, is working with the 
Aristotelian conception of the soul as consisting of three 
“parts.” “The soul,” Rozemund explains, is the principle of 
life, and life is manifested in a range of activities: 
nutrition and growth in plants; in animals, also motion and 
sense perception; in humans, intellectual activity and will” 
(2006: 49). 
 There are times at which Descartes seems to embrace 
this conception. In Meditation II, the meditator emerges 
from doubt by identifying himself with his intellect, and 
explicitly omits nutrition, movement, the imagination, and 
sensation as features of the mental. For instance, the 
meditator writes: 
 
                                                        
17 Summa Theologicae, I.77.8. 
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Nutrition or movement? But I do not now have a body, 
these things are nothing but imaginings. Sensation? 
This also does not happen without a body, and I seem 
to sense many things in dreams that later I notice I 
did not really sense. Thinking? I have found it: it is 
thinking; this alone cannot be taken away from me. I 
am, I exist, that is certain. But for how long? For as 
long as I think, for certainly it could happen that if 
I cease to think, I thereby entirely cease to be. I 
now do not admit anything unless it is necessarily 
true; I am then strictly speaking only a thinking 
thing, that is, a mind, spirit, intellect or reason, 
words whose meaning was previously unknown to me. I am 
real thing, and really exist, but what of kind thing? 
I have said it, a thinking thing. (CSM II 18: AT VII 
27) 
 
While it’s tempting to interpret Descartes’s claim that 
he’s a thinking thing “in light of the broad list of mental 
states that includes sense perception and imagination,” in 
fact the meditator only identifies himself with “the 
intellectual aspect of the scholastic soul” (2006: 51). 
Accordingly, Descartes seems to concede the better part of 
the scholastic conception, claiming that he is only an 
intellect; sensation, imagination, nutrition, movement, 
etc., are all features of the body.  
 But matters become more complicated once we recognize 
Descartes’s broadening of the scholastic picture. For while 
sensations, imagination, movement, etc., aren’t mental for 
Descartes, he soon backpedals: 
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But I am also the same who imagines; for although 
perhaps, as I have supposed, no imagined things are at 
all real, the very power of imagination does, however, 
really exist and is part of my thinking. And again I 
am the same who senses, or who notices corporeal 
things as if through the senses; for instance, I see 
light, I hear noise, I feel heat. These things are 
false, for I am asleep. But certain I seem to see, 
hear, become warm. This cannot be false, and this 
properly what is called sensing in me, and this 
strictly speaking is nothing other than thinking. (CSM 
II 19: AT VII 29) 
 
It seems, then, that Descartes does include the senses and 
the imagination as features of the mind. Indeed, a mind for 
Descartes is a res cogitans, a thing that thinks. But 
elsewhere Descartes defines thought as “everything that is 
in us in such a way that we are immediately conscious of it. 
Thus all operations of the will, intellect, imagination, 
and the senses are thoughts” (CSM II 113: AT VII 160). In 
this passage, Descartes includes the senses and the 
imagination as features of mind, in addition to the will 
and the intellect. Properly speaking, then, sensation 
involves the ideas I have of seeming to see, or hear, or 
feel, etc. What I seem to see may be false — the object may 
not exist — for I may be dreaming, but I still sense. 
Moreover, Descartes claims that these ideas are clear and 
distinct. 
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 How can we make sense of this? On one hand, I’ve 
claimed that Descartes takes the senses to be confused, and 
indeed this is the standard interpretation of his view: 
Meditation I is intended to take us away from the senses. 
On the other hand, Descartes claims that, properly speaking, 
the senses are clear and distinct. The resolution requires 
that we recognize that Descartes introduces three “grades” 
of sensation.  
 
If we are to get a clear view of what sort of 
certainty attaches to the senses, we must distinguish 
three grades of sensory response. The first is limited 
to the immediate stimulation of the bodily organs by 
external objects; this can consist in nothing but the 
motion of particles of the organs, and any change of 
shape and position resulting from this motion. The 
second grade comprises all the immediate effects 
produced in the mind as a result of its being united 
with a bodily organ which is affected in this way. 
Such effects include the perceptions of pain, pleasure, 
thirst, hunger, colours, sounds, taste, smell, heat, 
cold and the like, which arise from the union and as 
it were the intermingling of mind and body… The third 
grade includes all the judgments about things outside 
us which we have been accustomed to make from our 
earliest years — judgments which are occasioned by the 
movements of these bodily organs. (CSM II 294-5: AT 
VII 437) 
 
The second grade concerns the union of soul and body. It 
therefore has a mental and a physical part. The mental 
counterpart of this union includes the seemings mentioned 
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above, and this is sensation properly speaking. It’s this 
grade of sensation that Descartes regards as clear and 
distinct.  
 Confusion only emerges in grade three. In short, it’s 
not the seemings that are confused, but rather the third 
grade that introduces the possibility of confusion. Sensory 
perceptions are confused because they’re being intermingled 
with body. Thus, for instance, Descartes writes that 
“sensations of hunger, thirst, pain and so on are nothing 
but confused modes of thinking which arise from the union 
and, as it were, intermingling of the mind with the body” 
(CSM II 56: AT VII 81:”).  
 Back to Hume: Hume doesn’t totally upend Descartes, 
but merely abstains from any discussion of the causes of 
our impressions. In essence, Hume begins with the mental 
aspect of Descartes’s second grade — the senses proper. But 
Descartes thinks these are clear and distinct no less than 
Hume, for confusion emerges only when we make a judgment. 
For Descartes, the confusion and error is first and 
foremost applicable to common empirical judgments, such as 
“that’s a cat.” For Hume, the confusion and error is first 
and foremost applicable to metaphysical judgments, or how 
they “infect” common empirical judgments. Thus, Descartes 
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would agree that what Hume characterizes as “impressions” 
are, in fact, clear and distinct. 
 
 Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I indicated that Hume takes 
impressions to be clear and distinct, and that ideas can be 
rendered clear and distinct by discerning the impressions 
from which they’re copied. Hume’s copy principle is the 
basis of the latter claim. And, in fact, the copy principle 
is Hume’s microscope; it’s the means by which we can make 
progress in the moral sciences and thus elucidate the 
nature of our knowledge about the world and ourselves. 
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Chapter Six 
The Real Hume 
 Introduction 
In Chapter One, we saw that Hume’s seemingly committed 
to a contradiction, that we both have and lack an idea of 
thick causation. In addition, New Humeans claim that Hume 
has room within his theory of ideas for an idea of thick 
causation, whereas Old Humeans contest this claim. In this 
chapter, I show how Hume isn’t committed to a contradiction, 
and why the skeptical realist interpretation is incorrect. 
To recap, thick causation involves a causal connection 
between cause and effect that has the AP property; that is, 
a property such that, one can infer the effect from the 
cause, a priori. Hume, as we’ve seen, denies that we have 
any impression-based source for this idea. In this chapter, 
I analyze Hume’s discussion of our causal talk, in order to 
discern what Hume takes us to be thinking about when we 
putatively speak about thick causation. This will help us 
solve the nasty problem and see whether the New Humean 
interpretation is viable. 
I shall argue that Hume provides — whether implicitly 
or explicitly — three accounts of the ideas we employ when 
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putatively speaking about thick causation. In the course of 
doing so, I indicate how the notion of clear and distinct 
perception factors into these three accounts. 
It may prove helpful, however, to give a broad outline 
of what these three accounts are. Hume’s first account of 
what we’re thinking about when we are putatively thinking 
about thick causation is an obscure perception of the words 
that factor into our causal talk.1 In contrast, his second 
and third accounts involve confused perceptions. In general, 
Hume claims that we mistakenly project our idea of the felt 
determination of the mind onto objects. In this case, when 
one speaks about a cause determining its effect, one 
misunderstands one’s meaning in saying so. Finally, Hume 
claims that we’re involved in confusion when we conceive of 
the relation of causation as a relation between ideas.  
 
 First Account: Words 
 Hume’s initial account hasn’t received much, if any, 
attention. It’s an extremely interesting account, and it 
can help us solve a number of interpretative problems.  
                                                        
1 I hope it goes without saying that my interest isn’t solely with causal speech. I’m using “causal talk” 
loosely, as Hume’s interest is in causal thought more generally.  
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When considering the nature of our causal talk, Hume 
writes: 
 
Thus upon the whole we may infer, that when we talk of 
any being, whether of a superior or inferior nature, 
as endow’d with a power or force, proportion’d to any 
effect; when we speak of a necessary connexion betwixt 
objects, and suppose, that this connexion depends upon 
an efficacy or energy, with which any of these objects 
are endow’d; in all these expressions, so apply’d, we 
have really no distinct meaning, and make use only of 
common words, without any clear and determinate ideas. 
(T 1.3.14.14) 
 
In this well-known passage, Hume claims that when we talk 
about an object as endowed with a power or force, we (i) 
“have really no distinct meaning,” (ii) “make use only of 
common words,” and (iii) do so without “any clear and 
determinate ideas” (ibid.). This, I hope, sounds familiar. 
 In the previous chapter it was noted that for 
Descartes, a perception is clear and distinct when it’s 
perceived by an attentive mind; and that an attentive mind 
is a mind that attends to its ideas rather than to the 
words it employs. Thus, in the Search for Truth, Eudoxus 
asks Polyander what he is, and Polyander answers that he’s 
a man. But Eudoxus responds that this is merely to “assent 
to words,” as it’s “very seldom that our concept of a thing 
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is so distinct that we can separate it totally from the 
concept of the words involved” (CSM I 221: AT VIIIA 38).  
Hume’s making a similar claim at T 1.3.14.14. He’s 
claiming that when people attribute some power to an object, 
they’re often merely making use of “common words,” words 
without any associated ideas. He mentions, for instance, a 
number of cases in which we think we have an idea 
associated with a word, but in fact are merely substituting 
a synonymous word: 
 
I begin with observing that the terms efficacy, agency, 
power, force, energy, necessity, connexion, and 
productive quality, are all nearly synonymous; and 
therefore ‘tis an absurdity to employ any of them in 
defining the rest. By this observation we reject at 
once all the vulgar definitions, which philosophers 
have given of power and efficacy; and instead of 
searching for an idea in these definitions, must look 
for it in impressions, from which it is originally 
deriv’d. (T 1.3.14.4)2 
 
In this passage, Hume clearly claims that many people 
— philosophers among them — don’t explain or clarify their 
terms, but merely redefine them by means of synonymous 
terms. It’s no use searching for the idea of necessary 
connection “in these definitions” (ibid.), for there’s no 
idea there to be had.  
                                                        
2 Hume charges Locke with making this mistake (T 1.3.14.5). 
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Consider, in light of this, Hume’s remarks: 
 
The “By Which” Passage (BWP) 
Thus, if a cause be defined, that which produces any 
thing; it is easy to observe, that producing is 
synonymous to causing. In like manner, if a cause be 
defined, that by which any thing exists; this is 
liable to the same objection. For what is meant by 
these words, by which? (EHU 8.25, fn. 19) 
 
and 
 
Shou’d any one… pretend to define a cause, by saying 
it is something productive of another, ‘tis evident he 
wou’d say nothing. For what does he mean by 
production? Can he give any definition of it, that 
will not be the same with that of causation? If he 
can; I desire it may be produc’d. If he cannot; he 
here runs in a circle, and gives a synonymous term 
instead of a definition. (T 1.3.2.10) 
 
 
 Thus Hume claims that, when people speak of a cause as 
endowed with a power, they’re saying something without any 
content — they repeat the words without knowing that they 
lack associated ideas. In Descartes’s terms, they do so 
inattentively. 
 This creates a problem for New Hume interpretations 
that depend upon relative ideas. Unless we can have some 
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impression-based idea of the relation, Hume would consider 
the idea to be inattentive and preoccupied with words. Thus 
when Strawson contends thick causal connections are “that 
in virtue of which reality is regular in the way that it 
is,” he must have impression-based source for the “in 
virtue of” relation, or else his words are meaningless. And 
it’s just such an impression-based source that his words 
seem to lack. 
 Accordingly, Hume’s initial account of causal talk 
seems to suggest that it is empty because merely circular 
verbiage. So as to illustrate Hume’s first account of 
causal talk, consider the following example: 
 
K: The moon has the power to move the tides. 
 
Suppose that someone defines the word “power,” in K, in the 
following manner: 
 
L: “Power” is that by which the movement of the tides 
is constantly conjoined with the location of the moon. 
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This provides a synonymous definition of the term “power,” 
as suggested by BWP. But does it give “power” a meaning? 
The answer is no. The first thing to note is that Hume 
frequently makes claims on the order of: “we have no idea 
of connexion or power at all,” and that “power” and “energy” 
are words “absolutely without any meaning” (EHU 7.26). The 
way to read Hume — at least at this stage of the argument — 
is to note that Hume admits that one can have an idea of K. 
K is a complex idea that contains one’s idea of the moon, 
one’s idea of the tides, and one’s idea of motion, etc., as 
component ideas.  
However, Hume also claims that a component idea that 
factors into K is the word “power,” and not an idea simply 
annexed to this word. Thus we can have an idea of K — an 
idea which contains what people take to be an idea of thick 
causation — but it’s an obscure idea, because it depends 
merely upon one’s idea of a word. This isn’t an idea of 
thick causation — one doesn’t, for instance, conceive the 
effect following a priori from the cause. It’s nothing more 
than an obscure idea of what one takes to be thick 
causation. Thus, when Hume claims that “we have no idea of 
power at all,” and that “these words are absolutely without 
any meaning” (EHU 7.26), he’s claiming that we have no 
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impression-based idea associated with the word “power,” not 
that we lack an idea of K. 
This discussion also helps us see why Hume considers 
the debate over liberty and necessity to be “merely verbal.” 
Hume’s point is that proponents of necessity and proponents 
of liberty have the very same ideas of both necessity and 
liberty, and thus they agree. In short, the only idea of 
necessity and liberty that both camps can clearly and 
distinctly conceive — and which both camps recognize in 
their “practice and reasoning” (EHU 8.21) — is one which 
resolves the dispute between those who affirm and those who 
deny freedom. Thus, they “dissent to [this] in words only, 
not in their real sentiment,” and consequently merely show 
“a reluctance to acknowledge it in words” (ibid.). 
Accordingly, as far as causation is concerned, Hume’s 
first account of what we take to be our idea of thick 
causation is an obscure perception of words rather than 
content. Once we apply Hume’s microscope of the moral 
sciences and attend to our ideas, we clearly and distinctly 
perceive that we have no idea of power. 
While Hume clearly believes that such obscurity 
sometimes affects our causal talk, he doesn’t believe that 
pointing out such obscurity solves all the problems. In 
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other words, he doesn’t believe that the word “power” is 
actually meaningless. This takes us to his second account 
of our causal talk. 
 
 Second Account: Projection 
Hume has thus far argued that people sometimes employ 
words without any meaning, and thus only obscurely take 
themselves to conceive of thick causation. Having noted as 
much, he moves on to what he thinks is a more common 
problem.  
 
But as ’tis more probable, that these expressions do 
here lose their true meaning by being wrong apply’d, 
than that they never have any meaning; ’twill be 
proper to bestow another consideration on this subject, 
to see if possibly we can discover the nature and 
origin of those ideas, we annex to them. (T 1.3.14.14) 
 
Here, Hume seems to admit that we do mean something by 
“power,” but he believes that this meaning is “wrongly 
applied,” basically, misunderstood. We think we mean one 
thing when we really mean another. In other words, Hume 
thinks that our idea is confused. 
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 Here again there’s a parallel with Descartes. Recall 
that Descartes, when providing an example of a clear but 
confused idea, notes that 
 
[W]hen someone feels an intense pain, the perception 
he has of it is indeed very clear, but is not always 
distinct. For people commonly confuse this perception 
with an obscure judgment they make concerning the 
nature of something which they think exists in the 
painful spot and which they suppose to resemble the 
sensation of pain; but in fact it is the sensation 
alone which they perceive clearly. Hence a perception 
can be clear without being distinct, but not distinct 
without being clear. (CSM I 208: AT VIIIA 22) 
 
Hume’s projective account of causation — in which we “gild 
and stain” natural objects with “the colours borrowed from 
internal sentiment” (EPM Appendix 1, 19)3 — is very similar 
to the kind of account that Descartes offers in this 
passage. 
Descartes claims that we clearly perceive the nature 
of pain, but that we perceive it in a confused way when we 
apply or attribute it to body. Similarly, Hume claims that 
we clearly perceive the nature of power — as the internal 
impression or determination of the mind — but that we 
perceive it in a confused way because we wrongly apply it 
to natural objects. This, says Hume, is a confused idea of 
                                                        
3 “EPM” refers to An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, and the number indicates the paragraph.  
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power. The extent of the error is brought out forcefully in 
the following passage:  
 
[T]he case is here much the same, as if a blind man 
shou’d pretend to find a great many absurdities in the 
supposition, that the colour of scarlet is not the 
same with the sound of a trumpet, nor light the same 
with solidity. If we have really no idea of power or 
efficacy in any object, or of any real connexions 
betwixt causes and effects, ‘twill be to little 
purpose to prove, that an efficacy is necessary in all 
operations. We do not understand our meaning in 
talking so, but ignorantly confound ideas, which are 
entirely distinct from each other… [W]hen, instead of 
meaning these unknown qualities, we make the terms 
power and efficacy signify something, of which we have 
a clear idea, and which is incompatible with those 
objects, to which we apply it, obscurity and error 
begin then to take place, and we are led astray by a 
false philosophy. This is the case, when we transfer 
the determination of the thought to external objects, 
and suppose a real intelligible connexion betwixt 
them; that being a quality, which can only belong to 
the mind that considers them. (T 1.3.14.27) 
 
 Thus, Hume claims that the idea that we associate with 
thick causation is a confused perception: it’s a clear idea 
of an internal impression that’s wrongly applied to natural 
objects. Hume applies his microscope to this confused idea 
— which enlarges the simple ideas — and discovers that our 
idea of necessity exists in the mind.  
Thus Hume claims that there are two kinds of necessity, 
and both exist in the understanding. He writes: 
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Thus as the necessity, which makes two times two equal 
to four, or three angles of a triangle to two right 
ones, lies only in the act of the understanding, by 
which we consider and compare these ideas; in like 
manner the necessity or power, which unites causes and 
effects, lies in the determination of the mind to pass 
from the one to the other. The efficacy or energy of 
causes is neither plac’d in the causes themselves, nor 
in the deity, nor in the concurrence of these two 
principles; but belongs entirely to the soul, which 
considers the union of two or more objects in all past 
instances. ‘Tis here that the real power of causes is 
plac’d, along with their connexions and necessity. (T 
1.3.14.23) 
 
 It’s here that the “real power of causes” is placed — 
not in “the causes themselves” or “in the deity” — contrary 
to what New Humeans wish to claim.  
Nonetheless, there’s an additional account of our idea 
of thick causation that hasn’t been adequately addressed. I 
turn to this account in the next section. 
 
Third Account: Necessitation 
It may be that when we engage in causal talk and take 
ourselves to be speaking of thick causal power, we aren’t 
attending solely to the words or projecting the internal 
impression of the mind.  
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The third account of necessitation is as follows. 
First, the mind has an idea of the cause and an idea of the 
effect. These ideas, of course, originate in experience and 
thus have impression-based sources. Second, the mind has an 
idea of relations between ideas. This idea, too, has an 
impression-based source, since our ideas of various 
relations of ideas — the Pythagorean Theorem, that the 
Winklevoss’s resemble one another, and so on — consist of 
ideas that originate in experience.  
Accordingly, the idea that we take to be an idea of 
thick causation emerges when the mind asserts or judges 
that the cause and the effect are relations between ideas. 
This, of course, is a confused perception, because as Hume 
repeatedly emphasizes, causes and effects aren’t relations 
between ideas.  
Hume doesn’t provide this as his explicit account of 
our idea of thick causation, but it’s clearly implicit in a 
number of his remarks. Consider, for instance, his comments 
at T 1.3.14.13, in which he first expounds and then 
responds to the following conception of a cause: 
 
[W]e must be able to place this power in some 
particular being, and conceive that being as endow’d 
with a real force and energy, by which such a 
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particular effect necessarily results from its 
operation. We must distinctly and particularly 
conceive the connexions betwixt the cause and effect, 
and be able to pronounce, from a simple view of the 
one, that it must be follow’d or preceded by the other. 
This is the true manner of conceiving a particular 
power in a particular body… Now nothing is more 
evident, than that the human mind cannot form such an 
idea of two objects, as to conceive any connexion 
betwixt them, or comprehend distinctly that power of 
efficacy, by which they are united. Such a connexion 
wou’d amount to a demonstration, and wou’d imply the 
absolute impossibility for the one object not to 
follow, or to be conceiv’d not to follow upon the 
other: Which kind of connexion we have rejected in all 
cases. (T 1.3.14.13) 
 
 In this passage, Hume claims that such a connection 
“wou’d amount to a demonstration” (ibid.) — that is, this 
conception of causation considers it in terms of a relation 
between ideas. Thus one of the ideas that we have when we 
take ourselves to be thinking about thick causation is when 
we conceive causation as a relation between ideas; but Hume 
of course claims that we can never “distinctly comprehend 
that power or efficacy” (ibid., emphasis mine). Nonetheless, 
we can have a confused or indistinct idea of it, and the 
component ideas in this confused perception all have their 
origin in an impression-based source. 
 There’s a corollary to this necessitation conception 
of our causal talk, one discussed by Kail and that’s 
suggested by his RFP. The RFP is: 
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 Reference-Fixer for “Power” (RFP) 
That which, were we to grasp it, would furnish the 
capacity to (a) “read off” what effect some object 
must have and (b) find it impossible to conceive of 
the cause without its effect. 
 
 This is distinct from the necessitation conception 
that I considered immediately above, in that Kail’s RFP 
concerns only “that which” — that is, some unknown feature 
in the cause — necessitates the effect. In Chapter Four, I 
took issue with Kail’s taking the RFP to concern the felt 
determination of the mind. But perhaps that’s because the 
RFP expresses a thick idea of necessary connection, an idea 
that Hume admits.  
 The truth is, Hume considers the RFP to express an 
incoherent notion, and thus a confused one. To see why, 
consider the following passage in the Dialogues Concerning 
Natural Religion. The passage concerns God’s essence and 
his purported necessary existence. Cleanthes says:  
 
It is pretended, that the deity is a necessarily 
existent being, and this necessity of his existence is 
attempted to be explained by asserting, that, if we 
knew his whole essence or nature, we should perceive 
it to be as impossible for him not to exist, as for 
twice two not to be four. But it is evident, that this 
can never happen, while our faculties remain the same 
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as at present. It will still be possible for us, at 
any time, to conceive the non-existence of what we 
formerly conceived to exist; nor can the mind ever lie 
under a necessity of supposing any object to remain 
always in being; in the same manner as we lie under a 
necessity of always conceiving twice two to be four. 
The words, therefore, necessary existence, have no 
meaning; or, which is the same thing, none that is 
consistent. (DNR 9.6) 
 
 This passage centers around an unknown feature of 
God’s nature which, if known, would render his nonexistence 
inconceivable. But Hume seems to claim here that the very 
notion of such a feature is incoherent, and thus such talk 
has no meaning.  
Kail responds to this, however, and claims that this 
notion can’t be incoherent for Hume. He provides two 
reasons for this claim. First, if correct, then the 
argument turns out “a little short, given what else happens 
in the text” (2007a: 100). Indeed, if Hume does in fact 
regard the notion of necessary existence to be incoherent, 
then “Hume lets a stone-dead horse suffer a few pages of 
unnecessary flogging” (ibid.). 
These unclear remarks become clearer if we consider 
what follows next in Hume’s text, for the discussion soon 
turns to whether matter could be a necessarily existent 
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entity (as opposed to God’s being such). Thus, in response 
to Cleanthes, Philo says: 
 
To a superficial observer, so wonderful a regularity 
[in algebra] may be admired as the effect either of 
chance or design; but a skillful algebraist 
immediately concludes it to be the work of necessity, 
and demonstrates, that it must for ever result from 
the nature of these numbers. Is it not probable, I ask, 
that the whole economy of the universe is conducted by 
a like necessity, though no human algebra can furnish 
a key, which solves the difficulty? And instead of 
admiring the order of natural bodies, may it not 
happen, that, could we but penetrate into the intimate 
nature of bodies, we should clearly see why it was 
absolutely impossible, they could ever admit of any 
other disposition. (DNR 9.10) 
 
But, argues Kail, Philo’s entire response is pointless if 
the notion of necessary existence is incoherent. Thus Hume 
must not regard the notion as incoherent. 
There are two things that can be said in response. 
First, if Kail is correct, then Hume’s discussion turns out, 
at worst, to be a little too long. Sometimes arguments 
don’t convince,4 and thus one must resort to further 
arguments. 
Kail’s second reason for thinking that Hume doesn’t 
endorse the incoherence of the RFP, is that when Cleanthes 
                                                        
4 I’m reminded of Robert Nozick: “Perhaps philosophers need arguments so powerful they set up 
reverberations in the brain: if the person refuses to accept the conclusion, he dies. How’s that for a 
powerful argument?” (1983: 4). 
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first suggests the incoherence of necessary existence, he 
qualifies it with “while our faculties remain the same as 
at present” (DNR 9.6). Thus, “it is not that necessity so 
characterized is incoherent, but rather as we presently are 
we cannot grasp any such feature” (2007a: 100). 
But Kail fails to note that our faculties at present 
demarcate what can be coherently thought and said. In 
addition, as I’ve argued, that alone is a sufficient 
rebuttal to his response, Hume distinguishes clear and 
distinct perceptions from obscure and confused ones. The 
meaning of our pronouncements is either distinct or 
confused (cf. T 1.3.14.13) depending upon whether the ideas 
associated with our terms are distinct or confused. Thus, 
just as the idea that results from our projecting an 
internal impression on to objects is confused (and 
incoherent), so too the idea of necessary existence is 
confused (and incoherent). To say that the determination of 
the mind exists in the objects, or that the existence of 
some object is necessary, is of a par with “honesty weighs 
ten pounds” or that “persons are prime numbers.” Such 
remarks are incoherent. 
Accordingly, Hume denies that we have an idea of thick 
causation, conceived as a connection that possesses the AP 
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property. Indeed, Hume would claim that when I utter or 
write these words, I don’t have any idea distinct from the 
words employed, or distinct from the idea that results from 
my projecting the internal impression of the mind, and so 
on.  
This is important. In the next section, I indicate how 
this helps solve the nasty problem. 
 
Sticking with Hume through Thick and Thin 
 The nasty problem is that for some term “T,” say 
“substancet” or “thick causation,” Hume claims that:  
 
1. “T”’s a meaningless expression. 
 
In addition, 
 
2. There’s an explanation as to why we believe in the 
existence of entities denoted by “T”. 
 
and 
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3. Explanations as to why we believe in the existence of 
entities denoted by “T” presuppose that “T”’s 
meaningful. 
 
However, on Hume’s meaning-empiricism: 
 
4. “T”’s meaningful º “T” has an associated idea. 
 
But (1)-(3) entail: 
 
5. “T” has and doesn’t have an associated idea. 
 
The solution to the nasty problem is to recognize that 
Hume distinguishes between two kinds of ideas: ideas that 
are obscure and confused, and ideas that are clear and 
distinct. Thus Hume would reframe (5) as: 
 
6.  “T” has an associated idea that’s obscure, and 
doesn’t have an associated idea that’s clear. 
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In other words, in asserting (1), Hume intends to assert 
that “T” doesn’t have a distinct meaning, that is, an 
associated idea which is a distinct idea. Instead, an 
expression like “thick causation” has an obscure or 
confused meaning, and it’s this obscure or confused meaning 
that Hume seeks to explain. In the case of causation, our 
obscure meaning is supplied by our attending to our words, 
and our confused meaning is supplied either by our 
projecting our idea of the determination of the mind onto 
objects, or our applying our idea of a relation between 
ideas to objects.  
Thus, Hume has an answer to the nasty problem. When one 
uses the word “power,” the only clear and distinct idea — 
and thus meaning — that one can have is an idea of the felt 
determination of the mind. In short, the only idea of power 
that we have is thin. 
 
 Fruit of the Hume 
Thus far, we’ve seen that Hume denies that we have any 
clear and distinct idea of thick causation. Our causal talk 
is either (i) obscure, because we attend to words that lack 
associated ideas, (ii) confused, because we project an idea 
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of reflection onto objects, (iii) confused, because we take 
causes and effects to be conceptually linked, or (iv) clear 
and distinct, because we conceive of causation as thin.  
The nasty problem doesn’t arise, because, when we talk 
about causation in a manner other than (iv), the idea that 
we’re employing is either (i)-(iii). Thus, our causal talk 
is either clear and distinct, or obscure and confused. 
When we fully appreciate this, we can clearly see how 
later positivists drew inspiration from Hume. Consider, for 
instance, Antony Flew’s famous gardener example: 
 
Once upon a time two explorers came upon a clearing in 
a jungle. In the clearing were growing many flowers 
and many weeds. One explorer says, ‘Some gardener must 
tend this plot.’ The other disagrees, ‘There is no 
gardener.’ So they pitch their tents and set a watch. 
No gardener is ever seen. ‘But perhaps he is an 
invisible gardener.’ So they set up a barbed-wire 
fence. They electrify it. They patrol with bloodhounds. 
(For they remember how H. G. Wells’s The Invisible Man 
could be both smelt and touched though he could not be 
seen.) But no shrieks ever suggest that some intruder 
has received a shock. No movements of the wire ever 
betray an invisible climber. The bloodhounds never 
give cry. Yet still the Believer is not convinced. 
‘But there is a gardener, invisible, intangible, 
insensible to electric shocks, a gardener who comes 
secretly to look after the garden which he loves.’ At 
last the Sceptic despairs, ‘But what remains of your 
original assertion? Just how does what you call an 
invisible, intangible, eternally elusive gardener 
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differ from an imaginary gardener or even from no 
gardener at all? (1955: 96)5 
 
Thus, when the believer states “[T]here is a gardener, 
invisible, intangible, insensible, etc.,” he or she isn’t 
actually asserting anything at all. Flew doesn’t deny that 
this sentence is linguistically meaningful. His point is 
that it’s not cognitively meaningful: it doesn’t make an 
assertion that’s either true or false. The assertion has no 
content. 
It’s difficult to definitively see whether Hume’s a 
positivist in the sense that Flew, for example, is. There’s 
some indication that he may be. Consider, for instance, 
Hume’s discussion of the concept of God. Demea contends: 
 
The question is not concerning the BEING but the NATURE 
of GOD. This I affirm, from the infirmities of human 
understanding, to be altogether incomprehensible and 
unknown to us. The essence of that supreme mind, his 
attributes, the manner of his existence, the very 
nature of his duration; these and every particular, 
which regards so divine a being, are mysterious to 
men… They are covered in a deep cloud from human 
curiosity: It is profaneness to attempt penetrating 
through these sacred obscurities. (DNR 2.1) 
 
                                                        
5 The example originally comes from John Wisdom. 
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The nature of God is immersed in obscurity, Demea claims, 
and that is precisely as it should be. But — and this is 
the relevant point — Cleanthes retorts as follows: 
 
It seems strange to me, said Cleanthes, that you, 
Demea, who are so sincere in the cause of religion, 
should still maintain the mysterious, incomprehensible 
nature of the deity, and should insist so strenuously, 
that he has no manner of likeness or resemblance to 
human creatures. The deity, I can readily allow, 
possesses many powers and attributes, of which we can 
have no comprehension: But if our ideas, so far as 
they go, be not just, and adequate, and correspondent 
to his real nature, I know not what there is in this 
subject worth insisting on. Is the name, without any 
meaning, of such mighty importance? Or how do you 
mystics, who maintain the absolute incomprehensibility 
of the deity, differ from sceptics or atheists, who 
assert, that the first cause of all is unknown and 
unintelligible? (DNR 4.1) 
 
Thus, Cleanthes concludes that since Demea has removed 
experience-based content from his idea of God, he’s an 
atheist “without knowing it” (DNR 4.3). But if Demea isn’t 
asserting anything different from atheism, then Demea isn’t 
asserting anything at all. This supports the view that 
Hume’s a positivist of the sort Flew is. 
 But even if this interpretation of Hume isn’t 
ultimately sustainable, it’s clear that something weaker 
but still very important can be attributed to Hume. His 
statements about the science of human nature make it clear 
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that: only statements informed by clear and distinct ideas 
are worth asserting or believing. We can put the point as 
follows: a proposition p has distinct content (or meaning) 
only if p is traceable to an impression (or experience), 
and a proposition p is worth asserting (or believing) only 
if p has distinct meaning. Thus if causal talk is obscure 
or confused, that’s a good reason to refrain from indulging 
in it. Indeed, as has been noted, the principal objection 
of Hume’s science of human nature is to remove obscurities 
and confusions.  
 
 Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I have argued that Hume explains our 
causal talk by appealing to four possible kinds of ideas: 
(i) an obscure idea of words that lack associated ideas, 
(ii) a confused idea based on the mind’s projecting an idea 
of reflection onto natural objects, (iii) a confused idea 
of the cause and effect that takes the two to be 
conceptually linked, and (iv) a clear and distinct idea of 
causes and effects understood in terms of Hume’s two 
definitions. 
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 I argued that Hume’s distinction between distinct and 
indistinct meaning — which hinges on whether the associated 
ideas are clear and distinct, or obscure and confused — 
certainly leans in a positivist direction. It’s unclear 
whether Hume is a positivist in the full-blooded, 
twentieth-century sense of the term, but it’s clear that 
Hume recommends that we pursue only what can be clearly and 
distinctly understood, and that in the case of causation 
the only thing that can be clearly and distinctly 
understood is an idea of thin causation. 
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Conclusion 
 
In the preceding chapters, I argued that clear and 
distinct perception has an essential role in Hume’s 
philosophy, indeed that failing to appreciate its 
importance leads to misunderstanding key components of his 
philosophy. Hume considers the moral sciences be immersed 
in obscurity and confusion, and his self-proclaimed 
“microscope of the moral sciences” is intended to expose 
and ultimately remove this obscurity and confusion. 
Hume aims to do this because he believes that a 
correct science of human nature is a prerequisite for 
progress in the other sciences. According to Hume, then, 
our impressions are naturally clear and distinct, whereas 
our ideas are naturally faint and obscure. Since ideas are 
ultimately traceable to impressions, Hume’s microscope 
involves our discerning the origin of our ideas, thereby 
rendering them clear and distinct.  
In the case of causation, Hume claims that the only 
clear and distinct idea of causation that we have is an 
idea of thin causation, that is, a felt determination of 
the mind to infer like effects from like causes. However, 
when characterized solely in terms of the objects, Hume 
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claims that causation is nothing more than regular 
succession. Nonetheless, some have advocated for — and 
Hume’s own project seems to demand — an idea of thick 
causation. This, as we’ve seen, is the foundation of the 
New Hume interpretation. 
I’ve argued that Hume denies that we have an idea of 
thick causation, for we can’t clearly and distinctly 
conceive of the relationship between causes and effects as 
conceptually necessary. At most, the ideas that we have 
when take ourselves to be contemplating thick causal 
connections are obscure and confused. Hume believes that we 
should stop theorizing about such connections, thereby 
permitting progress in the other sciences. Despite the 
exciting nature of the New Hume, it turns out that it’s not 
the real Hume. If I were playful, I would say that despite 
the current boom in the New Hume, the proper attitude is 
gloom, for textual evidence indicates that the figure is a 
cartoon for which there’s no room, and thus I advocate his 
doom. It’s a good thing I’m a serious philosopher and thus 
would never say such a thing. 
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